


THE MARINE

CORPS



F.B.
92

FLEET
MARINE
FORCE
NUMBER



MARCH
1938

WHERE THE
WORK IS **TOUGH...**
THEY CHOOSE "CATERPILLAR" DIESELS



WHERE tough jobs must be completed on time — where delays cost money and disrupt plans — they choose tough, dependable "Caterpillar" Diesel Tractors. Heavy-duty construction enables these rugged machines to take the beating that only a rock job can give — and come through with flying colors. They easily win out over mud and dust and snow, hauling their big pay-loads every trip — keeping at it day after day, week after week.

A fleet of 11 "Caterpillar" Diesel Tractors is at work on this Mohawk Dam project near Coshocton, Ohio — a project supervised by U. S. Army Engineers. Operating conditions are severe — the tractors haul big wagon loads of dirt and rock, up grades, over rock and through mud, on a contract that must be finished on time — but "Caterpillar" Diesels won't let this contractor down . . . they are built for just such jobs.

CATERPILLAR REG. U.S. PAT. OFF. **TRACTOR CO.**
PEORIA, ILL.



**WORLD'S LARGEST MANUFACTURER OF DIESEL ENGINES,
TRACK-TYPE TRACTORS AND ROAD MACHINERY**

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Vol. 22

MARCH, 1938

No. 1

CONTENTS

Landing Exercise Number Four.....	2
What Would Japanese Victory in China Mean to America?.....	4
Can the Attack From the Air Be Stopped?.....	7
"The Reserves Carry On"	11
Landing Studies	14
The Struggle for Power in the Mediterranean.....	17
Tripolitan Background of the War of 1801-1805.....	23
Book Reviews	25
Procurement Program for Second Lieutenants.....	26
Status of Various Grades in Marine Corps.....	28
A War of Movement—Some Factors for Consideration.....	30
Colonel Upshur Comments Upon Lt. Col. Krulewitch's Article.....	32
Vinson Bill	34
Further Observations on the Reserve.....	37
Selection Results	38

COVER

Fleet Marine Force Activities

Opinions or assertions in the articles are the private ones of the writers, and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the naval service at large.

Entered as second-class matter, March 27, 1929, at the Post Office, Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized November 23, 1918.

PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

Vol. 22

MARCH, 1938

No.

LANDING EXERCISE NUMBER FOUR

■ Last year it was Santa Clemente and this year it was Culebra that served as a drill area to carry out our annual joint maneuvers. Fleet Landing Exercise Number Four, having just been completed, left us with new and valuable professional lessons.

Outside of the several flu cases which cropped up during the trip south, the entire brigade enjoyed excellent health. Certainly the swimming and drill exercises experienced during the maneuver period gave the command a much improved physical condition.

Culebra is a splendid place to conduct Landing Exercises; due to the fine weather conditions. Different phases of the Landing Exercise developed a certainty of fact that one of the greatest needs of the Force is an increase in the enlisted strength. This shortcoming was a constant annoyance to the staff function. Working with the Army was an added benefit.

The Fleet Marine Force left Quantico for Norfolk on January 14, the First Tank Company via the USS *Antares*, and the remainder by train. At daybreak, January 15, the Exercise began as the USS *New York*, followed by the USS *Wyoming*, USS *Antares* and the destroyers got under way for Culebra. The USS *Arkansas* joined en route with the Army troops from Fort Hamilton, New York. The trip north and south was a most pleasant one. Those of us who used to make the same trip in the old *Dixie*, *Prairie* and *Buffalo* are the ones who can appreciate the fine accommodations.

When two hours out of Culebra two hundred men were transferred aboard destroyers which speeded ahead and landed the two companies before dawn, January 20. There was no sea and conditions were ideal; troops were landed in two waves and were all ashore in less than an hour. The troops which were landed formed a Beach Head and sent out reconnaissance patrols to ascertain whether or not a safe landing could be made by larger and following forces.

With the arrival of the other vessels, debarkation was effected without injury to personnel or loss of supplies; the establishment of camps began. Brigade Headquarters, the First Tank Company, the First Engineer Company, and the First Battalion, Tenth Marines, were stationed at Camp A. W. Johnson. This camp site had been used before and has two permanent buildings; one was used by Brigadier General Richard P. Williams, Commanding the Marine Forces ashore, and the other was used as the camp post exchange.

Near the head of Great Harbor, Camp L. M. Little was located. Camp R. E. Rowell was placed near Camp Little and the barrio of Dewey. The Fifth Marines and the Second Provisional Brigade, U. S. Army, were located at Camp Little, while Aircraft One was at Camp Rowell, where a landing field had been laid out.

During the absence of the *Antares*, while unloading aviation ma-

teriel at San Juan, the fresh water situation became acute. Hauling water by trailer over the rocky terrain of Culebra, the Marmon-Herrington tractors proved their worth.

The different phases of the Landing Exercise were worked out in progression by each participating unit. The Infantry and the Marines united in the attack phase and later in the defense phase. In each case the initial movement began afloat. The destroyers based at Culebra. The air force based at St. Thomas and Puerto Rico. The coordination was splendid. The choice of landings offered by Culebra and near-by Islands gave ample variety for conducting the desired type of exercises. The submarines participating accentuated the necessity for a close air spot during the early stages of the problem.

Captain W. L. Mann (M. C.), U. S. N., representing the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, reported, "For once definite, specific plans were projected for official investigation of means, methods and measures of Evaluation of personnel casualties from shore to ship." A medical evacuation of personnel casualties from miscellaneous causes, numbering about 16 per cent of the strength of the combat organizations participating, constituted the medical problem. The various categories of medical attention were realized and valuable lessons were carried away as a result of this Exercise. The fact that the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and Aviation all participated in the Exercise from 3 BBs, 1XAP, 6 DDs, 4SSs, 1XYZ, plus Aircraft One with certain Navy aircraft attached, made the medical problem of evacuation one of real size and variety.

Night movements came into their own during the subsidiary operations, and particularly so in conjunction with the aviation feature of them. The value of aerial photographs and the speed with which photographs can be converted into military intelligence was an outstanding development and furnished much thought for the future. Intermediate landings upon Islands such as Vieques contiguous to the main effort showed the importance of paralleled and stepped action.

The two liberty trips which permitted the command to see the capitals of Martinique, San Domingo, Haiti, and Puerto Rico proved to be the best recreational features of the Exercise, and incidentally contributed very favorably to the present Good-Neighbor Policy.

Lieutenant Colonel James Roosevelt of our Reserves participated in the last two weeks of the Exercise as his annual training period. He and Colonel J. C. Fegan flew the round trip from Washington in a Sikorsky transport plane.

Two regiments of the Puerto Rican National Guard, augmented by the 65th Infantry now stationed on that island and special troops, composed the *White Army* which formed the defense force for the attack Exercise against Puerto Rico. The defense troops were commanded by Brigadier General Walter C. Short, U. S. A.; while the attacking force was commanded by Rear Admiral A. W. Johnson, U. S. N., commander of the training squadron and the S. O. P.

Colonel L. A. Clapp was chief umpire for the Marine Corps. Major General F. B. McCoy, U. S. A., Commanding General, Second Corps Area, was an observer.

The critique held on board Admiral Johnson's flag ship heard a general discussion of the Exercises; during which the senior commanders voiced their opinions pro and con upon the merits and demerits of the general performance of various participating units. The Navy lessons and cogent points cleared up more than justified the time consumed, and the money spent on the Landing Exercise.—EDITOR.

WHAT WOULD JAPANESE VICTORY IN CHINA MEAN TO AMERICA?

(Courtesy America's Town Meeting of the Air)

■ Only last week, the President of the United States was quoted as having said in reference to our Far Eastern policy that "blind isolation could not assure security." One headline in the New York press read "Roosevelt Bars Peace At Any Price." The result of the present events in China cannot fail to affect the United States. Will Japanese domination of China mean the extension of fascism in view of Japanese ties with Germany and Italy? Will Japanese defeat mean the spread of communism in China? And so the events in the Far East must be followed by every American interested in the future of this country.

Mr. Upton Close, author of many books on Far Eastern questions, while a resident in China represented the Department of State, and the League of Nations. Mr. Charles C. Batchelder, formerly Chief of the Far Eastern Division in the Department of Commerce and American Trade Commissioner in many European and Far Eastern countries, holds some very definite views on what should be America's policy in the present Far Eastern crisis—rather opposite from those of Mr. Close. We shall hear first from Mr. Batchelder.

Mr. Batchelder:

"Speak softly and carry a big stick," was the motto of President Theodore Roosevelt. His general foreign policy was a brilliant success and his influence contributed materially toward establishing peace between Russia and Japan after the war of 1904.

Ineffective protests and the writing of exasperating notes have often characterized the policies of the United States since then. When incidents like those in China have happened, our motto has been "Roar like a lion and wave an umbrella." Now in a world in which most of the nations are armed to the teeth, because the real economic issues which cause wars have been evaded, with no attempt at settlement, this plan is worse than foolish. It even encourages aggression. Unsatisfied nations know that the United States will not go to war unless it is actually invaded. While appeals to ethical ideals may influence the public of the United States and of England, nothing counts in the international world today except the ability to apply force if necessary. "Self preservation is the first law of nations." The United States has lost its international influence because of its attempts to preach at other countries. What the other countries think is, "Put up, or shut up."

All other governments know, even if the American public does not, that the United States is not prepared to wage a successful war in Japanese waters any more than Japan is able to attack the west coast of the United States. This situation was deliberately planned and agreed upon during the Conference of Limitation of Armaments of

1922, at which I was one of the consulting experts.

The United States definitely agreed not to develop naval bases in our outlying possessions; and without great plants for refuelling, refitting, and repairing, our present navy is not equipped to fight in the vicinity of Japan and to return to the United States without the use of shore facilities. It would take at least two years and probably more for us to build up such refitting harbors in suitable places west of Hawaii. Only in alliance with several European great powers could we hope for success against Japan, and the public opinion of the United States is overwhelmingly against any such alliance.

I do not think that the United States should go to war against Japan to stop its expansion. The reactions to the sinking of the United States warship *Panay* proved that. American mothers are not willing to send their sons to die in the Far East in order to take from the Japanese the territory which they have conquered from China. Our financial and economic interests are relatively too small to warrant that. We are planning to withdraw from the Philippines partly in order to avoid being entangled in the affairs of Asia.

The United States cannot possibly stop the expansion of Japan unless it is clear that we are prepared to go to war if necessary. Perhaps not even in that case. No amount of diplomatic pressure will be of any use, unless it is backed by military preparedness. The ineffectiveness of economic sanctions has been shown beyond a possibility of doubt by the failure of the action of the League of Nations in the Ethiopian affair. The situation in Europe is so tense that the United States cannot count on the assistance of European armies and navies in the Far East.

The Japanese are driven to expansion by irresistible forces. Since they have inadequate quantities of coal, iron, and other raw materials, and sixty countries have imposed special restrictions against imports of Japanese goods, the leaders of Japan are convinced that they must control not only the sources of their supplies, but also their markets, as Holland does Java. England, France, Russia, the United States, Holland, Belgium, and Portugal control most of the undeveloped territories, and only China is left for Japan.

The Japanese are intensely brave and patriotic. They feel that they are battling for their national existence. Their leaders are prepared to risk a national disaster rather than to yield even to superior armaments. It is absolutely necessary to be familiar with the glorious past of Japan in order to understand its present policies.

Are we then to sit idly by, relieving our feelings by speeches and writing notes of protest, and let the Japanese overrun all China? Will it not be dangerous to allow the Japanese Empire to grow too much in size and power? Shall we not have to fight with it eventually for the control of eastern Asia and the Pacific Ocean?

What are other alternatives besides going to war with

CARDED

Japan to stop its expansion? Some of them may settle the situation. We might cooperate with the Japanese. The sympathies of the American public are so generally in favor of the Chinese, who are bravely defending their country against foreign invaders, that we are apt to overlook our real American interests, which are commercial, not political, as we do not desire to acquire more territory in Asia.

It is surprising to reflect that our trade with Japan is about two and a half times as valuable as that with China. Japan buys of us large amounts of raw cotton and other products which we are anxious to sell. If American women stop buying stockings made of Japanese silk, it will eventually throw our Southern cotton growers out of employment and they will have to be supported by funds raised by additional taxation. Our financial investments in China are relatively small, probably not over \$300,000,000 at the most. Few Americans are in business in China, though there have been at times about eight thousand engaged in religious and charitable activities.

What would Japanese victory in China mean to America? Our commerce would increase enormously with those portions of China which might be brought under Japanese rule, similar to that in Formosa, Korea, and parts of Manchuria. Especially in the north, the Japanese would bring law, order, and the efficient development of agriculture, mining, and manufacturing. A large share of the factories in China, especially in Shanghai, were until recently owned and operated by Japanese who often bought the mills when Chinese had failed to make a success of them. Few Chinese have either the capital or the organizing experience necessary for the operation of large plants. The Japanese would raise the standards of living and the demand for American and other foreign and Japanese goods.

Japanese financial, economic, and administrative resources will not be sufficient to develop a country almost as large as the continental United States and of which many provinces have been reduced to chaos by the recent fighting and destruction of property. American business interests would profit by cooperation with the Japanese in the development of China with American capital and management. Some concerns have already made satisfactory arrangements.

"There was a young lady of Niger, who smilingly rode on a tiger; they returned from the ride, with the lady inside, and the smile on the face of the tiger." This jingle may suggest the final solution of the Chinese problem. The Chinese say, "He who rides on a tiger does not dare to dismount." Less amusingly, we say, "He bit off more than he can chew."

The Chinese have been ruled by foreigners much of the time since 976 A.D., owing to their civil wars and their inability to unite, even against a foreign enemy. But they have always absorbed their conquerors. Where are today the Mongols of Kublai Khan and the Manchus? The Japanese will be absorbed in the same way in time.

Further, there are strong disruptive forces in Japan which may make it difficult for the Japanese to govern and exploit China for a long time and may even stop their expansion.

Japan is like a modern steel skyscraper built on founda-

tions of shifting sands. It has built up a modern industrial organization on a feudal agricultural and manufacturing system.

It is estimated that 8 per cent of the Japanese landowners own half of the cultivated land and that 5,500,000 farm households are living hardly above a subsistence level, heavily in debt and sometimes two years behind with their rent and taxes. Riots against the collection of rents and taxes have taken place. Some organizations of farmers demand the confiscation of farm lands, to be divided among the cultivators, and the abolition of the capitalistic system.

The heavy expenses of the present war with China and for past preparations for it will strain the resources of Japan to the limit. Most of the capital not absolutely needed to carry on business has already been absorbed by government loans, for few credits can be secured abroad. The taxation required to pay the interest on the national debt will probably exceed 40 per cent of the total national income, which is far beyond the safe limit. This will increase very largely the cost of all Japanese goods sold abroad and will make it most difficult for Japan to pay for its imports. If Japanese goods cannot be sold in other countries, owing to inability to meet competition, unemployment on a large scale will result. This will increase the existing dissatisfaction with the capitalistic system.

The very low prices at which Japanese goods have been sold abroad have been due to the exploitation of Japanese labor, which has been paid very low wages, though it is relatively efficient. The rise in wages has not kept pace with the increased cost of living.

The hard-pressed farmers and workers resent bitterly the light taxation of the commercial and wealthy classes, especially of those who have inherited large incomes or who have been enriched by the profits of the Great War. Thirteen families are supposed to own a majority of the corporate property of all Japan.

The general dissatisfaction with the existing social organization has made a fertile soil for the growth of socialistic and communistic doctrines. Many of the schools and universities are hotbeds of socialism which has infected even the children of the rich. The police are doing their best to repress such "dangerous thoughts," but without much success. It is suspected that the militarists have resorted to the war with China as a means of diverting the attention of the masses from their own grievances by appealing to their patriotism.

The soldiers and non-commissioned officers are drawn from the peasants and mill workers and share their resentment against conditions which are becoming unendurable and which will probably grow worse. There are doubts whether the troops would fire on mobs or rioters. The numerous assassinations of business men and of government officials, and the military mutiny in Tokio of February 26, 1936, are merely symptoms of the widespread unrest.

The masses have lost all confidence in the existing political parties, which are dominated by the wealthy business men. The only chance of improving their condition is believed to be a military dictatorship which will divide

the estates of the landlords among the tenants and nationalize all large plants and businesses.

What would Japanese victory in China mean to the people of the United States? While the Japanese may be able to hold on to their conquests in China and to rule them through local governments under Japanese control, the strain imposed by the war on the agricultural and working classes of Japan will be so great as to make a general social reorganization imperative. While this is taking place, the Japanese will not be able to expand so as to become a real danger to the United States.

The friction between the Japanese invaders and the Chinese will be so great as to prevent the spread of either the Japanese form of militarism or Chinese form of communism beyond the borders of China. Remember, the Chinese form of communism is different from other forms of communism. The Chinese are so fundamentally individualistic as to make either communism or fascism impossible in China, which has never been a democratic republic, as is so often supposed. American interests in China are only commercial. We should adopt in the Far East the same policy of the "good neighbor" which has worked so well in South and Central America—keep our hands off and mind our own business.

Mr. Close:

You see a million Japanese soldiers using the most ruthless tactics of war, building empire by the sword faster than ever it has been built before. You see one of the most promising movements of national rebirth in an ancient land crushed; its schools, hospitals, government and civic centers, and greatest cities in ruins; its earnest young leaders scattered and embittered, its crops destroyed or seized, work animals seized, and by reasonable estimates twenty million of its peasantry and townsmen condemned to the horrible death of starvation before summer. You see a war machine equipped with a hair-trigger self-starter but no brakes running down Britons, Americans and other neutrals in its way, while they are going about business and philanthropy in China in a decent manner no longer resented by the Chinese public. And you see seventy million Japanese people, devoted as no other people on earth to their Emperor, believing fervently in a national destiny more important to them than property, life, and the sensibilities and opinions of the world.

For years, now, some of us have been pointing out that Japan's mind and ambitions were driving her into fundamental clash with our world—not merely or even primarily forcible clash, but primarily clash of ideals, deep clash of opinion as to which methods are permissible in this modern world and which are to be outlawed. Here it is now—your business; and you want to know its fundamentals and what from the purely practical standpoint we had better do about it to save ourselves, our economy, and the ideals and modes of life without which life itself would be unlivable to us.

We must face the fact that the Japanese movement is setting the pace for those who scorn, ridicule and propose to destroy democracy, individual freedom, and human dignity in the world. The Japanese imperial movement, unhindered by us, has been setting this pace since the seizure of Manchuria in 1931. These things have followed: the

paralyzation of the League of Nations; brutal empire building in Africa; brazen intrigue and intervention in Spain; intransigence in Germany; incitations in France, Palestine and Brazil; and the Triple Alliance to destroy democracy and to build three new empires, which uses communism as its whipping boy to turn our minds from its material objectives. We must recognize that these objectives, if realized, will destroy the older empires of Britain and France and confine our economic life to our continental boundaries. Liberalism, democracy, and the spread of the machine were turning these old empires into self-federated groups of self-governing nations—the only movement in the world that could really promise the end of war. Along have come elements using brute force and the wiles of propaganda to turn the world back to the savage philosophy of might and conquest. Along have come nations whose totalitarian economy chains man as groom to his machine and uses the increment of the combination to pursue insane dreams of glory and centralized power based upon a type of slavery more bitter, harder to throw off, than the slavery of the ancient world. This way, friends, lies no prospect of peace in our time or our children's; this way lies the death of liberty, of human decency and of culture, and the conversion of man's proudest works into ruins.

There is one more consideration that we have not faced. It is high time to face it now. This: that the forces attacking what we consider fundamental decency have not been fulfilling our dear wish, our wishful belief, that they will hang themselves with their own rope. Instead they have proceeded unhindered to hog-tie us with the rope so generously issued them. Britain is already hog-tied. France is hobbled. We, the United States of America, remain the only nation left that can act without drawing a noose tighter about it. We are the only democratic nation left that can possibly take leadership in action. England and France have been beat to the draw, are looking down gun barrels. Until we create a diversion, until they can depend upon us to follow it up, it would be suicide for them to move. Their absurdly pathetic position is the result of their own past greed, desire to cast responsibility upon others, cowardice. Nevertheless, they are lost as allies to us now unless we relieve the checkmate.

And maybe we had better take warning from them. We are the only liberal, modern-minded nation left with freedom of action. How long will that last? It will be lost when Japan succeeds in Asia, if she does; when Japan pushes Chinese forces out of the rail-and-industrial area of China; when the surviving populace must starve or submit, and spirit-crushed leaders cooperate or die; when Japan gives her helots a doctrine of resentment against the white race, to save their ego for resentments they dare not express. It will be lost when Nippon has succeeded in yoking boundless Asiatic and island resources to "unspoiled" oriental labor under the cracking whip of industrialism dedicated not to improvement of the laborer but to theocratic imperial glory; lost when the United States is pushed by underselling into economic hermitage—save for specialties, which will have to be carried in Japanese ships and sold through Japanese brokers, because of inability of American industry, labor, and ships

(Continued on page 45)

CAN THE ATTACK FROM THE AIR BE STOPPED?

CARDED

CAPTAIN A. R. PEFFLEY

■ From earliest history man has endeavored to overcome his enemy by cunning. Early examples of contrivances for this purpose were the catapult and the ballista. These missile engines had the great advantage of killing at a distance, thus avoiding a hand to hand conflict. The slaying of the giant Goliath by David is a classic example of the early use of "artillery" by means of which a weaker man may overcome a stronger.

The story of guns is to a large extent the history of wars, which in turn is the history of mankind. Throughout the ages these cunning contrivances for killing at a distance have been developed, frequently shrouded in great secrecy and invariably associated with exaggerated claims. The Gatling Gun adopted by the Army in 1866 was to make the infantry soldier obsolete. Certainly there could be no defense against the machine gun which could fire "thousands of rounds a minute." *However, there never has been and never will be any instrument of destruction for which there is no defense.*

With the possible exception of the advent of printing, the invention of gun powder in the Thirteenth Century is the greatest of revolutionary occurrences. Firearms enabled relatively small groups of Europeans to drive Indians from North America. Exploration of the most desolate and savage parts of the world was made possible.

As a defense against bullets actuated at terrific velocity through means of powder, man simply built forts or dug under ground. Guns became larger and man dug deeper. Forts became stronger. On the sea iron ships replaced those of wood. Eventually an impasse was reached with the armor belt compromising with speed and armament. Thus, from the era of the war engine which hurled rocks against walled cities to the modern day when guns are capable of discharging vast quantities of high explosive shells at a rapid rate, with enormous velocity, to great distances, weapons to destroy and kill have progressively developed.

THE PRESENT PHENOMENA

Some seven hundred years following the coming of gun powder man created a machine which could fly through the air, carry a quantity of explosives, and project them onto the target below as desired. This new form of artillery has perhaps the most far reaching pos-

sibilities and is of more consequence than anything since the Thirteenth Century. When the airplane first appeared, it was not considered an instrument of war. Having a speed of forty miles an hour and being able to go on a direct route, it was an improvement over mounted messengers, providing necessary landing fields were available. Pilots of these flying contraptions were regarded with awe.

In 1914 a British plane discovered a German flanking operation at Mons. The incident spurred the development of observation planes. As a counter measure against reconnaissance the fast fighting pursuit plane was developed. In 1915 attack aviation came forth when the French used low flying aircraft against ground troops in the Somme offensive. The first instance of aerial bombing in the World War occurred in 1914 when a single German plane attacked Paris. The Germans were so pleased with the results of this affair that they began a series of Zeppelin raids. At this time they led the world in airship building having some fourteen ships. Hence, by the very nature of its possible missions aircraft divides itself as implements of war into four classes:

1. Observation aviation.
2. Fighting aviation (pursuit).
3. Attack aviation.
4. Bombardment aviation.

From 1914 to 1918 aviation progressed phenomenally. At the conclusion of the war the general characteristics of combat aviation were approximately as follows:

	Speed	Ceiling
Fighters _____	122	21,000
Attack _____	100	13,000
Bombardment _____	80	9,000

The progress aviation has made since 1918 is a story in itself. The forty-mile an hour, one hundred-mile radius gadget is now an aerial fortress capable of tremendous speed and of carrying large quantities of explosives. Truly Tennyson's "Airy Navies" have come to pass. That aircraft will be a tremendous force in warfare there can be no doubt. That it will destroy cities and drive all warships from the sea is highly questionable. Great things have been done by aviation, but in a calm analysis of its possibilities in the event of a major war we can say little more than that air superiority is important. In that particular phase of warfare involving an



attack against an advance naval base we can go farther and say that a *definite* air superiority is *essential*. But we cannot say that airplanes or telephones or cotton will win a war any more than we can say that Private Doe who peels potatoes for the galley will do so. Like the gatling gun and automatic weapons, aircraft will be a tremendous force, but no matter how tremendous, it will be a part of a general scheme and not the scheme itself.

WHAT PLANES CAN DO

Fighting aviation. Fighting planes fly to great altitudes, are capable of tremendous speed, and are highly maneuverable. Their mission is to attack enemy aircraft.

Observation aviation. This class has sufficient speed, radius, and maneuverability to accomplish its mission, which is either visual or photographic reconnaissance. They fight only if necessary. This is a *very* important type of aircraft.

Attack aviation. Attack planes operate at low altitudes against light construction, beach defenses, and troops. They are particularly effective against transportation "bottle necks," bridges, defiles, etc. They use machine guns, fragmentation bombs and chemicals.

Bombardment aviation. The mission of bombardment planes is to destroy *military* ground establishments. They operate at various altitudes depending on the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire, interference of defending aircraft, the capabilities of the plane, and the atmospheric ceiling. Obviously the greater the altitude the more difficult to hit the target. Above 15,000 feet oxygen tanks are necessary. It is apparent from the above discussion that bombardment and observation aviation are normal targets for *guns* and attack aviation and low flying observation for *machine guns*.

CHARACTERISTICS OF AERIAL TARGETS

All types of aircraft considered as targets have in general the following characteristics:

1. High speed.
2. Ability to operate in three dimensions.
3. Ability to change direction quickly.
4. A small vulnerable area.

Such targets have made necessary a new type of artillery. The artillery term "dead time" means that interval of time from the moment of observation of a target until the firing of the weapon, with the data calculated from that observation. In firing at surface targets a dead time of several seconds is permissible, but obviously in anti-aircraft fire the dead time must be greatly reduced if not entirely eliminated. Methods should be employed which permit the training and elevating of the guns almost as quickly as the finger can be pointed.

CHARACTERISTICS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS

From an understanding of the nature of the airplane we are ready to consider the type of weapon necessary to engage this target. The essential characteristics of the anti-aircraft gun are:

1. High muzzle velocity. As short a time of flight as possible is desirable. If one word could indicate the entire anti-aircraft problem that word would be "time."
2. Rapid fire. Direct hits will be most improbable. Hence, a time fuze to explode the shell when desired is

necessary. Anti-aircraft fire seeks a *hit* quickly. Many hits on one target are not necessary and very unlikely to be attained.

3. A rapid automatic solution of firing data. As previously stated no time is available for computations on a plotting board. Soon after the target appears data must be available for laying the guns. Also, this data must be automatic and continuous as long as the target is within range. The first shells must be *on* or very nearly so.

4. The calculated firing data must be transmitted instantaneously to the guns.


HOW THIS PROBLEM IS SOLVED

By discussing the various units of an anti-aircraft battery an indication of the manner by which the above essentials of anti-aircraft fire are acquired will be indicated. Figure one shows the various elements which go to make up a three-inch battery.

The Director. This is nothing more than a computing device. This machine has available for its use:

1. Azimuth of the target, by tracking the target.
2. Angular height of target, by tracking the target.
3. Altitude of target from the nearby height finder.

With the above known elements the director computes and delivers for the guns:



1. Quadrant elevation.
2. Firing azimuth.
3. Fuze setting to have the shell burst when it meets the target.

Taken individually, the parts of the director are very simple devices. Altogether a rather complicated machine results. In order to hit the target but three things are necessary: (1) The gun must be laid along a certain azimuth. (2) It must be inclined a certain amount above the horizontal. (3) The shell must burst when its trajectory intersects the target. By taking the basic data as previously stated, and from it turning out firing data, the gun is laid as desired.

The Height Finder. The basic linear quantity involved is altitude. In operating a bomb sight it is necessary that the plane maintain a constant altitude or "level off" just before it drops its bomb. It is during this time that fire will be most effective and desirable. The height finder is nothing more than a range finder which measures altitude instead of range. This altitude is automatically transmitted to the director. (The director, incidentally transmits to the height finder the azimuth and angular height of the target to insure the height finder being on the same target as the director.)

The data transmission system. It has been stated that data must be transmitted instantaneously and continuously. This is done by the data transmission system. The answers to the problem which the director computes are transmitted through an electric cable and indicated by positioning the rotor of a receiver motor. This position is indicated on the receiver dial by a pointer. By matching mechanical pointers, which move in accordance with the manner in which the gun is laid, with the electric pointer, the gun points where the director tells it.

Power units. A gasoline engine generates alternating current for the data transmission system.


Simply, the main features employed in firing an anti-aircraft battery are:

The director takes in certain elements of available information. It then computes firing data for the guns. It transmits this data over an electric wire. By matching pointers, the gun is laid. The shell is fired and bursts in accordance with the fuze setting. Thus, from a gallon of gasoline we have produced a shell exploding in space in the vicinity of the target.

THE TACTICS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE

Referring to figure two we see indicated the critical zone of fire around a defended area. By using the formula for falling bodies $S = \frac{1}{2}gt^2$ it is a simple matter to find that with a speed of 200 miles an hour, at an altitude of 15,000 feet it will take a bomb some thirty seconds to reach the ground. As 200 miles an hour is about 100 yards a second, the Bomb Release Line is placed 3,000 yards from the defended area. The plane must be either shot down or forced to turn back before it reaches this line.

It is assumed that forty-five seconds will be required to operate the bomb sight. This gives a "Critical Zone" approximately 4,500 yards across. In this area the fire of the guns must be placed. Let us assume that gun



batteries are mutually supporting up to 6,000 yards horizontal range. We can also say, rather emphatically, as a matter of fact, that all parts of the critical zone should be covered with the fire of at least one battery. Thus, it is a simple matter by using transparent discs of 6,000 yards radius to the scale of the map to determine the number and position of the batteries necessary to cover the critical zone.

Searchlights should be placed at such distance as to enable the guns to open fire at maximum effective range. This distance (between gun and light) is found to be 9,000 yards. If we make lights mutually supporting at 6,000 yards, the picture is complete.

Anti-aircraft machine guns are placed so as to defend areas most likely to be attacked by low flying or dive bombardment aviation. Batteries should provide an all around defense and be mutually supporting. The problem of control of machine gun fire rests to a great extent with individual gunners. Careful and systematic training is necessary.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT

There is no question concerning what one battery can do to one target. The technical features of anti-aircraft artillery have to a great extent been solved. A well trained anti-aircraft battery can place one hundred rounds a minute very close to an airplane in flight. The weakness of anti-aircraft defense lies in the lack of sufficient guns and equipment to operate them. Anti-aircraft equipment is very expensive, complicated, in some instances delicate, and requires a long time to manufacture. Obviously there will rarely be as much equipment as is desired. Hence, before planning a defense a list of priorities should be made. Then each priority should be defended adequately in order of importance as far as the

equipment will go and the remainder disregarded. This will mean that only some places can be defended particularly; the remainder incidentally. As a matter of fact not all places will need anti-aircraft defense.

A great deal has been said concerning bombing civilian population. In the war laboratories of Spain and China cities have frequently been subject to aerial bombing. Is this a proper use of aircraft? Does not the bombing of a civilian community violate the war principles of the objective? What did Franco accomplish by bombing Madrid? Many people were killed and buildings destroyed, but the net result was nothing more than an aroused enemy. It has been stated that the mission of bombardment aviation is to destroy *military* ground establishments, rail centers, depots and manufacturing plants. If digression is made from the military feature a valuable weapon of war is diverted to an improper use.

PLANES VERSUS GUNS

The first blows in a war will without doubt come from the air. It is believed, however, that if aviation accomplished all that will be demanded of it, equipment and personnel will be expended faster than they can be supplied. As the conflict progresses aviation will be used only against carefully selected objectives. Such targets naturally will be those which the anti-aircraft artillery will defend. Finally, it is further believed that anti-aircraft artillery will be able to provide adequate defense for places needing defending, at least for those objectives requiring it the most.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT IN THE MARINE CORPS

The tactical principles enumerated above apply to the Marine Corps anti-aircraft problem. In coast defense the critical area to seaward can be covered only up to the range of the guns. Terrain will rarely permit a perfect geometrical all around defense. However, regardless of the problem we must strive to approximate the tactical principles of defense. A Marine anti-aircraft battalion consists of a headquarters battery, a battery of guns, a battery of lights, and two batteries of caliber .50 machine guns. Incidentally, this organization is the same as the provisional anti-aircraft battalion which supports an Army division. Whether an advanced base would be a target for bombardment aviation would depend on the facilities of the base. It will certainly be subject to attack aviation. Hence, the Marine Corps organization for base defense is properly strong in machine guns, when we add to those mentioned above the organic machine guns in the 3-inch gun and searchlight batteries.

Navy yards and dry docks are bombardment targets. The Coast Artillery is charged with the anti-aircraft defense of the United States. This Corps has done a fine job in solving both the technical and tactical problems involved in anti-aircraft artillery defense. Lack of men and guns is the big weakness. As far as the Army is concerned, Navy yards, dry docks, and other naval establishments are merely parts of a priority list. How high on the list they would stand would be determined by the local situation.

Should not the Marine Corps be charged with the anti-aircraft defense of naval establishments? Navy

yards, naval bases and air bases are certainly of paramount interest to the Navy and at the top of the Navy priority list. In many cases anti-aircraft defense will be a joint problem of both the Army and Navy. Frequently, important Army and Navy establishments are located in the same area. A great deal of co-ordination between the Army and Navy will be necessary to have a well-planned and efficient anti-aircraft defense. Proper co-ordination of the anti-aircraft artillery and our own aviation will always be required.

PRESENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE MARINE CORPS

The Second anti-aircraft Battalion less the Searchlight Battery of the Marine Corps at the present time is engaged in training at Hilton Head off Parris Island, S. C. This battalion consists of a Headquarters and Service Battery, one gun battery, a caliber .50 machine gun battery and a searchlight battery. At the conclusion of its training on Hilton Head Island this battalion may be transferred to San Diego. Within another year or two the First Anti-aircraft Battalion may be organized.

A SUMMARY OF THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT PROBLEM

(1) Attack and other forms of low flying aviation are targets for anti-aircraft *machine guns*. High flying bombardment and observation planes are targets for *guns*.

(2) Attack aviation is particularly effective against transportation bottlenecks, troops in defiles and light defensive work.

(3) Bombardment aviation should be used only against military objectives other than troops. The bombing of civilian areas will arouse rather than shatter a nation's morale.

(4) Aviation will be a tremendous force in the next war. It will not win the war. Planes cannot hold ground. They can be a lot of help to Private Blue in the infantry and cause his enemy Private Red a lot of inconvenience. However, if anyone will win a conflict it will be Private Blue, lying on his stomach on a hill firing on Private Red as he falls back.

(5) Guns should be so emplaced as to bring the maximum effective fire on planes before they reach the bomb release line. These gun positions will usually be in the vicinity of the Bomb Release Line. However, in coast defense positions or where inaccessible terrain is involved, positions will obviously need to be regulated accordingly. However, when the target is in the critical zone it must be engaged to the maximum range of the guns. The position of the bomb release line and the width of the critical zone are determined by the speed and altitude of the plane and the time required to operate the bomb sight.

(6) All parts of the critical zone must be covered with the fire of at least one battery. This fire should thicken as the bomb release line is approached.

(7) Searchlights should be so located as to permit the gun batteries to deliver fire at their maximum effective range.

(8) Along a coast line, and particularly in base defense, searchlights should be used with great caution.

(Continued on page 44)

"THE RESERVES CARRY ON"

BY COLONEL WILLIAM P. UPSHUR, USMC
Director, Marine Corps Reserve

■ In the fine Anniversary Number of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE of November, 1937, the Reserve Division felt that our excellent Marine Corps publication was not doing its part in the presentation of items relating to the Reserve, because all that appeared in the GAZETTE consisted of some three columns of names, showing what young men had been commissioned, followed by the names of those who had been discharged, had resigned, died, or had been transferred to the honorary retired list. It occurred to the Director of the Reserve that valuable space was being wasted as far as his particular Division is concerned, because the Reserve Bulletin, which is issued quarterly, contains all such data and is seen by many more Reservists than is the case when the same information is printed in our own service publication. The Director, therefore, offered to furnish items of interest, and the Editor of the GAZETTE commented in reply that "this offer was certainly a welcome Christmas present."

It is highly probable that the Reservists know far more about the life and doings of the regular service than the regulars do about the Reserve. Since the enactment of

the Reserve Act of February 28, 1925, the Marine Corps Reserve has come a long way, with various ups and downs and many difficult problems to solve, and with small financial resources to help solve them. The former Reserve organization included Brigades and Regiments, with widely scattered units difficult to control. More recently, this organization has been simplified by providing for Reserve Battalions and no regiments or brigades. Each battalion, as far as practicable, is centrally located in the town or city providing the necessary facilities. In this respect, and because of lack of money to do otherwise, the status of these Battalions is very similar to that of a college Greek-Letter Fraternity. Before a Battalion is authorized and established anywhere, it is necessary for the community not only to apply for the establishment of a local battalion, but to provide, free of charge to the Marine Corps, armory space, including company rooms, storerooms, drill halls and gallery ranges, and to promise to heat and light the buildings furnished. The active component of the Reserve is known as the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, and at present consists of eighteen Battalions, located on both coasts of the United States and in the general vicinity of the Great Lakes. Three Battalions are located in or near New York City; two are at Philadelphia, and one at Boston;



Marine Corps Reserve during range practice at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va.

one in Washington, D. C.; one at Augusta, Ga.; one at New Orleans; one at Galveston; two in the State of Washington, and two in California. In the Great Lakes Region we have Battalions at Chicago, Indianapolis, Detroit, and Toledo. Nineteen in all—one of which, the 18th, is still a paper battalion, as it cannot be organized until its parent unit has been sufficiently recruited to divide itself into two battalions.

A comparatively small, though growing, number of regular officers and enlisted men are beginning to have first-hand knowledge of the Reserve by their assignment as Inspector-Instructors of the various Battalions, and duty on the Boards of Observers assigned each year to attend the encampment of Reserve units and to report on their general efficiency. Each Inspector-Instructor is assigned two selected non-commissioned officers as assistants, and during the summer training additional officers and non-commissioned officers are assigned, not only to report, as previously stated, on the condition of the Battalion undergoing training, but also to assist in the training; by the assignment of a selected N.C.O. to each Reserve company, and by providing a Quartermaster Sergeant and a qualified mess cook to each battalion to supervise and improve the administration of supplies furnished and the preparation of food.

In one particular, it is probable that the Reservist excels even the regular marine — his morale and enthusiasm are beyond praise. The officers frequently spend much more than the pay received for drills and training, for various purposes, to improve the battalions and detached companies, such as the purchase of guidons, pennants, drill trophies, furniture, pictures and decorations for the armory, and in one case, for an ambulance for the medical detachment of the battalion. On occasion men have been known to spend more on transportation to attend drills than the pay they receive for such service. All are eager and anxious to improve themselves to the maximum extent, and every effort is being made to facilitate this most worthy ambition.

Without making invidious comparison a study of the duties and mission of the Marine Corps indicates that its Reserve branch is of far more significance and importance to it than are the reserves of either the land or naval forces, because in time of National Emergency there is no opportunity for the Marine Corps Reserve to give additional training prior to probable participation in combat. The duties assigned the regular Marine Corps in time of war are of such pressing and urgent nature, and require so many men, that we probably would be unable to fulfil our mission without augmentation by the Reserve.

A glance by the regular into armory conditions of the reservist, perhaps would be of interest. They constitute a cross-section of society as far as housing is concerned, under every condition from comparative prosperity to utmost poverty. In those states, such as New York, Ohio, Illinois, and Michigan, where provision is made for Naval Militia and where our men have the dual obligation of service to their state as Militiamen and service to their Government as Federal Reservists, there is comparative prosperity. Splendid armories have been provided by these states, providing every facility, and where our men receive additional emolument from the state authorities. In other

states having no Naval Militia, this situation does not exist. Instead, Reservists occupy armories in the basements of condemned school buildings, in some cases flooded by water in the rainy season; the garrets of old office buildings; storage rooms in Post Office buildings; and city halls, and in one case, a former Court House building. At Texas City, Texas, the company located there, which belongs to the 15th Battalion, Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, with Headquarters in Galveston, has constructed its own armory. This small town is public-spirited and its good citizens donated a plot of land and gave funds for the purchase of building material. The armory was constructed by members of the company, working in the late afternoons and on Sundays and holidays. What these men did is a more eloquent tribute to their high morale than anything else that could be said about them.

The laws under which the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve trains and operates provides for forty-eight drills per annum, for which each officer and enlisted man receives one-thirtieth of one month's pay of the regular Marine for each drill attended, and an annual two weeks' training period in the summer for which the emoluments are the same as for the regular Marine Corps, and amount to one-half of one month's pay.

The period for drills and training for a reservist is far less than is generally realized. A recruit of the regular service receives as much training in a month as a Fleet Reservist gets in a year. Armory drills are divided into two categories: (1) Basic Training for recruits; and (2) more advanced and progressive training for those men who have satisfactorily completed the basic training. Practically all drills are conducted at night and take place under widely varying conditions. In Aberdeen, Washington, the company knows by instinct exactly how many steps and half-steps are safe to take without going overboard on a restricted wharf where they must wheel and maneuver. In Philadelphia, all drills may be classified as "night maneuvers" as the battalions there must plunge into an inky darkness on the parade ground and can be located by



Men of Major Stickney's 8th Battalion, FMCR, receiving machine gun instruction

the drill commander only when the head of the column emerges into the rays of the street lights on the farther side. This condition is being corrected, however, and flood-lights will be provided shortly. In some cases the drill hall is studded with pillars, where skill is required in drill equal to that of the driver of a Ford car in heavy traffic on a busy street. In other places men drill on abandoned lots littered with tin cans and other refuse, or on city streets, menaced by fast-moving traffic.

The favored organizations in the Naval Militia States in general, have adequate drill decks, which provide ample room for drills, but which require special technique in executing a halt or wheel, by reason of the glass-like smoothness of the underfooting. In these armories a man slides to a halt instead of executing it in the usual manner.

There is almost as much variety in the type of indoor galleries (and outdoor ones, too, for that matter), provided for the development of skill in Marksmanship. In some cases standard apparatus is available; in others, the ingenuity of the battalion has developed necessary adjustments in equipment, salvaged to some extent from refuse dumps. The most notable indoor gallery is located on the old hulk, the USS *Newton*, the home of Company "B", 4th Battalion, located at Jersey City. A ship's funnel has been installed between decks in a horizontal position, with targets at one end and a shooting platform at the other. Rifle shots, however wild, menace no one, as they are confined within the steel walls that constitute this unique "indoor range."

The plan of training during the armory period has been somewhat modified during the past year to devote more attention to marksmanship. The outstanding characteristic of the regular marine is skill with the weapon with which he is armed, and it is realized that for the Reservist, whose drill time is so limited, as much attention as possible must be paid to this important feature. At Headquarters of the Marine Corps, in the Division of Reserve, we now have Captain Joseph F. Hankins, Team Captain of last year's successful Marine Corps Reserve Rifle Team, who is in charge of this important branch of instruction. Considerable additional time has been allotted to marksmanship outside of the regularly assigned drill periods. All Battalions have been encouraged to enter teams and individual shots in small-bore competitions conducted by the National Rifle Association. Next summer, range firing will extend over a period of six half days, which is believed to be an improvement on the former requirement of devoting two whole days on the range. All firing is conducted at 200 yards.

The armory training, in addition to the requirement that all members of the organization qualify with the small-bore rifle before firing service ammunition, also contemplates instruction in the various duties of the individual, the squad, the platoon and the company, that limited facilities permit — primarily close order drills and formations, and the rehearsal of extended order formations, so that during the summer training period attention may be given exclusively to marksmanship, extended order, scouting, patrolling, and similar instruction in the field. The training to be conducted during the summer of 1938 is looked forward to with considerable interest as it differs somewhat from anything that has been carried out heretofore.

Formerly, in spite of every effort to do otherwise, considerable time was devoted to rehearsals for ceremonial formations and close order drill, which have no place in the scheme of training conducted during the brief two weeks when organizations are assembled in camp. The purpose of our training is to enable the men, first but not most important, to make a presentable appearance in street parades, and second — the most important — to fit them as far as is possible for duty in the field, including ability to use their weapons skilfully, knowledge of how to take cover and how to advance without undue losses, digging light field entrenchments, march discipline, and a practical though limited knowledge of first aid and camp sanitation, care of the feet, maintenance of good health, etc.

Summer training is conducted under varying conditions, desirable and undesirable. Every reservist desires above all else to train at one of our large stations, such as the Marine Barracks, Quantico, the Marine Corps Base, San Diego, or at Parris Island; where he can mingle and associate with, and experience the life and environment of the regular marine. There are better facilities for training at these stations and more available regular personnel to assist the "Citizen-Marine."

Even those regulars who know better, find it difficult to realize the very difficult conditions under which the reservist normally carries on. At the armory, when you see a reserve company formed for drill in our familiar uniform, composed of fine young men of the type usually found in the regular service, it is hard to realize that for most of their time all of them are strenuously engaged in making their living by long hours of arduous labor, many of them being married with families to support. The time devoted to drill is nearly always made available by considerable personal denial and sacrifice. It is strange, therefore, when the time for field training arrives, that it is attended by so many with unbelievable enthusiasm and loyalty. After all, this precious two weeks is the only time during the year when these men are released from their ordinary civic pursuits, and when their natural desire would seem to betake themselves to the country roads in the old flivver with their families, and to enjoy the country-side and a peaceful and relaxed period of rest from the vicissitudes life has afforded during the preceding eleven and one-half months. When, therefore, these men give up this pleasant opportunity and go to camp where they drill and sweat like "Her Majesty's Jollies," seven hours a day, the service they render is beyond praise.

This brief sketch of service in the Marine Corps Reserve has been devoted primarily to the "Fleet Marine Corps Reserve." No mention has been made of the inactive branch, the "Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve," nor to the splendid Marine Corps Reserve Aviation Squadrons. Consideration will be given to them in a future article.

It only remains to say at this time, that the Marine Corps is deeply indebted to its younger brother, the Marine Corps Reserve; that every regular should take every opportunity to become better acquainted with this lusty and growing youngster, and use every means in his power to facilitate his progress and help him over the numerous rough places in his effort to perfect himself for service in time of National Emergency.

LANDING STUDIES


H. M. KENYON, CAPTAIN, U.S.M.C.

■ The study of landing troops against organized defense has come bodily from the river crossing operations of the U. S. Army. These operations have long been matter of fact procedure, as anyone may learn by reviewing any of the Army publications dealing with this subject, some of which publications have come to the attention of Marine officers while at the Infantry School, Fort Benning. The Civil War largely developed river crossing tactics along with the pontoon and neither has changed greatly since those days.

General Grant has left us two excellent examples of landing operations—Vicksburg and Petersburg. The former campaign is especially interesting to us as Marines because Colonel Ellet with a Marine brigade was probably the first troop commander to connect with Grant from below Vicksburg and because the landing from the west to the east side of the river was carried out by the Navy under Admiral Porter. Here was our greatest landing, made under cover of naval gunfire with a strength of 30,000 men, including a few Marines. Petersburg is interesting because it follows as a clear example of how Grant there used the knowledge he gained at Vicksburg. We should never omit Vicksburg if we would understand practical problems in landing and we should glance at Petersburg to see how well a lesson was learned.

The long and painful operations by which this (opening of the Mississippi) was achieved group themselves into four episodes: (a) The Grenada expedition of Grant's force; (b) the river column under McClernand and Sherman; (c) the operations in the bayoux; and (d) the final overland campaign from Grand Gulf. The country in which these operations took place divides itself sharply into two zones, the upland east of the river, upon which it looks down from high bluffs, and the levels west of it, which are a maze of bayoux, backwaters and side channels, the intervening land being kept dry near the river itself by artificial banks (levees) but elsewhere swampy. At Vicksburg, it is important to observe, the bluffs trend away from the Mississippi to follow the course of the Yazoo, rejoining the great river at Memphis. Thus there are two obvious lines of advance for the Northern Army, on the upland (Memphis and Grand Junction on Grenada-Jackson), and downstream through the bayou country (Memphis-Helena-Vicksburg). The main army of the defenders, who were commanded by Lieut.-General J. C. Pemberton, between Vicksburg and Jackson and Grenada, could front either north against an advance by Grenada or west along the bluffs above and below Vicksburg.

The first advance was made at the end of November, 1862, by two columns from Grand Junction and Memphis on Grenada. The Confederates in the field, greatly outnumbered, fell back without fighting. But Grant's line



of supply was one long single line, ill-equipped railway through Grand Junction to Columbus, and the opposing cavalry under Van Dorn swept round his flank and, by destroying one of his principal magazines (at Holly Springs), without further effort compelled the abandonment of the advance. Meanwhile one of Grant's subordinates, McClernand, was intriguing to be appointed to command an expedition by the river-line, and Grant, meeting half-way an evil which he felt himself unable to prevent, had sent Sherman with the flotilla and some 30,000 men to attack Vicksburg from the water-side, while he himself should deal with the Confederate field army on the high ground. But the scheme broke down completely when Van Dorn cut Grant's line of supply, and the Confederate Army was free to turn on Sherman. The latter, ignorant of Grant's retreat, attacked the Yazoo bluffs above Vicksburg, (Battle of Chickasaw Bayou) on December 29th; but a large portion of Pemberton's field army had arrived to help the Vicksburg garrison, and the Federals were easily repulsed with a loss of 2,000 men. McClernand now appeared and took the command out of Sherman's hands, informing him at the same time of Grant's retreat. Sherman thereupon proposed, before attempting fresh operations against Vicksburg, to clear the country behind them by destroying the Confederate garrison at Arkansas Post. This expedition was completely successful; at a cost of 1,000 men the fort and its 5,000 defenders were captured on the 11th of January, 1863. McClernand, elated at his victory, would have continued to ascend the Arkansas, but such an eccentric operation would have been profitless if not dangerous, and Grant, authorized by the general-in-chief, Halleck, preemptorily ordered McClernand back to the Mississippi.

Retreating from the upland, Grant sailed down the river and joined McClernand and Sherman at Milliken's Bend at the beginning of February, and, superseding the resentful McClernand, assumed command of the three corps (XIII, McClernand; XV, Sherman; XVII, McPherson) available. He had already imagined the daring solution of his most difficult problem which he afterward put into execution, but for the present he tried a series of less risky expeditions to reach the high ground beyond Pemberton's flanks, without indeed much confidence in their success, yet desirous in these unhealthy flats of keeping up the spirits of his army by active work, and of avoiding, at a crisis in the fortunes of the war, any appearance of discouragement. Three such attempts were made in all, with the cooperation of the flotilla under David D. Porter. First, Grant endeavored to cut a canal across the bend of the Mississippi at Vicksburg, hoping thus to isolate the fortress, to gain a water connection with the lower river, and to land an army on the bluff beyond Pemberton's left flank. This was unsuccessful. Next he tried to make a practicable channel from the Mississippi to the upper Yazoo, and so to turn Pemberton's right, but the Confederates, warned in time, constructed a fort at the point where Grant's advance emerged from the bayou. Lastly, an advance through a maze of creeks (Steele's Bayou Expedition), towards the middle Yazoo and Haine's Bluff, encountered the enemy, not on the bluffs, but in the low lying woods and islands,

and these so harassed and delayed the progress of the expedition that Grant recalled it.

Shortly afterward Grant determined on the maneuvers in rear of Vicksburg that established his reputation. The troops marched overland from Milliken's Bend to New Carthage, and on the 16th of April Porter's gunboat flotilla and the transports ran past the Vicksburg batteries. All this, which involved careful arrangement and hard work, was done by the 24th of April. General Banks with a Union Army from New Orleans was now advancing up the river to invest Port Hudson, and by way of diverting attention from the Mississippi, a cavalry brigade under Benjamin Grierson rode from LaGrange to Baton Rouge (600 miles in 16 days), destroying railways and magazines and cutting the telegraph wires en route. Sherman's XV corps, too, made vigorous demonstrations at Haine's Bluff, and in the confusion and uncertainty Pemberton was at a loss.

It may be well to quote Grant's own words, along with the first authentic order for landing operations ever issued in American campaigns.

"I had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a point below Vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to the possible but not expected success of some one of the expedients resorted to for the purpose of giving us a different base. This could not be undertaken until the waters receded. I did not, therefore, communicate this plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary to make preparations for the start. My recollection is that Admiral Porter was the first one to whom I mentioned it. The co-operation of the Navy was absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) of such an enterprise. I had no more authority to command Porter than he had to command me. It was necessary to have part of his fleet below Vicksburg if the troops went there. Steamers to use as ferries were also essential. The navy was the only escort and protection for these steamers, all of which in getting below had to run about fourteen miles of batteries. Porter fell into the plan at once and suggested that he had better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to run the batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work better than soldiers. I was glad to accept his proposition, not only because I admitted his argument, but because it would enable me to keep from the enemy a little longer our designs.

"The enemy was evidently expecting our fleet, for they were ready to light up the river by means of bonfires on the east side and by firing houses on the point of land opposite the city on the Louisiana side. The sight was magnificent but terrible. I witnessed it from the deck of a river transport, run out into the middle of the river and as low down as it was prudent to go. My mind was much relieved when I learned that no one on the transports had been killed and but few, if any, wounded.

"The experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this, however, during the war. Admiral Farragut had run the batteries at Port Hudson with the flagship *Hartford* and one iron-clad and visited me from below Vicksburg. The 13th of February Admiral Porter had sent the gunboat *Indianola*, Lieut. Commander George

Brown commanding, below. She met Colonel Ellet of the Marine brigade below Natchez on a captured steamer. Two of the colonel's fleet had previously run the batteries, producing the greatest consternation among the people along the Mississippi from Vicksburg to the Red River. (Colonel Ellet reported having attacked a Confederate battery on the Red River two days before with one of his boats, the *De Soto*. Running aground, he was obliged to abandon his vessel. However, he reported that he set fire to her and blew her up. Twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy. With the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the *New Era*, and succeeded in passing the batteries at Grand Gulf and reaching the vicinity of Vicksburg. The *Queen of the West*, one of Colonel Ellet's vessels, ran the blockade on February 2nd and was sunk in the Red River and later raised and used by the Confederates.)

"On the 27th McClernand's corps was all at Hard Times, and McPherson's was following closely. I had determined to make the attempt to effect a landing on the east side of the river as soon as possible. Accordingly, on the morning of the 29th, McClernand was directed to embark all the troops from his corps that our transports and barges could carry. About 10,000 men were so embarked. The plan was to have the navy silence the guns at Grand Gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to debark in the shortest time possible under cover of the fire of the navy and carry the works by storm. The following order was issued:

Perkins' Plantation, La.,
April 27, 1863.

Major General J. A. McClernand,
Commanding 13th, A. C.

Commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much of it as there is transportation for. Have put aboard the artillery and every article authorized in orders limiting baggage, except the men, and hold them in readiness, with their places assigned, to be moved at a moment's warning.

All the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain behind, send to a point nearly opposite Grand Gulf, where you see, by special orders of this date, General McPherson is ordered to send one division.

The plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and silence all the batteries commanding the river. Your corps will be on the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below the promontory first brought to view passing down the river. Once on shore, have each commander instructed beforehand to form his men the best the ground will admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points; but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself. The first object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintain themselves until such time as preparations can be made and troops collected for a forward movement.

Admiral Porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicated to you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such troops as may be below the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced.

It may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, out of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run past Grand Gulf and land at Rodney. In case this should prove the plan, a signal will be arranged and you duly informed, when the transports are to start with this view. Or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past but not the men. In this case, then, the transports would have

to be brought back to where the men could land and move by forced marches to below Grand Gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place. There will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate that the transports can run down and debark the troops at Grand Gulf; one, that the transports can run by without the troops; and the last, that the transports can run by with troops on board.

Should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be left to run the blockade.

If not already directed, require your men to keep three days' rations in their haversacks, not to be touched until a movement commences.

U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.

"At 8 o'clock A. M., 29th, Porter made the attack with his entire strength present, eight gunboats. *For nearly five and a half hours the attack was kept up without silencing a single gun of the enemy.* All this time McClernand's 10,000 men were huddled together on the transports in the stream ready to attempt a landing if signalled. I occupied a tug from which I could see the effect of the battle on both sides, within range of the enemy's guns; but a small tug without armament, was not calculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were being attacked themselves. About half-past one the fleet withdrew, seeing their efforts were entirely unavailing. The enemy ceased firing as soon as we withdrew. I immediately signalled the Admiral and went aboard his ship. The navy lost in this engagement eighteen killed and fifty-six wounded. A large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship, and most of those from a single shell which penetrated the ship's side and exploded between the decks where the men were working their guns. The sight of the mangled and dying men which met my eyes as I boarded the ship was sickening."

Here Grant was quickly able to see the futility of attempting to take a position and land when he might better get ashore elsewhere. He put the troops on the opposite bank, marched to a place where a landing could be made and went ahead.

"The embarkation below Grand Gulf took place at De Shroon's, Louisiana, six miles above Bruinsburg, Mississippi. Early on the morning of the 30th of April McClernand's corps and one division of McPherson's corps were speedily landed.

"When this was effected I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalled since. Vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defenders demoralized by any of our previous moves. . . . All the campaigns, labors, hardships and exposures from the month of December previous to this time that had been made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object."

Grant and Porter attempted a landing against organized defense. Their ultimate objective was taking Vicksburg, not just getting ashore. Grand Gulf, impregnable from the water, collapsed without a fight when Grant was behind it.

A fight took place at Raymond on the 12th of May and Jackson was captured just in time to forestall the arrival of reinforcements for Pemberton under General Joseph E. Johnston. The latter being in supreme command of the Confederates ordered Pemberton to come out of Vicksburg and attack Grant. But Pemberton did

(Continued on page 42)

THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(Courtesy America's Town Meeting of the Air)

Mr. George V. Denny, Jr.:

■ Our topic this evening is phrased, "The Struggle for Power in the Mediterranean." What do Italy's advances in the Mediterranean mean to the British Empire? What does the struggle between these two great powers mean to America?

We are to hear three different viewpoints: Major James Strachey Barnes, long a resident of Italy and author of several books on Fascism, who will outline the Italian position; Mr. S. K. Ratcliffe of London, England, noted journalist and authority on British foreign policies; and Mr. Quincy Howe, editor and writer, whose position is best described by the title of his latest book, *England Expects Every American to Do His Duty*. After the three speakers have concluded their remarks, our question period will be divided between our audience here in Town Hall and a Town Meeting Discussion Club who will ask questions from Pittsburgh. And now, may I present our first speaker, Major James Strachey Barnes.

Major Barnes:

I have been asked to state Italy's case in this debate. I speak from the point of view of an Englishman, who agrees with our Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, that it is our interest to let bygones be bygones and to restore the traditional friendship between the two countries.

The Mediterranean has been called the life-line of the British Empire. The Suez Canal is now also the life-line of the Italian Empire, while the Mediterranean is Italy's very life blood. Both countries are therefore vitally interested in the freedom of the Mediterranean and Red Seas. This should make for agreement and not for disagreement. If, in a war, Italy were England's enemy, England would have no alternative but to send her commerce with the East around by the Cape. She might still, but only with difficulty, at great risk and great cost, maintain her garrisons in the Middle East. This effort however, would handicap her in other theaters of war, disperse her strength and maybe lead to temporary if not permanent disaster. But with Italy a firm friend, England is in a position to economize in the Mediterranean and to concentrate her resources where they may be more urgently needed. Her commerce through the Mediterranean would be guaranteed. Much the same can be said from Italy's point of view. The interests are mutual. The surest way of neutralizing any dangers that may be supposed to arise from the Rome-Berlin axis is an alliance with Italy.

Any idea of Italy planning to attack the British Empire is absurd. Mussolini is not a fool. With the conquest of Abyssinia, Italy has become a satisfied power. She urgently needs peace for thirty or forty years, or she will not only risk losing what she has gained, but fail to reach that position of comparative ease and affluence which is the condition of achieving her ultimate imperialistic aims, which I shall describe in a minute.

I cannot, of course, prophesy what may happen in forty

years' time. Some people may say that when that time comes, Italy will not consider Abyssinia sufficient for her purposes. I cannot tell. But England has no need to fear Italy in this respect. Her only danger lies in herself. If she decays, as some predict, in moral strength, in population, and in wealth, and becomes unable to maintain order in her African colonies, Italy may step into her shoes. But this will be England's fault, not Italy's cunning. Nature abhors a vacuum and the earth belongs to those who have the greater gifts of life.

The Italians—it would be silly to deny it—are an imperialistically-minded people, probably the most imperialistically-minded people in the world. History, as well as their astonishing success in Rhodes and Tripoli, shows what Italians can do as imperialists. They built the greatest empire the world has ever seen—the Roman Empire, founding thereby the modern state, the rule of law, and diffusing throughout mankind the heritage not only of their own culture, but that of Greece and Israel. And Italians are also the people who, by God's providence, were chiefly instrumental in building the greatest spiritual empire of the world—the Roman Catholic Church—which will endure forever. The Venetians, not to speak of the Genoese, also built an empire with a constitution which lasted over a thousand years. For a hundred and fifty years, Venice was the greatest maritime power in the world. Lastly, it was the Italians who created what we call the Renaissance, another kind of spiritual empire, which gave cultural leadership to the world for more than two centuries. And now Italy, bursting with renewed creative energy, is aware of yet another imperial destiny.

It is no use quarrelling with imperialism, as some foolish people attempt to do. You might as well quarrel with life itself. For imperialism is no more nor less than a necessary manifestation of superabundant vitality and creative talent. You can criticize a particular imperialism, either in the means it employs or in the ends it achieves. But you cannot condemn imperialism without condemning life itself. Anti-imperialism is surrender to death.

Now, what are Italy's ultimate imperial aims? Like that of all the Latin countries, it is a particular form of cultural leadership. France's imperial aim is also cultural. She teaches mankind preeminently the art of living—all the exquisite refinement of living. That is the French genius. The Italians on the other hand love building—building buildings, railways, roads, draining marshes, building legal codes, social systems, political institutions, philosophical and artistic syntheses. She wants to make Rome again the civil cultural center of the world in harmony with that other Rome which is already the religious cultural center of the world. That is the Italian ambition and it responds to the Italian genius.

Now, the Englishman, in his imperialism, gives expression mainly to a love of adventure for its own sake and for private gain. In these more sophisticated days, his love of adventure has become merged in the romance of business and the pursuit of money. There is nothing to be ashamed of in that, but he is apt to be somewhat at a loss

what to do with his money when he has made it. His native culture is apt to be sterile unless it is fertilized by Latin culture. England's own great culture, in other words, ebbs or flows (to change the simile) with the ebb and flow of Latin culture. And now that French inspiration is running low and Italian inspiration is still not yet in flood, England's culture is suffering. Therefore, as an Englishman who is not too proud to face facts, I welcome the promise of a new era of Italian cultural leadership, which is the aim of Italy's imperialism. It can do us nothing but good.

No nation, however, can attain to cultural leadership without a sufficiency of population, a sufficiency of territory to receive a large population, without a sufficiency of wealth, of power, and of prestige. Having therefore achieved her national unity as a first step, Italy is now seeking to achieve a sufficiency of material goods and elbow room to enable her to develop her culture and make it shine before the world.

This very naturally disturbs the vested interests, including our own. But just as a wise employer of labor goes half way to meet the demands of his men, who as they become better educated, feel the need for better opportunities, better pay, and better conditions of work, so I consider that my country should be prepared to meet Italy half way and help her to attain that sufficiency of material goods and elbow room which would enable her to perform those cultural functions which constitute her genius and which are bound to flow back to fertilize our own genius.

I have read Mr. Howe's book *England Expects Every American to Do His Duty*. I agree with Mr. Howe's main thesis. What is happening in Europe is no vital interest whatever of America's except that America in her own interests wants peace. What is happening in Europe is a struggle between rival imperialistic systems and, if it comes to a fight, it matters very little to America which system wins. If America had adopted the cash-and-carry policy in 1914 and had never come into the war, America would have been in a better position today, even if Germany had won the war. She would not have become the creditor of debtors who cannot pay their debts; and, if Germany had won, however unpleasant it might have been for my country, it would have insured peaceful conditions in Europe under a German hegemony for an indefinite period. That would have been all to the Advantage of American trade and she would have had nothing to fear from Germany because the Atlantic and a strong navy make her practically immune from attack.

This avowal—from an Englishman—shows you that I am doing my best to tell you the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

The policy advocated by Mr. Ratcliffe of an alignment of democratic nations against the fascist nations is more than any other likely to lead to war, which both America and my country are interested to avoid. It is the policy of mad dogs, who really in their heart of hearts want another war to make the world safe for democracy. The last war failed to do that and another war on the same scale would only make the world safe for communism. That is certain. That is what Russia is doing her best to bring about, and that is why Russia is behind all the popular efforts to divide the world on this issue.

America and England have nothing whatever to fear from Fascism unless their own democratic systems fail to promote social justice. If they fail, Fascism may spontaneously grow up in America and England, as it grew up in Italy. Parliamentary democracy failed in Italy and that is why Fascism triumphed in Italy. But Fascism in America or England will never be fomented and financed by Italy. No Italian dreams of trying to subvert our forms of government. As Mussolini has said, "Fascism is not an article for export." Americans and Englishmen have nothing to fear from Italy interfering in their internal affairs, and if Americans and English have any real regard for liberty, they will not try to deny Italy's right to decide her own internal affairs as she wishes.

On the other hand, Russia is continuously meddling in our internal affairs. There are Communists in this country and in England working under orders from Moscow and financed from Moscow. If therefore there is any argument in favor of an alignment of nations on an ideological basis, America and England ought to join the anti-Communist front with Italy and Germany, not because they care what sort of government Russia has, but because it is intolerable to have a foreign country attempting to subvert the foundations of our chosen political institutions.

To conclude: for thirty years at least, Italy's and England's interests run parallel; and, as for America, she had much better stand aloof and watch events. The Monroe Doctrine has proved a sound doctrine and it ought to be supplemented by America saying to herself, "Keep outside Europe."

Chairman Denny:

Thank you, Major Barnes. I now take pleasure in introducing our second speaker, Mr. S. K. Ratcliffe.

Mr. Ratcliffe:

This is almost a new enterprise for me, as doubtless for Major Barnes. Englishmen abroad, it is believed, always stick together, tell the same story, stand up for the British system. We two are antagonists in this debate. Its subject is *not* remote from the interests and welfare of the United States. There is no major European problem to which American people can be indifferent.

Now the proper opponent for Major Barnes would have been a stiff Tory imperialist for whom the world of empire never changes. I am not of that kind. If all Britons are imperialists, then I am one decidedly tempered by experience. I believe the old imperialisms to be finished. I am convinced that we live in an altered and awakened world.

Let us get our terms of reference clear. There is no actual struggle for power in that Middle Sea around which civilizations have revolved for so many thousands of years. But there is a gathering conflict of interests, and a startling change in the balance of power bears witness to this. The picture has been transformed by two developments—the increase of Italy's naval and air power, bringing a grave threat to peace in the Mediterranean; and the prolongation of the bitter war in Spain, the results of which will be momentous for all Europe. Until the other day, Britain and Italy were friends; had been so for ages. But within the short space of two years all Mediterranean questions

have had to be discussed in wholly new terms, by reason of the thrusting of this one power.

Time compels me to keep to the bare essentials. Take then, first, the reiterated statement that the Mediterranean route is the life-line of empire. How far is this accurate? For France, certainly. Destroy the straight connection between France and Northwest Africa, and the French colonial empire is at an end. And similarly—one agrees of course with Major Barnes on this point—the Suez Canal is the vital link for Italy's empire in Northeast Africa. But is the line of Gibraltar-Suez equally the life-line of Britain? A positive Yes is commonly the answer to this query, because of essential supplies and of imperial power. But look at the facts and the map. Food and raw materials are poured into Britain by sea to the tune of, roughly, one million tons a week. Rather more than 10 per cent of this total is the product of Mediterranean lands, while less than 10 per cent goes through the Suez Canal. Foodstuffs amount to only a small percentage of the whole. Britain buys from all the world, and her trade routes, like those of the United States of America, cross all the seas. But, you will say, British ships crowd the Mediterranean: they did so throughout the Great War, paying a fearful toll to the submarine. Quite true; and the lesson was learned. If war should come again, the Admiralty, we may guess, would make the Mediterranean a forbidden area for British commerce. Merchant ships would take to the wide oceans; the Mediterranean countries themselves might suffer most.

I am not arguing that a closed Mediterranean would be a small matter for Britain. Of course not; it would be a grim affair. But I am saying that in respect of essential supplies its disadvantage could be overcome. Mussolini himself has remarked this. The Mediterranean route, he said in a well-known phrase, is for England a "short cut." Britain was an imperial power, and in the Orient, for more than a hundred years before the making of the Suez Canal. Only during the past seventy years has the life-line theory been held.

There are here, surely, two things which outweigh all others: the extent and character of the Italian preparations, and the fact of British responsibility in the Mediterranean and beyond.

An impressive contrast is indicated by the first point. No words that I could use would overstate the marvel of peace and safety which the Mediterranean world enjoyed throughout the last century. After Napoleon, as we all know, England held command of the seas. With the Washington Conference of 1922, the scope of sea power was formally changed. Naval supremacy by any one power belongs to the past. But note the transformation wrought by recent policy and action over the region we are now discussing. Instead of a Mediterranean that offered little more evidence of force held in reserve than we see along the splendid Canada frontier, there is the immense naval and air equipment of a new militant power; submarine and air bases scattered over the sea from Majorca to the Isles of Greece; a spreading network of military roads across the desert of Libya to the borders of Egypt; the most thorough-going system of radio propaganda, in native tongues, over a vast territory. But we are being reassured. We are now told that a conquered Ethiopia stands for the limit of Italian imperial aims.

Signor Mussolini does not agree. He said the opposite in his usual ringing tones. Italy satisfied? We cannot tell. But safe she is; entirely unthreatened.

This brings me to the familiar saying that Fascism is not an article of export. Nearly all Fascist writers quote it. I remind Major Barnes, however, that the Duce has gone far beyond his earlier statement. Fascism, he proclaims, is to be the world system of our century. His actions are in accord with his words. And Major Barnes is the author of a book, *The Universal Aspects of Fascism*. When a leading British statesman said that the Italian troops in Spain, after the adoption of the non-intervention policy, numbered not less than 100,000, Mussolini replied that the Italian exceptions to non-intervention did not exceed 40,000. He confessed, that is, the largest military interference in a foreign country, without recognized war, that modern Europe has known. And then—the terrific radio barrage, the disciplined press, the films, the schools around the Levant!

I come now to the basic matter—British responsibility in and around the Mediterranean. In a few moments you will be listening to the voice of an American writer who has discovered and announced that England expects every American to do his duty! I wish all challenging slogans were as easy to dispose of as that one is. Not a British statesman worth naming today has any other wish or hope concerning America than this: that her mighty strength may go into the will to peace. Let me turn it the other way round. Power and obligation belong together. Duty is shared, not shunted. Go to Geneva, or to any other international center, and you will be made aware of at least one thing: that in the Old World, England is expected to shoulder the burden of every nation! I am not joking. Generosity and initiative in our time are expected from two great governments and no more—from Britain, and from the United States. All of us know this. And you are blessedly remote from the storm, while we are right in it. Now, British responsibility in the Mediterranean means chiefly Egypt and Palestine. For Egypt, our obligation is plainly defined in the recent treaty. And as to Palestine, what? Britain there bears a heavy charge that may well seem unmanageable. I will say one thing only about it. The Western world, and the American people especially, would have little mercy for Britain if her Government were to shirk the duty that has been laid upon her by the League mandate and by the warring communities of the Holy Land.

I want a closing word on two great topics. First imperialism. Rival imperialisms, going on in the old way, cannot avoid a ruinous clash of arms. The United States is not an imperialist system. You may need to pass through a century of consolidation. You may need another half century for the fulfillment of national unity. You are redeeming your pledges in the Philippines and the Caribbean. And the British system, with all its great faults, is the one Empire that can claim to be self-redeeming. Is an Irish Free State, independent of English rule, a thing of no import? And India, now with a democratic constitution, building a structure of rapidly growing self-government? Try to think of a free dominion under a Fascist empire! Can you imagine it?

And finally, it does not seriously matter, you are told

by some, what system rules the outer world. Well, not a few American observers, looking ahead, have stated the central issue. One of them puts it thus: "Though it is no doubt written in the book of fate that Britain will no longer carry on alone the authority she exercised in the nineteenth century, it is also written in that book that our civilization is doomed to another dark age unless that authority can be perpetuated, by peoples who intend to live by the same political tradition." That is a faithful saying. You, and we, should ponder it.

Chairman Denny:

Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe. And now we will hear from Mr. Quincy Howe, author and writer on world affairs.

Mr. Howe:

Tonight you are hearing three speakers discuss "The Struggle for Power in the Mediterranean." Not one of us lives within a thousand miles of the Mediterranean. How, then, can we possibly know what we are talking about? The answer is simple. The whole essence of the Mediterranean struggle lies in the fact that the Mediterranean peoples themselves have little or nothing to say in the matter. Forces outside their control are determining their destiny for them.

Our discussion would be no different if a Frenchman and an Italian were to join. It is of course true that both France and Italy play important parts in the Mediterranean struggle. But what are they struggling for? The French must control a large section of the western Mediterranean. Otherwise, how can they keep the people of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in a state of colonial dependency? Furthermore, France has a stake in the eastern Mediterranean because the people of Syria too are subject to French rule. But the chief importance of the Mediterranean as far as France is concerned lies in the communication line to North Africa. For if German troops again invade France as they did in 1914 the French general staff will need black African man power to save white European civilization.

Colonial and military considerations play an even more important part in the Mediterranean policy of Fascist Italy. The Italian people import many of their vital necessities over the Mediterranean seaways. In addition, the present Fascist government must control a large part of the Mediterranean or lose its entire colonial empire. Fascist Italy must control the central Mediterranean in order to rule the province of Libya in North Africa. It must enjoy complete freedom of movement in the eastern Mediterranean because that way lies the route to the colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland, and conquered Ethiopia. And on top of all this, Fascist Italy has recently developed more Mediterranean ambitions in Asia Minor, in Egypt, and in Spain.

Yet the nation with the largest Mediterranean battle-fleet is not a Mediterranean nation at all. The backbone of the British Empire extends from England, past Gibraltar, past Malta, through the Suez Canal, and on to India. This backbone could, it is true, avoid the Mediterranean altogether and take a longer course around South Africa. But if the British Navy withdrew from the Mediterranean, the British Empire would not only lose Egypt and Palestine; it would be cut off from the

pipe line that carries its oil supply from the rich fields of Irak to the shores of the Mediterranean.

Thus, three great colonial empires—the French, the Italian, and the British—dominate the struggle for the Mediterranean. They have the guns, the fortifications, the battleships, the air-fleets. And they use and need these mighty weapons not to protect their own people from foreign aggression but to maintain and extend their imperial holdings. It is true that the people of Italy would starve to death if a hostile foreign power controlled the whole Mediterranean. But this does not mean that Mussolini must overthrow the legal and democratic government of Spain. On the contrary, Mussolini's aggressive policy in the Mediterranean and elsewhere brings him into conflict not only with the people of Ethiopia and the people of Spain; it runs counter to the imperial interests of other imperial powers—notably Great Britain.

In other words, the struggle for power in the Mediterranean amounts to nothing more or less than a struggle between rival imperial interests. For instance, the present rearmament program in Great Britain is not directed primarily against the subject peoples of India. Mussolini's battalions are not being trained exclusively for use against Ethiopians and Spaniards. Britain, Italy, and other great nations have one simple and sufficient reason for arming themselves to the teeth. They are preparing to fight each other for the spoils of empire.

So, at least, it seems at the moment. But a rift has lately appeared in respect to British imperial policy, and Major Barnes and Mr. Ratcliffe have given clear statements of the dilemma that has divided the British Foreign Office against itself for the past few years. Major Barnes believes that the British Empire must make a deal with Mussolini and, I dare say, with Hitler, if it is to survive. Mr. Ratcliffe believes that the British Empire can evolve along progressive, democratic lines especially if it takes a firm stand against Fascist aggression.

The United States lies more than three thousand miles away from the Mediterranean but that does not mean that the American people can disregard the struggle for power there. We learned in 1914 how rapidly events in Europe can catch up with us. The time is therefore none too soon for us to begin to understand the issues. The struggle for power in the Mediterranean boils down to little more than a straight imperialist dog-fight and bluffing match. England and France stand on one side; Italy stands on the other, with Germany not so far in the background. Major Barnes suggests that British imperial interests may be reconciled with the imperial interests of German and Italian Fascism. Such a proposal seems to me almost the height of romanticism. It ignores the entire history of imperialist development. It disregards the entire nature of imperialist rivalry. If there is one thing more absurd than to expect the lion to lie down with the lamb it is to expect the lion to lie down with the tiger.

But Mr. Ratcliffe's point of view seems to me even more fantastic—if that is possible. Mr. Ratcliffe does not suggest that the lion lie down with either the lamb or the tiger; he announces that the lion is not a lion at all but a lamb in lion's clothing. I hope I am not speaking out of turn if I pause to remark that the British Empire rules over three hundred million subject Indians and some one

hundred million other subject peoples. Anyone who classes such an empire among the world's democracies should be referred to the nearest dictionary.

A contest between rival imperial systems is now shaping up in the Mediterranean and in other parts of the world. What line should American foreign policy pursue? If the aim of American foreign policy is to defend American democracy, strict neutrality and complete isolation would seem to be the order of the day. As between England and Italy or France and Germany our watchword should be "A plague on both your houses."

Why has the United States refused to follow such a line? Because the United States is by no means a perfect democracy; it, too, is an imperialist power and any American who proclaims his moral superiority toward the British, Italian, French or any other imperial system merely proclaims his own ignorance. As long as we maintain our rule over the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and our other island possessions; as long as our citizens have over twelve billion dollars worth of foreign investments; as long as our State Department upholds American property rights and special privileges in far-off China, we cannot look down our noses at any other government.

Here, then, is the choice before us. On the one hand we might scrap our imperialist holdings and withdraw our protection from the property rights that a few of our citizens enjoy abroad. Our alternative is to pick the winning side in the coming imperialist war and recognize that war frankly for what it is. Actually we do neither. Instead of reaching a clear and frank decision, our State Department and our President talk about "peace-loving nations," "war-making nations," "quarantining the aggressor"—phrases that have absolutely no meaning whatsoever.

In consequence, wider and wider masses of people believe that all the wars now in preparation or actually under way involve a purely moral combat and that some undefined principle of abstract justice, rather than national self-interest, governs our national policy. If this evening's discussion has destroyed a few of these illusions as far as the struggle for power in the Mediterranean is concerned, it will not have been in vain.

Chairman Denny:

Thank you, Mr. Howe. We are ready for the question period. Please rise, state the name of the speaker to whom your question is directed. Questions, please!

Man: Major Barnes, you made a statement which may be interpreted to mean that after Mussolini got Ethiopia, he was well satisfied. Now, don't you think that after Il Duce has had one wonderfully hearty meal, wouldn't he get hungry again a little later on and want to devour some more food?

Major Barnes: I think I have explained that point. It will take at least thirty years for him to digest Ethiopia. And as he is now over fifty years of age, he will then be eighty. Italy, I think, may or may not be satisfied after that time, but meantime, what I do say is that England's interests and Italy's interests run parallel.

Man: Mr. Howe, you stated that the British Empire governed 400,000,000 people. Do you know that the British Empire is made up of self-governing colonies?

You also stated that the United States protects its colonies, whereas the British Empire governs hers. It doesn't seem consistent.

Mr. Howe: The British Empire is composed partly of self-governing Dominions, and partly of colonial subject peoples, such as the people of Africa. The total population runs in the neighborhood of 400,000,000. As for American imperialism and British imperialism, I don't think there is a straw to choose between the American administration of the Philippine Islands, for example, and the British administration of India. The real point, however, is that American foreign investments have developed a large stake of American property abroad which, quite as much as any territorial holdings we may have, would involve our country in war.

Woman: Major Barnes, if you think Mussolini is so satisfied, how do you explain his participation in Spain?

Major Barnes: I would like to point out a thing which is not generally known, but it is a fact. It was Italy who first raised before the Non-Intervention Committee the question of the retirement of volunteers, and at that time there was not one Italian volunteer in Spain. The other side already had many volunteers fighting there. That is a fact. It is in the minutes of the Non-Intervention Committee. The reason why Italy went there was merely to counteract the popular front volunteers which were already in Spain and among them were already Americans. Every single one of Italy's volunteers is a volunteer. Some of them had been in the regular army but had been allowed to go. They have been struck off the active list. The great majority of them are animated by crusader spirit, because they know perfectly well that fighting for Spain means fighting for Christianity and therefore for civilization, and against Bolshevism and therefore against atheism and savagery.

Chairman Denny: Mr. Ratcliffe, will you comment on that same question?

Mr. Ratcliffe: Yes. Of course, the point touched upon by Major Barnes comes very near to the whole problem of the foreign troops in Spain. The use of the word "volunteer" is obscure. It begs the question. To me the essential point with regard to the proposal that there should be withdrawal from Spain of foreign troops or foreign volunteers is this: that Italy suggested it should be withdrawal man for man, knowing that the total of Italian troops was very much larger than those in the international brigade.

Man: Major Barnes, does the anti-imperialism of the Scandinavian countries suggest to you a "surrender to death" as you suggested or indicated in your opening remarks?

Major Barnes: The Scandinavian countries are not imperialist nations. They have, relatively speaking, no very great vitality or creative talent. They have very nice countries. They live perfectly quietly; I am not saying they shouldn't. But if Sweden goes on in the way she is going with birth control, there won't be any Sweden left in a hundred years' time.

Chairman Denny: I happen to see in a box here a distinguished English woman, Mary Agnes Hamilton, who for five years has been a Director of the British Broadcasting Corporation and is lecturing here tomorrow morn-

ing in the Town Hall. I wonder if she would comment on the progress of the meeting so far. Mrs. Hamilton, may we hear from you?

Mrs. Hamilton: I will try to add another English voice, especially since Mr. Howe has stripped England and, in fact, all other countries of every decent garment of democracy, and Major Barnes has suggested that the garment of democracy is not decent at all.

I wish that I were on this occasion a citizen of France or of Greece or of some Mediterranean country who could, I think, testify that British control of the Mediterranean has not in the past been oppressive or threatening to their vital interests, whereas there is the apprehension that the full-blooded imperialistically-minded and aggressive Italian nation will threaten not only us but them. I think many citizens of Britain would desire that the League of Nations control the Mediterranean and other seas, English and other. Short of that position, I agree with my fellow countryman, Mr. Ratcliffe, in believing that despite the shocking errors of our past and our guilty blood-stained record, there is at this moment in Great Britain not only a democratic system but a democratic feeling and a very realistically felt democratic spirit. And it is in support of that spirit that we feel we can ask for your sympathy and support for the institutions we share together.

Woman: Major Barnes, when you make the statement that all the Italians in Spain are volunteers, do you wish to give lie to the American newspaper correspondents of almost all conservative papers who last year in interviewing Italian soldiers who had been captured north of Madrid stated that they thought they were bound for Ethiopia?

Major Barnes: I do give lie to that, and I will tell you why. I was in Ethiopia with the Italian troops during the Ethiopian War, and the lies that were printed in the capitalist press in England and this country were so great that when I came out people were all wondering why the fellows ever got there. There was not one single word in 90 per cent of what was printed in the papers at that time that was the truth, and therefore it is with a sense of a good deal of doubt that I disbelieve these statements that are still made. And it is very curious that the Leftists in this country seem to take all their information from the capitalist press.

Chairman Denny: Tonight we are happy to have the participation from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, of the Spectator Club, a Town Meeting Discussion Club of students and instructors of Duquesne University. Their Chairman, Mr. Paul M. Lackner, President of the Club, is going to preside. Are you ready in Pittsburgh, Mr. Lackner?

Mr. Lackner (from Pittsburgh): Tonight we welcome the unique opportunity to put our questions directly to the New York speakers. And now we have our first question.

Man (From Pittsburgh): Major Barnes, you have stated that English and Italian interests are parallel. Is it not a necessary part of traditional English foreign policy to prevent any nation from becoming so strong that England must, as you have put it, be its firm friend?

Major Barnes (From New York): Well, that is a question of measure. As I said, I think Italy's policy, I am certain Italy's policy is not to annex Egypt, the Sudan,

Palestine; is not to attack England. England, after all, is an old country. She has got what she wants, and she has really nothing to fear, unless she decays. If Italy is not satisfied with Ethiopia after 30 years, that is a thing I can not prophesy about. Her ultimate object is cultural leadership and not territorial conquest.

Man (From Pittsburgh): Mr. Ratcliffe, do you believe that a slogan such as "The white man's burden is civilizing nations" is to be taken at face value today in view of the history of imperialism since the 1890's?

Mr. Ratcliffe (From New York): Of course I don't think that any slogans are to be taken at their face value. There are two points I should make in answer to that question. The first would be that we can not avoid the responsibilities that we have inherited. If anybody thinks, for example, that Britain could walk out of India, with its enormously complicated problem of human welfare and difficulty of administration, then I should say they had better put the suggestion to any given hundred educated Indians and listen to the answer.

The other point in my reply would be a repetition or expansion of what I said in my address. You must judge any system, imperial or non-imperial, by what it is trying to do under the challenge of today. My journalistic life in great part has been spent in criticizing the British imperial system, from England and elsewhere. I recognize, as I believe the vast majority of my countrymen do when criticizing our system, that it has shown, as my distinguished fellow-countrywoman said, a deep spirit of seriousness and of democracy, and is moving in the direction of the self-redemption of a great and difficult and faulty system.

Woman (From Pittsburgh): Major Barnes, you stated that the Italians have vigorously abstained from trying to subvert the political institutions of other countries. How can that be true when the English are having to send propaganda to subvert the propaganda that Mussolini's agencies have sent into Albania and into the Holy Land?

Major Barnes: That has nothing whatever to do with Fascism. I said Fascism was not a policy which Italy was trying to advocate in foreign countries for the purpose of subverting the other country's democratic institutions. The propaganda which Mussolini's government has indulged in in the Middle East is counter-propaganda. England has had all the way with propaganda heretofore. England is the clearing house of the news of the world and even American news filters, to a large extent, through English spectacles. There is a tremendous amount of propaganda made by England all over the world. Italy suddenly discovered that there was in the Mohammedan world a place where she has great prestige and where England has trouble, and so she thought: Here at least we can do a little counter-propaganda in the same way as England, that is, by straight news which is given a twist. England now is indulging in counter-counter-propaganda. I hope it will be very successful.

Man (From Pittsburgh): Mr. Ratcliffe, does your reference to "a Middle Sea without menace to the people on its borders" imply that England has since her domination of that sea always used the Mediterranean without menace to the nations which border it?

Mr. Ratcliffe: A Middle Sea without menace to the people on its borders—put that up to any member of a small nationality around the Mediterranean and see whether there will be any doubt about the emphasis of the answer, that the old Mediterranean was entirely safe, secure for all, free for all peoples and all ships.

Man (From Pittsburgh): Mr. Howe, if a war broke out between the rival imperialisms, what policy would you favor for the United States, a policy of neutrality by statute operating against both parties in the dispute irrespective of the aggressor, or a policy of cooperation with the attacked powers against the aggressor or aggressors—this cooperation in the form of sanctions—or the use of armed force?

Mr. Howe (From New York): I personally should advocate a policy of isolation and neutrality. I realize, however, that this is completely impossible and unrealistic as long as we are living under the capitalistic imperialist system of today. Therefore, unless we could change that system before that war—of which I think there is practically no chance at all—I should advocate making an alliance, forming a line of policy which will be in the greatest accordance with our imperialist interests and recognize those interests for precisely what they are. To outline just what form such a policy should take would require a considerable amount of time. All I can say is that, of course, it would have to be made in collaboration with the British Empire, and since I think that Empire is on its way out, I should demand and insist, if I were in the State Department, that we get a guarantee in advance from Great Britain to abandon many privileges that it holds today and that are indefensible, can not be held, and would doom us to destruction if we went to a war in behalf of them.

Chairman Denny: Thank you, Mr. Howe.

Man: Major Barnes, does that elbow room you spoke about which Italy needs justify the destruction of innocent lives in Spain by her airplanes and the havoc resulting

by the reported ruthless sinking of ships by her submarines?

Major Barnes: All war is a horrid business and to pretend for a single minute that Italian airplanes were purposely bombing innocent women and children is just about as absurd as to say that the airplanes of the other side have purposely bombed innocent women and children. I don't think either side would purposely bomb innocent women and children. If you do engage in war, you make war with the gloves off. The sinking of ships by Italian submarines is an accusation which has been authoritatively denied.

Man: Major Barnes, how do you explain Italy's expeditions into Ethiopia as part of their cultural crusade?

Major Barnes: I think that Italy's occupation of Ethiopia is an enormous advantage to the Ethiopians. If you would read any book on Ethiopia written by people who are by no means favorable to Fascism or Italy, like Lady Simon, for example, you would realize that the rule of Ethiopians is about the most ghastly affair in the history of mankind. You forget for one thing that the Ethiopians only occupy one-quarter of the territory of Ethiopia; that all the rest has been conquered by the Ethiopians in the last fifty years, and most of it in the last thirty years; that in one province, the Province of Jimma, for example, twenty-five years ago, there were 1,250,000 inhabitants, and that there are now only 12,000 inhabitants. Why? Because they have been carried off in slavery and driven into the mountains and starved to death. That is the sort of rule which Italy is getting rid of in Ethiopia; but I admit that she went there chiefly in order to get some place in the sun which she could colonize with her own surplus population. One reason why she went there and had to go there was that she was not given colonies at the end of the Great War, in spite of the formal pledge of the Allies to do so in the event of the German colonies being taken away from Germany.

TRIPOLITAN BACKGROUND OF THE WAR OF 1801-1805

FELIX HOWLAND, 1ST LIEUT., V.M.C.R.

■ The old song runs, "From the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli." Actually the other way around would be better, since the War with Tripoli in which Marines under Lieutenant O'Bannon took part was in 1801-1805 and the War with Mexico fully forty years later. Be that as it may, one sometimes wonders why it was that the United States had to fight Tripoli and yet could remain at peace with such comparatively important Barbary powers as Morocco, Tunis, and Algiers.

Although every Marine, and nearly every schoolboy, knows that we had a war with Tripoli, there are not many people, even among the professional historians, who know why. The story has never before been told in English and it may interest some of the readers of the GAZETTE to know.

Until the middle of the sixteenth century, Tripoli was

governed by the Knights of Malta. It was only in 1551 during the reign of Solomon the Magnificent that she was conquered by the Turks. Thereafter it was governed by "Bashaws" sent out from Istanbul. These worthies maintained themselves, rather against the will of the people, by means of heavy garrisons of Turkish troops and, though the country did not like its rulers, it prospered. As was true of nearly every seaport of that day, many of the seamen made their living through piracy, but this was far from being either the commonest or most respected profession in the community.

About the year 1714 the Turkish bashaw was recalled to Istanbul and left the government in the hands of a certain Ahmad Karamanli, destined to be known to his successors as "Ahmad the Great." This man, a native of Tripoli, saw that the opportunity had come to free his country from Turkish rule. The way he did this is described in a letter written by a Miss Tully, an English

woman, who lived at Tripoli some years later:¹

"During this period Hamet-Bey, applying to the Porte, was made Bashaw. He soon found means of making a total alteration in the government; and the sudden manner in which he effected this change was truly singular. He contrived, without any disturbance, in the space of twenty-four hours, to clear Tripoli of all the Turkish soldiers, amounting to several hundreds of disciplined troops. At his palace, not far from town, he made a superb entertainment, and invited all the chiefs of the Turks to partake of it. Three hundred of these unfortunate victims were strangled, one by one, as they entered the skiffer, or hall. This skiffer is very long, with small dark rooms or deep recesses on each side, in which a hidden guard was placed. These guards assassinated the Turks as they passed, quickly conveying the bodies into those recesses out of sight, so that the next Turk saw nothing extraordinary going on when he entered the fatal skiffer, but, quitting his horse and servants, met his fate unsuspectingly.

"Next day the Turks, who remained in this city (no doubt by order), were found murdered in all parts, and little or no inquiries were made after those who had perpetrated such horrid deeds. Only a few straggling Turks remained to tell the horrid tale. Great presents were sent by the Bashaw to Constantinople to appease the Grand Signior, and in a day or two no one dared to talk of the Turkish garrison, which, in a few hours, had been totally annihilated. Having in this dreadful manner freed himself and his family from the Turkish yoke, and succeeding in keeping the Grand Signior in humour, he caused Tripoli to remain entirely under a Moorish government, for which the Moors still call his reign glorious."

Ahmad the Great established order, encouraged commerce, and, forbidding piracy, ruled wisely and well. At last in his old age he became blind and, feeling no longer able to rule, he put everything in order and blew out his brains. He had ruled thirty-two years in all and was succeeded by his son Mohammad in 1746.

Nothing is known of Mohammad or his reign. If we judge by this it must have been peaceful and short. All we know is that he was succeeded by his son Ali.

Ali was moderate, intelligent, liberal and peace-loving. Under him Tripoli grew wealthy and was generally considered the happiest of the Barbary states. Pirates were not allowed and no European nations considered it necessary even to make treaties of peace and friendship, so little danger did her government threaten. In this policy the United States followed suit, and though she made a treaty with Morocco as early as 1787 did not even open relations with Tripoli until about 1794.

Unfortunately Ali had three sons. Of these the eldest was named Hassan and was noted for his nobility of character as well as his ability. The second son, Ahmad, was well-intentioned but weak. The youngest, named Yussef, was cruel, dictatorial, avaricious, and, worse than all these, jealous of his older brothers.

About 1792 Yussef was able to pick a quarrel with

Hassan, the crown prince. This bothered their mother a great deal and she asked both her sons to visit her and be reconciled to each other. The unfortunate interview ended when Yussef shot his brother, and leaving him dead in his mother's arms, fled from the city and began a revolt against his father.

Suddenly everything in Tripoli went wrong. The crops failed and pestilence broke out. The country lay helpless before so many catastrophes. However, seventy-five years of peace and able government had made Tripoli a storehouse of wealth and there was a good deal to invite envy even though the people were starving. This fact was quickly appreciated by a Turkish pirate named Ali ben Zoul (alias Ali Boulgour), who seized the city on 29 July, 1793, and proceeded with the systematic plunder of the countryside.

Thanks to this unexpected intervention, Ali Bashaw and his two remaining sons, Ahmad and the rebel Yussef, pooled their interests. Going to Tunis, they received aid and under the joint command of Ahmad and Yussef an army went to the relief of Tripoli. The Bashaw, overcome with grief and age, stayed behind in Tunis, where he died, naming Ahmad as his heir.

The army was successful in its mission and in April, 1794, Ali ben Zoul fled from Tripoli with his spoils, leaving behind an utterly ruined city. But Tripoli's troubles were not yet over.

We have said that Ahmad was weak, even if well-intentioned. He had scarcely proclaimed himself Bashaw when his brother deposed him and ascended the throne himself. But Yussef found that his kingdom was not an easy one to rule. It was bankrupt and was unable to supply the money which he required for his amusements. There seemed but one thing to do and he did it. He threw the city open to pirates and commenced operations against all Christian powers, the United States included.

The United States, which, as we have seen, had had no reason until now to negotiate with Tripoli, followed the lead of the European countries and bought a treaty of perpetual peace from Yussef for \$56,000. This treaty was concluded on 4 November, 1796, but it was not long before Yussef felt that he had been too easy-going and began a series of demands for gifts and presents. Somehow the Americans did not seem to feel as generous as the Bashaw thought they ought to be. *At last he declared war against the United States on 14 May, 1801.*

The war lasted until 1805 and taught Yussef to be more careful in what he asked the Christian powers, for, following the lead of the United States, the European countries told him that they would no longer tolerate piracy and ransom. However, internal conditions improved steadily, making up for the loss of the profits of piracy (which had been only an emergency measure anyway), and Tripoli had fairly peaceful and prosperous existence until Yussef's death in 1830.

After a brief and bloody civil war, his son Sidi Ali ascended the throne. The country was, however, much weakened and Sidi Ali was none too well loved, so that when the Turks re-took it in May, 1835, after one hundred twenty-one years' absence they had little difficulty and were able to hold it until 1912, when Italy took it over.

¹Tully, Miss. "Narrative of ten years' residence at Tripoli in Africa, etc."—London, 1816.

²Medina, G. "Les Karamanli de la Tripolitaine et l'occupation de Tripoli par Ali Boulgour." Revue Tunisienne, Tunis, 1907.

The Karamanli Dynasty
 1714 Ahmad the Great
 1746 Mohammad ben Ahmad
 ? Ali ben Mohammad
 1793 (Ali ben Zoul, alias Ali Boulgour)
 1794 Ahmad ben Ali
 1794 Yussef ben Ali
 1830 Sidi Ali ben Yussef
 1835 (Turkish Conquest)
 1912 (Italian Conquest)

BOOK REVIEWS

LT. COL. M. L. KRULEWITCH, FMCR

IF WAR COMES, by R. Ernest Dupuy, Major, Field Artillery, U. S. Army, and George Fielding Eliot, late Major, Military Intelligence Reserve, U. S. A. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1937. 368 p.

Intended primarily for the civilian reader, the military and naval establishments will find considerable of interest in this book. It analyzes the available instruments of war and concludes with an interesting discussion of the strength of the United States in any possible offensive or defensive war. The authors have used material from the Spanish and Ethiopian campaigns, and have likewise gone to classical authorities for precedent. A careerist will no doubt find considerable material which prepared for the lay reader appears elementary and axiomatic, but there is excellent food for thought contained in this volume. The authors conclude that the new weapons of warfare will not revolutionize the art of war and purport to answer the oft discussed question as to the feasibility of the "totalitarian war" which has come to signify the ruthless extinction of peaceful populations in entire areas, with attacks on great cities and the inevitable destruction of women, children and non-combatants. The writers take the position that such will not be the future course of warfare and among their reasons point to the effect on neutral opinion, the waste of tremendous effort on non-military targets and the importance of guarding against reprisals.

A careful estimate of the national situation for war in the case of each of the world powers is made throwing many an interesting sidelight on popular misconceptions. After reviewing the respective situations of Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, France and Great Britain, the authors undertake to weigh the strength of the United States—if war comes. The discussion tends to emphasize what most students of military and naval science accept as self-evident—that the United States is strong in so far as its bases are adequate and sufficient. The navy's lack is reiterated to be the need for auxiliaries, the replacement of overage destroyers and submarines, light cruisers and additional drydock and repair facilities. The conclusion reached, however, is that the United States is at present prepared to defend itself but that she is not prepared—and the authors amplify their statement "nor do we think there is any necessity for her to be prepared"—for aggression against others.

There is added in this volume a series of appendices including tabulations presenting comparative estimates of the military, naval and air strength of the several world powers including the United States and Japan, together with a comparison of the troop organizations, infantry, artillery, and anti-tank weapons of several of the powers.

An interesting chart has been prepared showing the strategic situation of the great powers with regard to raw materials. Generally speaking the United States is far in the lead with Russia in second place. Japan, it is noted, appears superior to the United States in domestic production only in the cases of chromite, tungsten and

mica. The percentages in this chart, however, are not up to date and it may well be that changes in the last few years have varied the results shown.

It will be found useful and of interest to the members of the armed forces as well as to the civilian reader.

Counter-Attack In Spain. By Ramon J. Sender. Translated from the Spanish by Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell. Boston. Houghton Mifflin Co. The Riverside Press (1937). 288 p.

Ramon J. Sender, still under 40, is considered by many as one of the most distinguished of living Spanish writers. Of landholding conservative stock, his study of the law at Madrid brought him into early contact with many young intellectuals of the period. Prior to his military service in Morocco, he was one of the group of university students who protested against the administration of Primo de Rivera. An avowed Communist and an important member of the Popular Front, his writing must be considered as subjectively colored by his political philosophy, but despite this fact and with due allowance for it, the book presents a most interesting picture of the war in Spain. It has received favorable comment in many quarters and the Bureau of Navigation has reported that "critics, in general, have considered it the best single volume on the present conflict." (Let. 21 January 1938; Nav-149-EA PII-2 (471).

This book gives a graphic picture of the Spanish battle-front. In it we find described the desperate defenses, hastily organized by groups of laborers and peasants in many of the sectors, and there is adequately portrayed the woeful lack of arms and munitions on the Loyalist side in the early stages of the war. Reference is made on many occasions to the German and Italian assistance rendered the Insurgents, but little or no comment is made with regard to the substantial help given to the Loyalist regime by the Soviet.

The book reminds one of "Le Feu" by Barbusse, the famous French Socialist, who soldiered at the front during the World War. There is a quality to the writing which even in translation is not lost.

This single volume covers practically the first six months of the war, and in the defense of Madrid at Guadarrama, with the outpouring of the civilian population to the battle-front close to the city, we are faintly reminded of the taxi-cab parade out of Paris in 1914. Through the pages of the book, despite the political ardor of the so-called Popular Front, with its Socialists, Communists, Anarchists, Syndicalists, etc., one receives the impression that an organized and smoothly functioning military machine did not exist on the Loyalist side. The chapter on Guadarrama begins with a section entitled "War Without An Army"; and Mr. Sender's spirit, enthusiasm and fervor brings to mind not only certain aspects of the Russian Revolution but the French Revolution as well, before the advent of Napoleon. The crimes of degraded violence attributed to the Moors in Spain may have been matched to some extent by outrages on the other side.

Despite the fact that this book has not been prepared solely as a military resumé of the operations on the Spanish front, it will prove both entertaining and of value to the service reader.

PROCUREMENT PROGRAM FOR SECOND LIEUTENANTS

■ It is estimated that by 1 July, 1938, the Marine Corps will be faced with a shortage of fifty-nine (59) commissioned officers under existing laws, or with a shortage of seventy-nine (79) officers in the event legislation increasing the number of commissioned officers is enacted by Congress.

The procurement plan for the coming fiscal year was approved 4 February, 1938, by the Secretary of the Navy. Twenty-five (25) graduates of the Naval Academy will be appointed as second lieutenants this year. Thirteen meritorious noncommissioned officers of the Marine Corps applied and were recommended for advancement from the ranks and took the preliminary mental examination 28 February at the various stations. The number to be appointed from the ranks as a result of the final examinations to be held at the Marine Barracks, Washington, D. C., the end of May, can not now be definitely determined.

A quota of seven has been allotted to the honor graduates of the Platoon Leaders' Classes at Quantico and San Diego, who graduate from college this year and pass the final physical examination.


A competitive examination will be held for aviation cadets of the Marine Corps Reserve who are naval aviators, and officers of the Marine Corps Reserve who accepted their appointments prior to 1 February, 1938, the subjects included in the mental tests being the same as specified for the examination of meritorious noncommissioned officers. (See Circular Letter, MGC to all officers, No. 234, dated 15 Dec., 1937.) Candidates in this group must be between twenty and twenty-five

years of age on date of commission in the regular service.

Continuing the policy in effect for many years, a quota has been assigned to graduates in current classes of certain selected colleges throughout the United States having Army and Navy ROTC training, and twenty-one (21) second lieutenants will be commissioned 1 July, 1938, from this source. Applicants must be between 20 and 25 years of age, single, citizens of the United States, must complete the four year Army or Navy ROTC course in an "honor status," and must be recommended by the Professor of Military or Naval Science and Tactics, and the President of the college. The only examination required of applicants from this group is the physical one.

If pending legislation authorizing an increase in commissioned officers is passed by the Congress during the present session, the limitation of 1,093 officers would be raised. This would enable the Marine Corps to appoint an additional twenty (20) second lieutenants this year from colleges having Army and Navy ROTC training.

In the selection of current graduates completing the ROTC training in an honor status, the Major General Commandant has received the whole-hearted cooperation of the Professors of Military and Naval Science and Tactics and the Presidents of the institutions selected to nominate applicants. The list of colleges and universities for this coming year covers every section of the United States and, based on the representative types recommended in former years, it is expected that a most satisfactory group of college graduates will be procured during the coming year.



**APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF SECOND LIEUTENANT
IN THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**

It is provided by law that vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant shall be filled, first, as far as practicable from graduates at the Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., each year on completing the prescribed course; second, from meritorious noncommissioned officers of the Marine Corps; and, third, from civil life.

All commissions are probationary for a period of two years and may be revoked for cause by the Secretary of the Navy or for failure to pass the final examinations for permanent commission. The marriage of any second lieutenant holding a probationary commission is considered cause for revocation of his commission.

Marine Corps aviation officers are detailed from officers of the regular service who have had at least two years' service and who apply for such duty.

**I. GRADUATES OF THE U. S. NAVAL ACADEMY,
ANNAPOLIS, MD.**

The Secretary of the Navy allots a quota to the Marine Corps from each year's graduating class at the Naval Academy. Seniors desiring commissions in the Marine Corps submit applications to the Superintendent of the Naval Academy. Detailed information regarding appointment as a midshipman may be obtained by addressing the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

**II. NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF THE
MARINE CORPS**

A noncommissioned officer of the rank of corporal or higher may be recommended for a commission by any general, field officer, or officer in command of a company or detachment, if, in the opinion of that officer, the aspirant has the moral, mental, and physical qualifications required of an officer in the Marine Corps. Any

noncommissioned officer who meets the requirements regarding age and length of service and who feels that he has the basic education to pass the mental examinations, should communicate with his immediate commanding officer not later than January of the year in which he wishes to be considered for advancement. A candidate from this source should have a first class high school education and at least TWO years of college training, or its equivalent.

A set of sample questions is available in printed form and may be obtained by addressing the Major General Commandant (via official channels if the applicant is a member of the Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve).


Following are the requirements for candidates from the ranks:

(a) Must be over 21 but less than 27 years of age when commissioned, about 1 July; single; citizens of the United States.

(b) Must have completed two years of enlisted service by 1 July of the year in which examined for commission, at least one year of which must have been in the Marine Corps. Not more than one year of active duty with pay as an enlisted man in the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps Reserve will be credited in computing the length of service. Time spent at the Naval or Military Academy is not counted in computing length of service.

(c) Must qualify in preliminary and final examinations in the following subjects: United States history, English grammar and composition, general history, geography, algebra (quadratics and beyond), geometry (plane and solid), trigonometry (plane and spherical), physics (elementary). Also, TWO subjects to be chosen by the candidates from: calculus (differential and integral), electricity, and English and American literature.

(Continued on page 50)



STATUS OF VARIOUS GRADES IN MARINE CORPS WITH REGARD TO SERVICE IN GRADE AND ELIGIBILITY FOR SELECTION

COLONEL'S GRADE

December 1938 Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June 1939):

No. eligible for consideration..... 14
No. to be placed on promotion list..... 1
No. completing 35 years commissioned service by 6/30/39..... 5

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/39 (if not on promotion or staff eligible lists)..... 4

December 1939 Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1940):

No. eligible for consideration..... 22
(Eligibles left from previous year..... 9)
(New eligibles..... 13)

No. to be placed on promotion list..... 2

Additional number completing 35 years commissioned service 6/30/40..... 4

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/40 (if not on promotion or staff eligible lists)..... 4

December, 1940, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1941):

No. eligible for consideration..... 29
(Eligibles left from previous year..... 16)
(New eligibles..... 13)

No. to be placed on promotion list..... 1

Additional number completing 35 years commissioned service by 6/30/41..... 7

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/41 (if not on promotion or staff eligible lists)..... 4

December, 1941 Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1942):

No. eligible for consideration..... 28
(Eligibles left from previous year..... 24)
(New eligibles..... 4)

No. to be placed on promotion list..... 1

Additional number completing 35 years commissioned service by 6/30/42..... 5

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/42 (if not on promotion or staff eligible lists)..... 4

NOTE: The number of colonels to be involuntarily retired may be reduced by 3 if the colonels to be placed on the staff eligible list by the 1939, 1940 and 1941 selection boards are selected from among those colonels completing 35 years commissioned service in the years indicated.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL'S GRADE

December, 1938, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1939):

No. eligible for consideration..... 22

No. to be placed on promotion list..... 4

No. completing 28 years commissioned service on 6/30/39..... 0

December, 1939, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1940):

No. eligible for consideration..... 38
(Eligibles left from previous year..... 18)
(New eligibles..... 20)

No. to be placed on promotion list..... 4

No. completing 28 years commissioned service on 6/30/40..... 1

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/40 (if not on promotion list)..... 1

December, 1940, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1941):

No. eligible for consideration..... 59
(Eligibles left from previous year..... 33)
(New eligibles..... 26)

No. to be placed on promotion list..... 4

No. completing 28 years commissioned service on 6/30/41..... 8

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/41 (if not on promotion list)..... 6

December, 1941, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1942):

No. eligible for consideration..... 62
(Eligibles left from previous year..... 49)
(New eligibles..... 13)

No. to be placed on promotion list..... 4

Additional number completing 28 years commissioned service on 6/30/42..... 6

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/42 (if not on promotion list)..... 6

MAJOR'S LIST

January, 1938, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1938):

No. eligible for consideration..... 54

No. placed on promotion list..... 12

No. completing 21 years commissioned service by 6/30/38..... 34

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/38..... 11

No. on retention list..... 13

January, 1939, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1939):

No. eligible for consideration..... 109
(Eligibles from previous year..... 31)
(New eligibles..... 78)

No. to be placed on promotion list..... 9

Additional number completing 21 years commissioned service by 6/30/39..... 54

(This figure does not include number on retention list from January, 1938, board).

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/39..... 11

January, 1940, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1940):

No. eligible for consideration..... 127
(12 now in captains grade)

(Eligibles left from previous year..... 89)

(New eligibles..... 38)

No. to be placed on promotion list..... 9

Additional number completing 21 years commissioned service on 6/30/40..... 48

(This figure does not include number on retention list from January, 1939, board)

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/40..... 11

January, 1941, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1941):

No. eligible for consideration..... 155

(40 now in captain's grade)

(Eligibles left from previous year 107)

(New eligibles, estimated 48)

No. to be placed on promotion list..... 9

Additional number completing 21 years commissioned service on 6/30/41..... 42

(This figure does not include number on retention list from January, 1940, board)

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/41..... 11

January, 1942, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1942):

No. eligible for consideration..... 151

(16 now in captain's grade)

(Eligibles left from previous year.. 135)

(New eligibles 16)

No. to be placed on promotion list..... 9

Additional number completing 21 years commissioned service on 6/30/42..... 15

(This figure does not include number on retention list from January, 1941, board)

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/42..... 11

CAPTAIN'S GRADE

February, 1938, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1938):

No. eligible for consideration..... 78

No. to be placed on promotion list..... 2

No. completing 21 years commissioned service on 6/30/38..... 19*

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/38 (if not on promotion list)..... 14

*(To date five of the captains who would involuntarily retire on 6/30/38 have either applied for voluntary retirement or are in process of being retired for physical disability prior to 6/30/38).

February, 1939, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1939):

No. eligible for consideration..... 193

(Eligibles from previous year..... 57)

(New eligibles 136)

No. to be placed on promotion list to be determined by Secretary of the Navy.

No. completing 21 years commissioned service on 6/30/39..... 13

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/39 (if not on promotion list)..... 13

February, 1940, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1940):

No. eligible for consideration:

(New eligibles 65)

(Eligibles left from previous year to be added)

No. to be placed on promotion list to be determined by Secretary of the Navy.

No. completing 21 years commissioned service on 6/30/40..... 23

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/40 (if not on promotion list)..... 23

February, 1941, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1941):

No. eligible for consideration:

(New eligibles 82)

(Eligibles left from previous year to be added)

No. to be placed on promotion list to be determined by Secretary of the Navy.

No. completing 21 years commissioned service on 6/30/41..... 12

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/41 (if not on promotion list)..... 12

FIRST LIEUTENANT'S GRADE

February, 1938, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1938):

No. eligible for consideration..... 48

No. to be placed on promotion list..... 32

No. completing 14 years commissioned service by 6/30/38..... 4

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/38 (if not on promotion list)..... 4

February, 1939, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1939):

No. eligible for consideration..... 31

(Eligibles from previous year..... 12)

(New eligibles 19)

No. to be placed on promotion list to be determined by Secretary of the Navy.

No. completing 14 years commissioned service on 6/30/39..... 0

February, 1940, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1940):

No. eligible for consideration:

(New eligibles 29)

(Eligibles from previous year to be added)

No. to be placed on promotion list to be determined by Secretary of the Navy.

No. completing 14 years commissioned service by 6/30/40..... 1

No. to be involuntarily retired on 6/30/40 (if not on promotion list)..... 1

February, 1941, Selection Board (Fiscal year ending 30 June, 1941):

No. eligible for consideration:

(New eligibles 29)

(Eligibles from previous year to be added)

No. to be placed on promotion list to be directed by Secretary of the Navy.

No. completing 14 years commissioned service by 6/30/41..... 0

MEMBERS

■ Have you read the 1938, or the Fifty-Ninth Annual Report, of the Secretary and Treasurer of the Navy Mutual Aid Association? If not; you and your wife should do so. Its pages are of vital interest to us all! The report has developed into a much needed book of information on the state of our insurance company plus the reaches and aid of the association. Captain J. R. Hornberger certainly did an excellent job on its composition.

A WAR OF MOVEMENT—SOME FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION

CAPTAIN L. M. ANDREWS, U.S.M.C.

■ To accomplish the mission of conquering and destroying the enemy's armed forces,—the objective in waging war,—success in battle is dependent upon the ability to move. Position warfare does not usually play a decisive part in reaching the objective. This short paper will deal with several factors concerned with a war of movement.

THE RIFLE

In the War of the Revolution (1775-1783), the Continental Army, whether Regulars or Militia were nearly all frontiersmen, trained from childhood in the use of the rifle and musket. Some Continental Line Regiments and certain famous rifle regiments including Morgan's Virginians, Rawling's Maryland Riflemen, and Miles' Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment were equipped with flintlock rifles, which in the hands of skilled marksmen had an accurate killing power up to 200 yards. The British Army was armed with the flintlock smooth-bore musket,* an inaccurate and not too reliable weapon with a maximum effective range of from 50 to 60 yards.

While available statistics are neither complete nor accurate, it can safely be said that in practically every pitched battle involving forces which were at all equal numerically, the British losses far exceeded our own. The British battle losses between the period 1775-1781 had been as five British soldiers to three American soldiers.

Small arms experts today who have compared the rifles of the principal armies of the world generally do not consider the Springfield rifle** to be superior to several of the foreign types. The French Lebel rifle is considered by many to be as good as or even better than the Springfield. Since the Springfield was first adopted by the Army,—there have been very few changes of importance, other than the adoption of a larger and heavier front sight and improvements in type and quality of ammunition and the design of the bullet. However, there is the new semi-automatic rifle, patterned after the Springfield, but of greater fire power, which has not yet been put in use by the United States. The writer does not have complete data concerning this rifle.

The prime importance of fire power has been recognized by the adoption of the Browning automatic rifle for employment in each infantry squad, the adoption and successful use of the Thompson submachine gun by Marines in Nicaragua (a weapon of limited range but great fire power), and the uniform practice of close support of infantry units by use of the machine gun, both in

offense and defense. Also, there are other weapons for the same purpose such as the .37 millimeter gun, the trench mortar, rifle and hand grenades, and flame throwers.***

However, of all of the small-arms weapons, veteran soldiers still place their main dependence in the rifle. In a war of movement, fire power alone is insufficient. We must have the ability to move and keep moving. Since the rifle is our basic weapon, skilled marksmanship is essential. Rifle expertness, unlike knowledge, cannot be conveyed quickly by an instructor, nor be gained by the average man in a short period of intensive training. For instant and accurate rifle use, a combination of mental and manual dexterity is necessary which comes only by long practice. As a body, American soldiers in the World War were unskilled marksmen and for each casualty produced they fired about 7,000 shots. It cannot be stressed too strongly that in war it is the hit that counts.

In spite of the work of the National Riflemen's Association and the well-directed training by the National Guard, R.O.T.C., C.M.T.C., and Naval Reserve organizations,—our mode and standard of living has changed from what it was at the time of the Mexican War and when we still had a frontier. The United States today is a non-militaristic nation engaged principally in peacetime pursuits.

It is very doubtful if the American Armies of the future will be made up of trained riflemen, familiar with the capabilities and limitations of their weapon, and expert in its use—as their forefathers were.

The American Armies of the future will in all probability be raised, trained and equipped ready to fight in about four months' time or less. In a war with a major power, we will not have the time to prepare thoroughly. Therefore, in our training methods, a thorough grounding in rifle marksmanship is one essential which cannot be over-emphasized.

Present methods include theoretical work such as nomenclature, functioning, care and cleaning of the rifle, training in sighting and aiming, positions, trigger squeeze and rapid fire; effect of wind, making sight changes and using the score book, followed by small-bore practice. Then the recruit is given caliber .30 practice, followed by record practice. The expenditure of ammunition is very limited and with Reserve organizations, the firing is conducted at ranges of only 200 yards. The firing is carried on at stationary targets, and in peacetime, recruits are instructed by trained coaches at adequate rifle ranges.

The following suggestions are presented in view of a national emergency, for what they may be worth:

(1) Proper and adequate sites should be selected near permanent military posts likely to be used in event of a National Emergency, which would be suitable for con-

*Except for about 200 Ferguson breech-loading flintlock rifles, inferior to the American rifle in precision but superior in rapidity of fire.

**U. S. magazine rifle, caliber .30, Model of 1903.

***There can also be added—tanks, armored cars, combat airplanes, artillery and anti-aircraft support, mining and sapping and chemicals.

struction of additional rifle ranges, with maximum ranges of at least 600 yards. Each post should have several sites selected, and if practicable, concrete butts should be put in for targets.

(2) As a part of the present training for regular and reserve units, qualified enlisted men should be trained in and assigned to duty as rifle coaches so that there will be a large number of men available for this duty at all times. A coaching organization should be built up which will form the nucleus for expansion in time of war.

(3) The allowance per man of .30 caliber ammunition should be very greatly increased for training purposes.

(4) The training in .30 caliber target practice should be continuous, thorough and progressive. After a recruit has qualified as marksman or better at fixed targets, he should then fire courses at moving targets until he becomes proficient. This marksmanship training must be kept up and not permitted to be crowded out for something else that may be pressing at the moment.

To become really skilled marksmen, our soldiers of the future must acquire besides skill at stationary targets with deliberate aim, proficiency at snap-shooting. A real rifleman must use his rifle with instant accuracy in the instinctive way that a batsman strikes a flying ball—unless so trained, he is not likely to give a good account of himself against a running, jumping, dodging charge of enemy infantry.

(5) Improvements in the rifle are bound to come. At present, the trend appears to be toward greater rapidity and hence greater volume of fire. While this is highly important, the ability to maintain an accurate sustained fire under all conceivable conditions is *even more important*.

The kick of the rifle against the shoulder, caused by the discharge of the piece, has always been an obstacle to accurate marksmanship because it causes flinching and nervousness. The Cutts compensator, a device which fits over the muzzle of the rifle and which looks a little like a flash-hider, was designed to eliminate this kick. For some reason, this invention has not been adopted by the government, perhaps because it did not prove to be practical. However, if the kick can be eliminated, a marked improvement in accuracy will result, which will make it much easier and quicker to train recruits to be good marksmen.

It is believed that improvements which will lead to greater accuracy and dependability in the rifle will continue to appear. However, inventive work along this line should be stimulated by the government.

To sum up, in a war of movement, the rifle is the basic arm. Our armies of the future must be trained to deliver an accurate sustained fire under any conditions with which they may be confronted.

PRESENT DAY ADVANTAGES IN A WAR OF MOVEMENT

Napoleon, more than one hundred and thirty years ago in waging a war of movement, marched his army behind a cavalry screen. He soon learned that the cavalry could only observe but not hold. Hence the accurate observation and correct report of the position of an enemy at a given time would not be reliable forty-

eight hours later when the orders based on such report were put into execution.

In 1806, a solution to this problem was first devised by placing a general advance guard of all arms immediately behind the cavalry screen to hold the enemy in position, while the remainder of the army followed at a day's march, in a formation ready to maneuver in any required direction.

Napoleon was a master of the strategic art of binding and restraining the independent will power of his opponents, and using the above-mentioned formation, he economized in nervous energy because he was marching always ready to fight wherever the enemy might stand or move to meet him.

Today, we have fast tanks, armored cars and airplanes, all having an almost instantaneous means of communication to and from the Command Post. The advance guard and main body are mechanized. In a war of movement, it would seem that with control of the air, Napoleon's tactics of marching always ready for battle,—with a strong composite advance guard to hold the enemy in position until the main body can arrive,—would be applicable to modern tactics, with suitable tactical principles worked out for quickly deploying and maneuvering a division or larger unit from trucks in any direction.

In an overseas operation involving either a raid or major operation, it would appear that the above-mentioned tactics would be applicable against a civilized enemy in terrain where operations could be carried out using mechanized units.

In connection with the study of overseas operations, it is believed that the Marine Corps should give serious consideration to land warfare by mechanized units, with adequate trucks available having sufficient means of defense against hostile ground and aviation forces, and with the trucks themselves properly designed to provide adequate protection to the occupants from enemy fire both from the ground and the air.

The ability to hit hard and hit quickly in a war of movement would seem to be more applicable and effective today under modern conditions of warfare than ever before, even though the problems of supply, air and ground reconnaissance, anti-aircraft protection, support by auxiliary arms, and those arising from the greater size of modern armies have become vastly more complicated than in Napoleon's time.

LEADERSHIP METHODS

It is axiomatic that the esprit de corps of an army must be developed by thorough training, and to be welded into a first-class fighting unit, it must engage in offensive action and impose its will upon the enemy in an unbroken series of engagements terminating in final success.

To achieve this result, the officers should be carefully selected and young enough to stand up under the rigors of active campaigning; should be thoroughly trained and grounded in fundamentals; should understand teamwork, and above all possess strong initiative, with the ability to quickly work out and solve a problem, determine the proper and common-sense action to take, and (when

necessary) put this action into execution without delay. They should be indoctrinated with the offensive spirit, and should consider that a risk is justified by the benefits to be gained if successful,—where, if unsuccessful, the detriment sustained would still not make the risk unwarranted. Mental alertness and thorough mental discipline are indispensable.

In every operation, each subordinate officer should thoroughly understand the general plan and its application to his particular situation. He must understand the objectives prescribed for his own and neighboring units.

"In striving for perfect unity of command, it is easy to fall into the error of over-centralizing control. Where such a case occurs the initiative of subordinates is almost dispensed with, and in the cases where initiative appears, it is promptly suppressed. * * * In a landing operation, the initiative of the subordinates must be highly developed so that the many varied and unforeseen situations which may arise will be handled in a manner which has for the ultimate goal the success of the main maneuver."

—*Principle of Cooperation.*

The above principle is applicable to any situation, providing the subordinate officers are of good quality and properly trained.

Admiral Nelson was perhaps one of the greatest exponents of decentralized command and by decentralization he entrusted some part of his reputation and achievement to subordinates. His system was careful planning—the officers of the fleet dined with him repeatedly before a battle and his vivid verbal explanations of his wishes inflamed them to enthusiasm. His memorandum

*Not always possible under conditions of modern warfare.

before the battle of Trafalgar gave them a picture of the attack he desired. The initial formation which he planned for the battle was an advanced squadron and two wings. Some of the pithy sentences contained in his memorandum have become classic in naval science, such as: "The order of sailing is to be the order of battle"; "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy"; and, "Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a sea fight above all others."

By careful selection and training, thorough knowledge of and familiarity with the plan of operation and its application to his own and neighboring units, by oral conferences with the Commander, his chief of staff, or other representative, and his immediate superior; and by a thorough grasp of written orders,—the subordinate commanders will each carry out the plan as it applies to their own situations as well as though the commander was always on the spot at the critical moment,* as was the practice of the Duke of Wellington.

Nelson's captains before a battle were so thoroughly conversant with the general plan and had gone over the details so thoroughly with Nelson and among themselves at frequent conferences, that the fleet could (and did at Trafalgar) successfully defeat the enemy without Nelson's guidance. Nelson's tactics involving organized teamwork and decentralized command were the result of careful planning, and thorough preparation. In applying those principles to leadership methods today, we must not lose sight of the fact that Nelson's success was largely due to his complete trust in able subordinates of proven ability who knew each plan of battle as well as Nelson did himself, and in the fact that Nelson was a first-class fighting man with the faculty of being able to inspire his subordinates with enthusiasm and the will to win.

COLONEL UPSHUR COMMENTS UPON LT. COL. KRULEWITCH'S ARTICLE ON THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE IN THE LAST NUMBER

■ This thoughtful study, prepared by Melvin L. Krulewitch, F.M.C.R., from the viewpoint of one who has had extensive duty and experience as a Reserve officer, is welcomed by the Reserve Division as a constructive contribution for the improvement of the military efficiency of the Reserve.

The Marine Corps Reserve, as such, in my opinion, is of greater importance to the Marine Corps than is the reserve of either the Navy proper or the Army to their respective branches, in the scheme of national defense. Unlike other reserves, the active members of the Marine Corps Reserve are required to be trained and ready on call, and have no opportunity to perfect their training

and organization when the Government requires their services.

The Reserve Division does not entirely concur in all of the comments contained in the foregoing article. The Battalion Commander of a Reserve Battalion is not exclusively responsible for the training and efficiency of his unit. While he has full responsibility as Commander, there is also a grave and important responsibility on the part of the Inspector-Instructor, a regular officer detailed by this headquarters to assist in the training and administration of the Battalion, and who, as such, is directly responsible to the Major General Commandant. The Inspector-Instructor does not exercise command but

he is responsible that regulations and requirements are complied with; it is his duty to take such action as may be necessary when they are not.

Prior to the detail of Inspector-Instructors and continuing on to the present time, this Division has maintained Coordinators (Senior Fleet Marine Corps Reserve officers) in the Central Reserve Area and in the Eastern Reserve Area. As of 1 September, 1937, the organization of the Reserve Areas has been discontinued and in their place has been substituted the organization of Reserve Districts corresponding to the several Naval Districts, each of which is commanded by a regular Marine officer, usually the Commanding Officer of the Marine Barracks most conveniently located with regard to the Headquarters of the Naval District concerned. These Reserve District Commanders are charged with the same responsibility and duty as was formerly performed by the Reserve Area Commanders.

Serious consideration has been, and is being given to the policy regarding running mates and it is considered to be a necessary policy to assign a running mate to a Reserve officer in the rank in which he is serving with permanent commission rather than initially to assign a running mate who continues to be such throughout his service. Many considerations make this necessary. Officers of the Fleet Reserve and the Volunteer Reserve are immobile as far as their assignments to duty are concerned. They cannot be moved from one Battalion to another unless such assignment becomes desirable and necessary by reason of their change in business and home address. When new Battalions or companies are organized, careful consideration must be given to the commissioning of officer personnel, or the transfer of inactive officers to active duty. In many cases it is necessary initially to commission officers with higher rank than some in other Reserve Districts or some who are assigned to other Reserve Battalions.

The present policy of this Division is to make no difference whatever between officers of the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve and officers of the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve. It is not considered a promotion to assign an officer from the Volunteer Reserve to the Fleet Reserve nor a demotion to transfer an officer from an active Reserve unit to inactive status. Such action is necessary to provide the required officers for service in active units in some cases, and in others to relieve officers from active duty by reason of promotion to a rank which is higher than is justified by the duties which are being performed. Special credit is due the officers of the Fleet Reserve for the many hours of work generously given for the promotion of efficiency of their unit, but it must be understood that they receive compensation for such service and that they are on active duty by reason of acceptance of active duty assignments.

As far as possible it is believed that all Volunteers should be qualified by reason of age and physical able-bodiedness to perform active duty on call. In the case of limited service officers not qualified for duty with troops but qualified for administrative and executive duties, the present policy contemplates that they, too, must be physi-

cally qualified, although not necessarily as young as those not restricted to limited service, and that their qualifications must be of such outstanding excellence as to insure that they will be an asset and not a detriment to the Marine Corps in case of a national emergency. The Reserve Division is mindful that care must be exercised in the issuance of commissions, because in time of need the Marine Corps may be embarrassed by a considerable number of officers that cannot be fitted into any job and can in no way be of any material or other benefit to the Service.

The system initiated several years ago, for the training of outstanding young men of officer caliber in what is known as the "Platoon Leaders' Class" has been an unqualified success and benefit to the Marine Corps in general. When time has permitted the distribution of the graduates of the Platoon Leaders' Classes to the Reserve units by reason of the location of the home or business activities of the young Reserve officers concerned, it is believed that great benefit will result to the active Reserve organizations.

Another matter that is being given most serious consideration is the requirements concerning the correspondence courses. This Division is aware of the fact that in many cases the most outstanding and desirable Reserve officers are at the same time the most outstanding and active citizens in their own communities and that by reason of such civil activities, the time that can be devoted to correspondence courses is much more limited than in the case of other officers who are not, relatively speaking, prominent in their communities and whose time, in consequence, is not so completely occupied. As a result of this situation, we are confronted by a situation which results in the most desirable officers' failure to comply with the requirements for completion of correspondence courses and in some cases, less desirable officers being able to complete their courses, and in consequence apparently being more deserving of promotion. This problem is difficult of solution but it can and will be solved in such manner as to improve existing conditions. I do not feel that it is appropriate to state a policy on this matter at this time.

In conclusion, I urge the thoughtful consideration of all officers of the regular service to the necessity of informing themselves as far as possible with the Marine Corps Reserve. It presents a fascinating study of activities which to a considerable extent are beyond the knowledge and understanding of the average regular officer. The morale of Reservists is superb. Their enthusiasm is in great measure beyond what could possibly be expected under the circumstances. As the Commanding General at Quantico recently stated in an inspiring address to Reserve Battalions undergoing their annual training: "What you get out of such training I am indeed at a loss to understand. What you give is far more than any of you may realize."

W. P. UPSHUR,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
The Director, Marine Corps Reserve.

VINSON BILL

■ To regulate the distribution, promotion, and retirement of officers of the line of the Navy, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there is hereby established a merit system for promotion by selection in the line of the Navy.

AUTHORIZED NUMBER OF OFFICERS OF THE LINE

SEC. 2. The total authorized number of commissioned officers of the active list of the line of the Navy, exclusive of commissioned warrant officers, shall be equal to 6 per centum of the total authorized enlisted strength of the active list, exclusive of the Hospital Corps, prisoners undergoing sentence of discharge, enlisted men detailed for duty with the Naval Militia, and the Flying Corps.

DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICERS OF THE LINE

SEC. 3. (a) The total number of commissioned line officers on the active list at any one time, exclusive of commissioned warrant officers, shall be distributed in the proportion of one in the grade of rear admiral, to four in the grade of captain, to eight in the grade of commander, to fifteen in the grade of lieutenant commander, to thirty in the grade of lieutenant, to forty-two in the grades of lieutenant (junior grade) and ensign, inclusive: *Provided*, That except in time of war there shall be not more than seventy rear admirals on the active list of the line of the Navy, exclusive of additional numbers in grade.

(b) To determine the authorized number of officers in the various grades of the line as provided in subsection (a) of this section, computations shall be made by the Secretary of the Navy at least once each year, and at such times as he may direct, and the resulting numbers in the various grades, as so computed, shall be held and considered for all purposes as the authorized number of officers in such various grades and shall not be varied between such computations: *Provided*, That no officer shall be reduced in rank or pay or separated from the active list of the Navy as a result of any computation made to determine the authorized number of officers in the various grades of the line: *Provided further*, That the number of officers allowed in any grade as a result of any such computation may be temporarily increased to include any such officers as may be promoted to that grade by reason of being recommended by a selection board as fitted for promotion as hereinafter provided; and the total number so carried in excess in the several grades shall be applied as a reduction to the numbers allowed to the grades of lieutenant and lieutenant (junior grade) and ensign, in the proportions of one-third of such total excess number in the grade of lieutenant and two-thirds in the combined grades of lieutenant (junior grade) and ensign.

(c) For the purpose of determining the authorized number of officers in any grade or rank of the line, there shall be excluded from consideration those officers car-

ried by law as additional numbers: *Provided*, That officers who, on the date of approval of this Act, are additional numbers in grade by reason of the operation of section 3 of the Act of March 3, 1931 (46 Stat. 1438), as amended, are hereby changed to regular numbers on the Navy list: *Provided further*, That no further such additional numbers shall be created.

(d) Whenever a final fraction occurs in computing the authorized number of officers of any grade, the nearest whole number shall be regarded as the authorized number.

PROMOTION BY SELECTION

SEC. 4. Subject to the provisions of section 1508 of the Revised Statutes, all promotions to grades above that of lieutenant (junior grade) of the line of the Navy, including the promotion of those officers who are, or may be, carried on the Navy list as additional numbers in grade, shall be only upon the recommendation of a board of naval officers as herein provided.

SELECTION BOARDS

SEC. 5. (a) The board for the recommendation of officers for promotion to the grades of rear admiral, captain, and commander shall consist of nine rear admirals on the active list of the line of the Navy not restricted by law to the performance of shore duty only, and shall be appointed by the Secretary of the Navy and convened at least once each year and at such times as the Secretary of the Navy may direct.

(b) The board for the recommendation of line officers for promotion to the grades of lieutenant commander and lieutenant shall consist of nine officers of the active list of the line of the Navy above the rank of commander, not restricted by law to the performance of shore duty only, at least one of whom shall be a rear admiral, and shall be appointed by the Secretary of the Navy and convened at least once each year and at such times as the Secretary of the Navy may direct.

OATH FOR MEMBERS OF SELECTION BOARDS

SEC. 6. Each member of a board provided for in section 5 of this Act shall swear, or affirm, that he will, without prejudice or partiality, and having in view solely the special fitness of officers and the efficiency of the naval service, perform the duties imposed upon him as herein provided.

ELIGIBILITY OF OFFICERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY SELECTION BOARDS

SEC. 7. (a) No captain, commander, or lieutenant commander who shall have had less than four years' service in the grade in which he is serving and on the promotion list of that grade, on June 30 of the fiscal year of the convening of a board provided for by this Act, shall be eligible for consideration by that board.

(b) No lieutenant who shall have had less than six years' service in the grade of lieutenant and on the promotion list for that grade on June 30 of the fiscal year of the convening of a board provided for by this Act shall be eligible for consideration by that board: *Provided*, That until June 30, 1943, officers with a total of thirteen years' commissioned service shall be so eligible.

(c) No lieutenant (junior grade) who shall have had less than three years' service in the grade of lieutenant (junior grade) on June 30 of the fiscal year of the convening of a board provided for by this Act shall be eligible for consideration by that board.

(d) No officer, except those appointed pursuant to the Act of June 4, 1920, shall be eligible for consideration by a board provided for by this Act unless he shall have completed successfully the professional examination required for promotion to the next higher grade.

INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED SELECTION BOARDS

SEC. 8. (a) The Secretary of the Navy shall furnish the appropriate selection board with (1) an estimate of the number of vacancies which will occur before the end of the next succeeding fiscal year, in each grade or grades for which the board will recommend officers for promotion, in excess of the number of officers then on the promotion list; (2) the names of all officers eligible for promotion to each grade or grades to which the board will recommend officers for promotion; (3) the records of all such officers: *Provided*, That after one year from the date of approval of this Act a list of names furnished by the Secretary of the Navy of officers eligible for promotion to the grade of lieutenant commander or to the grade of lieutenant shall in no case contain a number of names greater than double the number of estimated vacancies certified for the grade concerned.

(b) Any officer eligible for consideration for selection shall have the right to forward through official channels at any time not later than ten days after the convening of said board a written communication inviting attention to any matter of record in the Navy Department concerning himself which he deems important in the consideration of his case: *Provided*, That such communication shall not contain any reflection upon the character, conduct, or motives of or criticism of any officer.

DUTIES OF SELECTION BOARDS

SEC. 9. (a) From among those officers who are eligible for promotion and whose names are furnished the board by the Secretary of the Navy, each board shall recommend for promotion those officers whom it considers best fitted for promotion, in number equal to the number of estimated vacancies certified to the board by the Secretary of the Navy as provided in section 8 of this Act: *Provided*, That in each grade all officers not selected as best fitted for promotion but senior in lineal rank to the junior officer selected by each board shall be considered as having failed of selection as best fitted: *Provided further*, That such status of having failed of selection as best fitted shall not be considered as prejudicial to an officer with respect to his qualifications, his fitness for the naval service, or his eligibility for selection by the next succeeding selection board.

(b) In addition to the selection of officers best fitted for promotion as hitherto provided in this section, each selection board shall, from among those officers who are eligible and who have once failed of selection as best fitted by a preceding board, except officers in the grade of lieutenant (junior grade), designate those officers whom the board adjudges fitted for promotion.

(c) The recommendation of the board in the case of officers who are now or may hereafter be assigned to engineering duty only or to aeronautical engineering duty only shall be based upon their comparative fitness for the duties prescribed for them by law.

(d) No officer shall be selected as best fitted for promotion or adjudged fitted for promotion unless he shall have received the recommendation of not less than six members of the board.

REPORTS OF SELECTION BOARDS

SEC. 10. (a) The report of the board shall be in writing signed by all of the members thereof and shall certify that the board has carefully considered the case of every officer whose name was furnished to the board by the Secretary of the Navy as provided in section 8 of this Act, and that in the opinion of at least six of the members the officers therein recommended are either selected as the best fitted or are adjudged fitted, as the case may be, to assume the duties of the next higher grade, except that the recommendation of the board in the case of officers who are now or may hereafter be assigned to engineering duty only or to aeronautical engineering duty only, shall be based upon their comparative fitness for the duties prescribed for them by law.

(b) The report of the board shall be submitted to the President for approval or disapproval: *Provided*, That in case any officer or officers recommended by the board as best fitted for promotion are not acceptable to the President, the board shall be informed of the name of such officer or officers, and shall recommend a number of officers as best fitted for promotion equal to the number of those found not acceptable to the President and, if necessary, the board shall be reconvened for this purpose.

(c) The report of the board shall be accompanied by a confidential statement of the board's reason or reasons for its action in the case of the officers who are selected, adjudged fitted, or fail of selection. Such statement in so far as it concerns any officer shall be disclosed to such officer at his request.

PROMOTION OF OFFICERS SELECTED

SEC. 11. (a) The names of officers designated by a board as best fitted for promotion and the names of officers, except captains, adjudged by a board as fitted for promotion, and approved by the President, shall be placed upon a promotion list and promotions to fill vacancies shall be made from officers of the next lower grade whose names appear on the promotion list as having been designated as best fitted for promotion: *Provided*, That officers whose names appear on the promotion list as having been adjudged fitted for promotion shall be promoted at the same time that the officers next senior to them on the list of those designated as best fitted for promotion are promoted to the next higher grade: *Provided further*, That officers so promoted pursuant to the recommendations of the same report shall take rank with one another in accordance with their seniority in the grade from which promoted, and officers recommended in an earlier report shall, when promoted, have precedence of officers recommended in a later report.

(b) The Secretary of the Navy may, in his discretion, with the approval of the President, remove the name of any officer from the promotion list and submit it to the next ensuing selection board for consideration and recommendation: *Provided*, That the next ensuing selection board may select the officer concerned as best fitted for promotion or adjudge him fitted for promotion, and thereupon, with the approval of the President, the name of such officer shall be replaced on the promotion list, without prejudice by reason of its having been temporarily removed therefrom, and when promoted such officer shall take rank in accordance with his seniority on the promotion list at the same time his name was removed therefrom: *Provided further*, That if such officer is neither so selected nor adjudged fitted by such next ensuing selection board he will be placed on the retired list on June 30 of the then current fiscal year: *And provided further*, That if the name of any officer selected as best fitted for promotion be removed from a promotion list of officers in any grade and submitted to another board as provided in this subsection, the estimate of the number of vacancies furnished said board by the Secretary of the Navy shall be increased accordingly.

(c) No officer shall be promoted unless he has had not less than two years' actual sea service on seagoing ships in the grade in which serving: *Provided*, That in exceptional cases where officers are specifically designated, during war or national emergency declared by the President, by the Secretary of the Navy as performing, or as having performed, such highly important duties on shore that their services cannot be or could not have been spared from such assignment without serious prejudice to the national interests, the qualification of sea service in the cases of those officers so specifically designated shall not apply while the United States is at war, or during a national emergency declared by the President, or within two and one-half years subsequent to the ending of such war or national emergency: *Provided further*, That the qualification of sea service shall not apply to officers restricted by law to the performance of engineering duty only or to the performance of aeronautical engineering duty only.

RETIREMENT OF OFFICERS WHO FAIL OF SELECTION

SEC. 12. (a) For the purpose of the administration of this section, all officers on the active list now in the status of having failed of selection as best fitted, as defined in section 9 (a) of this Act, one or more times shall be regarded as having failed of selection once only.

(b) Officers, except lieutenants (junior grade), who twice fail of selection and are not adjudged fitted for promotion, shall be placed on the retired list on June 30 of the fiscal year in which they fail of selection the second time, with retired pay at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per centum of their active-duty pay at the time of retirement multiplied by the number of years of service for which entitled to credit in the computation of their pay on the active list, not to exceed a total of 75 per centum of said active-duty pay.

(c) Lieutenants (junior grade) who twice fail of selection shall be honorably discharged from the Navy with

one year's pay on June 30 of the fiscal year in which they fail of selection the second time.

(d) Officers promoted by reason of adjudgment as fitted for promotion may be continued on the active list of the line of the Navy until they shall have completed thirty years of commissioned service during which time they shall become eligible for selection, subject to the provisions of sections 7 (a) and 7 (b) of this Act, as best fitted for promotion, but shall not be eligible for consideration by any selection board for adjudgment as fitted for promotion: *Provided*, That if such officers are not so selected and if they twice fail of selection as best fitted they shall thereafter be ineligible for promotion: *Provided further*, That upon the completion of thirty years' commissioned service by such officers they shall be placed upon the retired list on June 30 of the fiscal year in which they completed thirty years' commissioned service with retired pay at the rate of 75 per centum of their active-duty pay: *And provided further*, That captains who are not selected for the grade of rear admiral but are adjudged fitted for promotion shall be retired, except that they may, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy, be continued on the active list of the Navy for a period of not to exceed five years after such adjudgment.

(e) When officers of the line of the Navy, other than commissioned warrant officers, have completed fifteen years' commissioned service, they may at any time thereafter, upon their own application, in the discretion of the President, be retired from active service and placed upon the retired list with retired pay computed as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

(f) Officers on a promotion list who fail to pass the required physical examination for promotion shall be retired in the rank for which they were selected, or adjudged fitted, with retired pay at the rate of 75 per centum of the active-duty pay of the grade to which selected.

(g) Officers who fail on the professional examination to establish their eligibility for selection, as provided by section 7 (d) of this Act, shall be placed upon the retired list with retired pay computed as provided in subsection (b) of this section on June 30 of the fiscal year in which said failure occurs: *Provided*, That officers of the grade of lieutenant (junior grade) who fail on such professional examination shall not be retired but shall be discharged with one year's pay.

(h) No lieutenant now an additional number on the active list of the Navy by reason of the operation of the Act of March 3, 1931 (46 Stat. 1483), as amended, shall be placed upon the retired list in accordance with the provisions of subsections (b), (d), and (g) of this section, prior to the date he would otherwise be transferred to the retired list under the law in effect on the date of approval of this Act.

(i) Any lieutenant (junior grade) now an additional number on the active list of the Navy by reason of the operation of the Act of March 3, 1931 (46 Stat. 1483), as amended, shall, at his own request, in lieu of the honorable discharge provided in subsection (c) of this section, be continued on the active list of the Navy until

the completion of the period of service designated in the said Act, as amended, and shall then be retired as provided therein.

(j) All line officers of the Navy who have been specially commended for their performance of duty in actual combat by the head of the executive department under whose jurisdiction such duty was performed, when retired in accordance with subsection (b) or with the third proviso of subsection (d) of this section, or when retired for physical disability, except as provided in section 12 (f) of this Act, shall, upon retirement, be placed upon the retired list with the rank of the next higher grade and with three-fourths of the active-duty pay of the grade in which serving at the time of retirement.

PROBATIONARY APPOINTMENTS OF OFFICERS

SEC. 13. The Secretary of the Navy, under such regulations as he may prescribe, may hereafter revoke the commission of any officer on the active list, initially commissioned after the date of this Act, who, at the date of said revocation, has had less than seven years of con-

tinuous service as a commissioned officer of the line of the Navy, of a Staff Corps of the Navy, or of the Marine Corps, and each officer whose commission is so revoked shall be discharged from the naval service with not more than one year's active-duty pay: *Provided*, That service as an acting chaplain shall, for purposes of this section, be considered as service as a commissioned officer.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

SEC. 14. (a) The provisions of this Act, except as herein otherwise indicated, do not apply to officers of the Staff Corps of the Navy or to officers of the Marine Corps.

(b) The Secretary of the Navy shall prescribe regulations whereby a uniform system of establishing a record of the efficiency of officers may be employed throughout the Navy.

REMARKS

The Major General Commandant has expressed himself in favor of applying the terms of this bill to the Marine Corps.

FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON THE RESERVE

MAJOR F. W. HOPKINS, USMCR

■ Lieut-Colonel Krulewitch, USMCR, in the November, 1937, issue of the GAZETTE, has made several pertinent comments on the Reserve, a subject upon which the present writer himself commented in the February, 1935, number of this publication.

After four years' service in the regular Marine Corps and over fourteen years' service in the reserve, I have seen the reserve grow from the little band who were "left over" in it after the War—until today in my own opinion at least it affords the best example of a Reserve organization in any of the three United States Services. There is very little change to be desired, although Col. Krulewitch and myself are in agreement on one point especially, the subject of my own article several years ago, and one of his points in the article referred to: namely, "casual" officers. In some degree, they are by way of becoming "forgotten men." I am aware that Headquarters has a plan for some, at least, and that all of them fit more or less in the general reserve plan. I do believe that there are, however, many officers of the VMCR, who compare favorably with officers of the FMCR for military efficiency, ability, and "up to dateness." It would be very wrong to place them definitely in a lesser category, and subordinate to FMCR officers. Many of them have had considerable active duty training, previous service as FMCR officers with organized units, considerable periods of CCC duty, combinations of both, supplemented by previous service in the Regular Corps, correspondence course work, individual study and activities voluntarily undertaken to keep them fitted for service. Many of them not only have been unable to belong to organized units because of business reasons, but because of residence

where such an association is impossible. It must also be remembered that a battalion can have but so many officers and even in a large city, where a battalion is being organized, such an activity generally is undertaken by the younger group, the lieutenants, who seek and deserve the promotion to company command rank that their activity merits—to the virtual "disbarment" of all but one or two of the senior Captains resident in that locality.

While current funds permit only the training of organized units, it is to be expected that emphasis is placed upon that phase, but it must be apparent that an individual VMCR officer who measures up to prescribed standards, is in time of emergency just as valuable and necessary to the Corps when called to duty and assigned to a specific duty as a Battalion of FMCR called in for its specific duty—on a relative basis, of course.

If it is not desirable to assign the more qualified VMCR officers to duty in the FMCR as individuals not connected with organized units, it does seem a partial solution of this class's situation to subdivide Class V of the VMCR (officers) into V-a and V-b (As Class II is subdivided) the class V-a officers being those who measure up to certain standards and have maintained themselves by active duty, work, study, etc., in a state that would make them desirable officers for general service early in the mobilization plans. Class V-b should comprise those specialists who have been commissioned for various activities or for some special knowledge that would be valuable to a mobilized Corps, and also officers who would not quite fit V-a, but are desirable for a limited service classification. Officers of Class V-a could be called in at the first mobilization for limited service—on recruiting duty, offices, etc., and then relieved by Class V-b and the retired officers as organizations for them are

formed from recruiting and other increases of Marine Corps enlisted personnel.

Those VMCR officers who do not fit into these categories should, of course, be dropped, preferably by honorable discharge.

Colonel Krulewitch refers to the rank situation, and especially the running mate situation. One knows about these things generally from personal experience, and mine has been that when that system was first adopted and I was assigned a running mate, the officer was actually that regular commissioned before I was (in grade), and that each time he has come up for selection and promotion, in his group, I have been similarly considered, and consequently can find no fault. He does object to an apparent discrepancy, wherein Captains (for example) in FMCR units, have regular Second Lieutenants as running mates—but overlooks the fact that these are FMCR "Gunboat" Captains, promoted from a basic permanent Lieutenant rank, and that after a specified time and experience in the "gunboat" grade, they are eligible for new commissions in the higher rank, and then the regulations provide the assignment of a new running mate. The system appears sound, otherwise officers temporarily increased in rank for FMCR units, after leaving the unit, would have in a brief period perhaps, attained a promotion. A large number, I understand, of officers in FMCR units were first appointed for duty in those units, and been promoted in those units, on this temporary basis, but have never had service in the Marine Corps other than in their own reserve unit. It would be manifestly an injustice to give them the higher permanent rank and running mate, as they would not in some cases be fully qualified "Marines" in the larger, "old timer," "Esprit de Corps," sense that is the basic foundation of the Corps.

In so far as the future of the senior officers of the Reserve is concerned, I submit that the question of further promotion worries them very little. I would much prefer to remain a Major in the reserve for the next ten years or more, with the possibility of active duty in that grade in the event of emergency, than to have the promise of a Colonelcy in the future, and then know that in that grade active service in war would of necessity be very restricted due to the fact that many regular officers would be better fitted for the responsibilities at that time and would be entitled to the vacancies existing in an expanded organization. Nine out of ten reserve officers will, I am sure, agree. One can reasonably fear the possibility of being "promoted out of the service."

Some of the FMCR officers appear to resent the fact that VMCR officers hold rank senior to them, but overlook the fact that some VMCR officers with several years' regular service, and twelve or fifteen years in the reserve which includes months or more of active duty, can equally resent (if they wish) the fact that FMCR officers who a few years ago were newly appointed second lieutenants with NO regular service are now serving as Captains. I do not believe that there is any officer in the VMCR, however, who lets this bother him. As a matter of fact there are VMCR officers now, who rank me—whose first appointment was made after I had been a Captain several years—and so what? The jobs they

can do and were commissioned in the reserve for, are things they can do far better than I can aspire to do—and for their particular duty I would not chose to claim rank.

It is my belief that among the greater number of reserve officers, the matter of rank (just as the matter of changes in uniforms) is better left alone, as any change will dissatisfy a number of people, work a few injustices, and only change the style but not the purpose, of the thing. We must put the purpose paramount—as the Corps has always put the mission ahead of the procedure and "paperwork."

Marine Corps Manual provides that all reservists be designated "USMCR." On some occasions the designation VMCR has been used, as in my own orders to CCC duty—which of course was then used by the Army in all correspondence with me—which frequently necessitated my explaining that I was not a VETERINARY. It is suggested that the designation USMCR (F) or USMCR (V) be used if a differentiation is necessary, although it is believed that it is the basic policy of Headquarters and present intent of regulations, NOT to make a distinction. As a matter of fact, the less distinction between FMCR and VMCR used will result in less thought about rank and position in the two classes.

The fundamental policy for the conduct of the reserve should boil down to one doctrine—that each separate unit of the reserve, whether organized battalion, separate company, aviation unit, individual officer, or enrolled reservist, should be fitted into the scheme of expansion for war in such a way as to serve the best interests of the Corps—and that no single one of these categories has more relative importance or unimportance than the other in this scheme. The ONLY important thing is an effective, speedy and competent reinforcing of the regular Marine Corps in time of need. To that end, every sincere reserve officer and man, whether an individual or connected with an organized unit, is dedicated. Without that purpose, there is no good reason why any of us should bother with the reserve at all.

SELECTION RESULTS

INTERMEDIATE BOARD
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Washington, D. C.

8 December, 1937.

To: Brigadier General Clayton B. Vogel, U. S. Marine Corps,

President, Marine Corps Selection Board,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Subject: Board to recommend officers of the Marine Corps of the rank of major for selection for promotion.

Enclosure: (A) List of majors eligible for selection for promotion to lieutenant colonel.

1. A Selection Board, consisting of yourself as president, and the following-named officers as additional members, viz:

Colonel Russel B. Putnam, U. S. Marine Corps,

Colonel Bennet Puryear, U. S. Marine Corps,
 Colonel Leander A. Clapp, U. S. Marine Corps,
 Colonel Joseph C. Fegan, U. S. Marine Corps,
 Colonel Roy S. Geiger, U. S. Marine Corps,
 Colonel Charles D. Barrett, U. S. Marine Corps,
 Lieutenant Colonel Selden B. Kennedy, U. S. Marine Corps, and
 Lieutenant Colonel Matthew H. Kingman, U. S. Marine Corps,
 and of Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd L. Leech, U. S. Marine Corps, as recorder,

is hereby ordered to convene at the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., on 3 January, 1938, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, for the purpose of recommending eligible officers of the rank of major for selection for promotion to lieutenant colonel, in accordance with the Act of 29 May, 1934, as amended by the Act of 1 May, 1936, and the Act of 28 July, 1937.

2. The names of all officers eligible for consideration for selection for promotion are transmitted herewith. Their records will be furnished the Board when it convenes. The Board is informed that such officers shall not appear before the Board in connection with the consideration of their names.

3. The Board is directed to recommend nine (9) officers of the rank of major for selection for promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel, exclusive of those officers, if any, who on promotion would be additional numbers in grade and who may be recommended by the Board for promotion to the next higher grade in accordance with existing law.

4. The proceedings of the Board will be conducted, in so far as may be practicable, in accordance with the provisions of Naval Courts and Boards, 1937. The following oath, or affirmation, will be administered to the recorder by the President of the Board:

"You, Lloyd L. Leech, do solemnly swear, or affirm, that you will keep a true record of the proceedings of this Board."

The following oath or affirmation will then be administered to the President and the other members of the Board by the recorder:

"You, and each of you, do solemnly swear, or affirm, that you will, without prejudice or partiality, and having in view solely the special fitness of officers and the efficiency of the naval service, perform the duties imposed upon you as provided by law."

5. In determining an officer's fitness for promotion, among other duties, administrative staff duty performed by him under appointment or detail, and duty in aviation or in any technical specialty, shall be given weight by the Board equal to that given line duty equally well performed; and the recommendation of the Board in the cases of officers assigned to assistant quartermaster and assistant paymaster duty only shall be based upon their comparative fitness to perform the duties prescribed for them.

6. The Board may, in its discretion, designate for retention on the active list until the end of the next fiscal year, as authorized by section 7 of the Navy personnel act of 3 March, 1931, any officer who has lost numbers

or precedence and has been promoted after suffering such loss.

7. Thirty-four (34) of the officers eligible for consideration will have completed twenty-one (21) years' commissioned service by 30 June, 1938, and, except as hereinafter stated, must be involuntarily retired unless selected. Of this group, two (2) are eligible for designation for retention on the active list until the end of the next fiscal year, in accordance with paragraph 6 above. The maximum number of involuntary retirements allowed by law is eleven (11). Therefore, the Board will designate by name for retention on the active list until the end of the next fiscal year the excess of officers over eleven, who, as a result of the action of the Board, would otherwise be involuntarily retired on 30 June, 1938.

8. The report of the Board shall be signed by all the members and shall certify that the Board has carefully considered the case of every officer eligible for consideration by the Board, and that in the opinion of at least six (6) of the members, the officers therein recommended for promotion are the best fitted of all those under consideration to assume the duties of the next higher rank, except that the recommendations of the Board in the cases of officers assigned to assistant quartermaster and assistant paymaster duty only are based upon their comparative fitness to perform the duties prescribed for them. The names of the officers recommended for promotion shall be entered in handwriting.

9. The members and the recorder of the Board are enjoined not at any time to divulge or disclose the vote or opinion of any particular member of the Board; and both they and all persons through whose hands the record passes on its way to the President of the United States, are enjoined not to divulge or by any means disclose the recommendations of the Board until they shall have been approved and released by proper authority.

10. The record of proceedings of the Board will be forwarded to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, direct, but not before ten days have elapsed from the date of the convening of the Board.

ADOLPHUS ANDREWS,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.

FINDINGS

The following officers were selected by the Intermediate Board. The Navy Department agreed, and the White House approved, January, 1938.

<i>Majors to Lieutenant Colonel</i>	<i>Retention List</i>
Ames, Evans O.	Anthony, Robert C.
Skinner, Emmett W.	West, Ralph E.
Gregory, Maurice C.	Strong, Frank D.
Creesy, Andrew E.	Brown, Campbell H.
Curtis, Merritt B.	Burnham, Lucian W.
Muldrow, Charles N.	Ladd, Shaler
McLean, James D.	Jeschke, Richard H.
Smith, Joseph T.	Pendleton, William
Knapp, Raymond E.	Hill, Thompson
Pfeiffer, Omar T.	Riley, William E.
Merritt, Lewis G.	Bone, Bert A.
Larkin, Claude A.	Thaxton, Robert C.
	Campbell, Harold D.
	Collier, Eugene F. C.

JUNIOR BOARD
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Washington, D. C.

10 January, 1938.

To: Colonel Alexander A. Vandegrift, U. S. Marine Corps,
President, Junior Marine Corps Selection Board,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Subject: Board to recommend officers of the Marine Corps of the ranks of captain and first lieutenant for selection for promotion.

Enclosure: (A) List of officers eligible for selection for promotion.

1. A Selection Board, consisting of yourself as President, and the following-named officers as additional members, viz:

Lieutenant Colonel Oscar R. Cauldwell, U. S. Marine Corps,
Lieutenant Colonel Gilder D. Jackson, U. S. Marine Corps,
Lieutenant Colonel Graves B. Erskine, U. S. Marine Corps,
Lieutenant Colonel William W. Ashurst, U. S. Marine Corps,
Lieutenant Colonel Ery M. Spencer, U. S. Marine Corps,
Major Raymond E. Knapp, U. S. Marine Corps,
Major John Halla, U. S. Marine Corps, and
Major Byron F. Johnson, U. S. Marine Corps,
and of Lieutenant Colonel Donald Curtis, U. S. Marine Corps, as recorder,

is hereby ordered to convene at the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., on 1 February, 1938, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, for the purpose of recommending eligible officers of the ranks of captain and first lieutenant for selection for promotion to major and captain, respectively, in accordance with the Act of 29 May, 1934, as amended.

2. The names of all officers eligible for consideration for selection for promotion are transmitted herewith. Their records will be furnished the Board when it convenes. The Board is informed that such officers shall not appear before the Board in connection with the consideration of their names.

3. The Board is directed to recommend two (2) officers of the rank of captain for selection for promotion to the rank of major, and thirty-two (32) officers of the rank of first lieutenant for selection for promotion to the rank of captain, exclusive of those officers, if any, who on promotion would be additional numbers in grade and who may be recommended by the Board for promotion to the next higher rank in accordance with existing law.

4. The proceedings of the Board will be conducted, in so far as may be practicable, in accordance with the provisions of Naval Courts and Boards, 1937. The following oath, or affirmation, will be administered to the recorder by the President of the Board:

"You, Donald Curtis, do solemnly swear, or affirm, that you will keep a true record of the proceedings of this Board."

The following oath or affirmation will then be administered to the President and the other members of the Board by the recorder:

"You, and each of you, do solemnly swear, or affirm, that you will, without prejudice or partiality, and having in view solely the special fitness of officers and the efficiency of the naval service, perform the duties imposed upon you as provided by law."

5. In determining an officer's fitness for promotion, among other duties, administrative staff duty performed by him under appointment or detail, and duty in aviation or in any technical specialty, shall be given weight by the Board equal to that given line duty equally well performed.

6. The board may, in its discretion, designate for retention on the active list until the end of the next fiscal year, as authorized by section 7 of the Navy personnel act of 3 March, 1931, any officer who has lost numbers or precedence and has been promoted after suffering such loss.

7. The report of the Board shall be signed by all the members and shall certify that the Board has carefully considered the case of every officer eligible for consideration by the Board, and that in the opinion of at least six (6) of the members, the officers therein recommended for promotion are the best fitted of all those under consideration to assume the duties of the next higher rank. The names of the officers recommended for promotion shall be entered in handwriting.

8. The members and the recorder of the Board are enjoined not at any time to divulge or disclose the vote or opinion of any particular member of the Board; and both they and all persons through whose hands the record passes on its way to the President of the United States, are enjoined not to divulge or by any means disclose the recommendations of the Board until they shall have been approved and released by proper authority.

9. The record of proceedings of the Board will be forwarded to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, direct, but not before ten days have elapsed from the date of the convening of the Board.

ADOLPHUS ANDREWS,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.

FINDINGS

The following officers were selected by the Junior Board. The Navy Department agreed, and the White House approved, February, 1938.

<i>Captains to Major</i>	Hendry, John B.
McKelvy, William N., Jr.	Winfree, Frederick B.
Larson, Emery E.	Fuller, Samuel D.
<i>First Lieutenant to Captain</i>	West, Ernest R.
Cramer, Mercade A.	Beadle, Roger W.
Lake, James B., Jr.	Porter, Robert R.
McCaffery, Joseph P.	Murray, Ellsworth N.
Johnson, Chandler W.	Turton, Howard J.
Weeks, George R.	Colley, Thomas J.
Moss, Clifton R.	Asmuth, Walter, Jr.
Holcomb, Bankson T., Jr.	Bowser, Alpha L., Jr.
Wieseman, Frederick L.	Starr, Marvin T.
Brown, Robert S.	Corson, George

Cooper, Harlan C.
Fojt, Robert E.
King, Billy W.
Shall, Richards E.
Brower, James H.

Humiston, Julian G.
Enright, William K.
Tschirgi, Harvey C.
Fawcett, Marion A.
Bisson, Robert O.

1938—APPROPRIATION BILL—1939 MARINE CORPS

PAY, MARINE CORPS

■ Pay of officers, active list: For pay and allowances prescribed by law for all officers on the active list—pay and allowances, \$4,155,289, including not to exceed \$248,921 for increased pay for making aerial flights, none of which shall be available for increased pay for making aerial flights by nonflying officers at a rate in excess of \$1,440 per annum, which shall be the legal maximum rate as to such nonflying officers; subsistence allowance, \$536,769; rental allowance, \$677,781; in all, \$5,369,839; and no part of such sum shall be available to pay active-duty pay and allowances to officers on the retired list;

For pay of officers prescribed by law on the retired list, \$1,706,000;

Pay of enlisted men, active list: For pay and allowances of noncommissioned officers, musicians, and privates, as prescribed by law, and for the expenses of clerks of the United States Marine Corps traveling under orders, including not to exceed \$250 for the expenses of attendance upon meetings of technical, professional, scientific, and other organizations, when, in the judgment of the Secretary of the Navy, such attendance would be of benefit in the conduct of the work of the Marine Corps, and including additional compensation for enlisted men of the Marine Corps qualified as expert riflemen, sharpshooters, marksmen, or regularly detailed as gun captains, gun pointers, cooks, messmen, including interest on deposits by enlisted men, post-exchange debts of deserters, and of men discharged or sentenced to terms of imprisonment while in debt to the United States, under such rules as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe, and the authorized travel allowance of discharged enlisted men, and for prizes for excellence in gunnery exercises and target practices, and communication competitions, and for pay of enlisted men designated as Navy mail clerks and assistant Navy mail clerks both afloat and ashore, and for gratuities to enlisted men discharged not under honorable conditions—pay and allowances, \$8,497,513; allowance for lodging and subsistence, \$708,414; in all, \$9,205,927;

For pay and allowances prescribed by law of enlisted men on the retired list, \$841,000;

Undrawn clothing: For payment to discharged enlisted men for clothing undrawn, \$248,400;

For pay and allowances of the Marine Corps Reserve
(a) excluding transferred and assigned men, \$908,545;
(b) transferred men, \$487,289; in all, \$1,395,834;

For mileage and actual and necessary expenses and per diem in lieu of subsistence as authorized by law to officers traveling under orders without troops \$150,000;

In all, \$18,817,000, plus \$100,000 of the appropriation "Pay, Marine Corps, 1938," such amount of such appropriation being hereby reappropriated, and the money herein specifically appropriated for pay of the Marine Corps shall be disbursed and accounted for in accordance with existing law and shall constitute one fund.

PAY OF CIVIL EMPLOYEES, MARINE CORPS

Pay of civil force: For personal services in the District of Columbia, as follows:

Offices of the Major General Commandant and adjutant inspector, \$130,000;

Office of paymaster, \$48,700;

Office of the quartermaster, \$137,500; in all, \$316,200: *Provided, That the total number of enlisted men on duty at Marine Corps Headquarters on May 7, 1930, shall not be increased, and in lieu of enlisted men whose services at such headquarters shall be terminated for any cause prior to July 1, 1939, their places may be filled by civilians, for the pay of whom, in accordance with the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, either or both the appropriations "Pay, Marine Corps" and "General expenses, Marine Corps" shall be available.*

GENERAL EXPENSES, MARINE CORPS

For every expenditure requisite for, and incident to, the authorized work of the Marine Corps, other than as appropriated for under the headings of pay and salaries, as follows:

For provisions, subsistence, board, and lodging of enlisted men, recruits and recruiting parties, and applicants for enlistment; cash allowance for lodging and subsistence to enlisted men traveling on duty; ice, ice machines and their maintenance, \$2,925,860;

For clothing for enlisted men, \$1,050,000;

For fuel, heat, light, and power, including sales to officers, \$470,000;

For military supplies and equipment, including their purchase, repair, preservation, and handling; recreational, school, educational, library, musical, amusement, field sport and gymnasium supplies, equipment, services, and incidental expenses; purchase and marking of prizes for excellence in gunnery and rifle practice, good-conduct badges, medals, and buttons awarded to officers and enlisted men by the Government for conspicuous, gallant, and special service; rental and maintenance of target ranges and entrance fees for competitions, \$681,520;

For transportation of troops and applicants for enlistment, including cash in lieu of ferrriage and transfers en route; toilet kits for issue to recruits upon their first enlistment and other incidental expenses of the recruiting service; and for transportation for dependents of officers and enlisted men, \$325,000;

For repairs and improvements to barracks, quarters, and other public buildings at posts and stations; for the renting, leasing, and improvement of buildings in the District of Columbia, and at such other places as the public exigencies require, and the erection of temporary buildings upon the approval of the Secretary of the Navy at a total cost of not to exceed \$10,000 during the year, \$400,000;

NOTE: Italics change denotes Senate action.

For forage and stabling of public animals and the authorized number of officers' horses, \$23,000;

For miscellaneous supplies, material, equipment, personal and other services, and for other incidental expenses for the Marine Corps not otherwise provided for; purchase, repair, and exchange of typewriters and calculating machines; purchase and repair of furniture and fixtures; repair of motor-propelled passenger-carrying vehicles; and purchase, exchange, and repair of horse-drawn passenger-carrying and other vehicles, including parts; veterinary services and medicines for public animals and the authorized number of officers' horses; purchase of mounts and horse equipment for all officers below the grade of major required to be mounted; shoeing for public animals and the authorized number of officers' horses; books, newspapers, and periodicals; printing and binding; packing and crating of officers' allowance of baggage; funeral expenses of officers and enlisted men and accepted applicants for enlistment and retired officers on active duty, including the transportation of their bodies, arms, and wearing apparel from the place of demise to the homes of the deceased in the United States; construction, operation, and maintenance of laundries; and for all emergencies and extraordinary expenses, \$2,400,000: *Provided*, That there may be expended out of this appropriation (including the exchange value of any vehicle that may be used as part payment) for the purchase of motor-propelled passenger-carrying vehicles, the gross cost of any one vehicle not to be in excess of the respective amounts as follows: Two at \$1,600 each; two at \$900 each; eight at \$700 each; and five motorcycles at \$350 each;

Marine Corps Reserve: For clothing, including clothing for aviation cadets, subsistence, heat, light, transportation, and miscellaneous expenses, \$275,000.

—ED.

LANDING STUDIES

(Continued from page 16)

not do so until it was too late. On May 16th, Grant, with all his forces well in hand, defeated him in the battle of Champion Hills with a loss of nearly 4,000

men, and sharply pursuing him, drove him into Vicksburg. By the 19th of May Vicksburg and Pemberton's army in it was invested by land and water. On the 4th of July, the day after, far away in Pennsylvania, the great battle of Gettysburg had closed with Lee's defeat, the garrison of Vicksburg, 37,000 strong, surrendered.

When Grant was preparing to make his second great landing he was well on his way to immortality. Using the element of surprise, he picked a place that was not defended. He was then handling the army of several generals who had failed to attain any degree of the objective.

The crossing of the James in front of Petersburg is an example of the speed and effectiveness with which such operations may be conducted. General Alexander, Confederate Chief of Artillery, relates in his book the complete surprise that Confederate forces experienced when they learned that Grant had laid the pontoon bridge and was moving across before Lee would credit the report. Excerpts from the Encyclopedia Britannica give a clear picture of what was Grant's understanding of making a landing.

"For four days Lee had refused to credit any report to the effect that Grant was crossing the James; his cavalry could not ascertain that the enemy in his front at Malvern Hill (VI Corps and Wilson's cavalry division), despite its menacing attitude toward Richmond, was only a flank guard for a movement to the south. . . .

"But a crisis was approaching. Sheridan's success at Five Forks induced Grant to deliver a general assault on the 2nd of April. The Confederate lines were bombarded all night and on the 2nd of April with Wright's corps (VI), Grant attacked the weakest part of Lee's line and broke through, losing 1,100 men in fifteen minutes. A. P. Hill was killed and his corps broken and was cut off from Petersburg. . . . ; Meanwhile Lee perceived that the hour had come when at last Richmond must fall, and at 3 P. M. he had issued orders for the march of the remains of his army to Lynchburg via Amelia Court House. . . . Lee's army stretched out for 15 miles, and when its advance guard was at Rice's Station its rear guard was still at Amelia Court House. . . . Sheridan's cavalry and two corps (II, VI) had caught the commands of Anderson, Ewell and Gordon, entangled with the trains of the army attempting the passage of Sailor's Creek. . . .

"Complete disorganization and demoralization seem to have taken hold of the Confederates on this fatal day. . . . Ewell became the victim of tactical envelopment after Anderson had been defeated and Gordon had failed to save the trains of the army. Surrender or massacre being the only alternative, Ewell surrendered, and here in fact the career of the Army of Northern Virginia ended, as Grant plainly saw, for at 5:30 P. M. he addressed a demand to Lee for his capitulation."

The key to the two greatest military activities Grant ever conducted laid in his investment of a hostile shore. Do we always fully comprehend the significance of the lesson Grant learned on the Mississippi and applied with devastating swiftness on the James?

Known as Best—

Best Known—


E. P. HINKEL AND CO., INC.

600 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Cleaners of Fine Chinese, Oriental and Domestic Rugs

Visit Our Plant When in Washington



CATERPILLAR COMPANY'S NEW TRACTOR

Providing Diesel economy, in a practical size, to new thousands of farms, cities and municipalities, Caterpillar Tractor Company has announced a new tractor, the Diesel D2.

Developing 25.5 horsepower at the drawbar, the new Diesel tractor will handle smaller blade graders, maintenance machines, terracers, roll-over scrapers and similar loads. On this kind of work, under normal conditions, the engine uses only $1\frac{1}{4}$ gallons of low cost fuel an hour. This compares with two gallons of gasoline or distillate, which the most efficient, spark ignition tractor will burn.

With such low fuel consumption, the tractor is well suited to hauling jobs, and the moving of light equipment. On any kind of work, it is estimated that savings of from 60 to 80 per cent in fuel costs may be expected with this tractor, as has been the case where larger Diesel tractors have replaced spark ignition machines.

The new tractor has a four cylinder engine with a bore and stroke of $3\frac{3}{4}$ " x 5". Starting is accomplished by an independent 10-horsepower engine, which provides ample power to turn the larger engine against full compression for as long as may be necessary. The starting engine cranks the Diesel through a pinion and clutch arrangement, and automatically disengages as soon as the Diesel

fires. The use of this independent engine insures easy and rapid starting, regardless of the temperature of climatic conditions.

A hot water manifold on the front side of the fuel filter housing is another all-weather feature. This keeps the Diesel oil at the proper temperature, regardless of operating conditions.

A unique feature of the Diesel D2 engine is the twin radiator, which has been developed by "Caterpillar" engineers. One is for cooling the water, and the other for cooling the lubricating oil. The importance of cooling the lubricating oil has long been recognized by tractor and automotive engineers. Oil at proper temperature, it is evident, insures longer life for the main and the connecting rod bearings.

With increased leverage on the steering levers, the Diesel D2 tractor is called the easiest steering track-type tractor ever offered. With literally finger-tip steering control, the machine is flexible and easily maneuverable under all conditions. The proven design of heavy-duty, slow speed steering clutches is maintained. The master clutch lever is hand operated, and the entire tractor is unusually accessible for maintenance and necessary adjustments or repairs.

BLADE GRADER CATALOG

Mechanical features of "Caterpillar" Blade Graders have been enumerated and discussed in a new booklet, issued by Caterpillar Tractor Co.

The advantages of the type of construction which "Caterpillar" employs in its four sizes of graders, have been clearly explained by means of pictures and concise text.

The booklet, which is entitled "CATERPILLAR" BLADE GRADERS, contains action pictures and specific owners' examples of work these machines are doing.

Attractively printed in two colors, the catalog may be obtained by writing Caterpillar Tractor Co., Peoria, Illinois, and requesting Form 4254.

CAN THE ATTACK FROM THE AIR BE STOPPED?

(Continued from page 10)

Army searchlights assisted Navy planes more than they hindered them on one joint Army-Navy maneuver. Should we provide beacons for enemy planes seeking to find an island? Would not a passive defense with troops and material well dispersed be a good defense at night? Should we use searchlights at all for illuminating planes in base defense? We can only say it will depend on the situation. Incidentally, searchlights may interfere seriously with the gunner in the plane attempting to use his bomb sights.

(9) Machine guns shall be so located as to engage low flying aircraft. At close range the problem of control is an individual one for the gunner.

QUESTIONS

1. What form of air attack will we be most likely to encounter?
2. How may we best dispose our equipment to meet this attack? Will we have sufficient equipment and trained men when the emergency occurs?
3. Should our first priority in base defense be our landing field or the harbor? Should we co-ordinate anti-aircraft defenses on the beach with those of ships in the harbor?
4. Finally, will anti-aircraft artillery defense, now greatly lacking in materiel, eventually be able to overcome or at least neutralize the great threat from the air?

THE SEARCHLIGHT BATTERY

(By Capt. M. S. Newton)

The searchlight battery consists of five sections, each one of which is comprised of the following elements:

The searchlight. This is a standard Army sixty-inch light of 800,000,000 candlepower capable of illuminating a plane 10,000 yards away under favorable conditions. The light is operated in azimuth and elevation by electrical control from the control station 200 feet distant. One man supervises the automatic feed of the carbons and strikes or extinguishes the arc as directed.

The sound locator. This is the ears of the section. Three men are required for its operation; an azimuth listener, an elevation listener and an acoustic corrector operator. The sound of the plane approaching is picked

up by the listeners through the horns of the locator and when balanced sound is obtained the angular elevation and azimuth of the plane are known. These data, corrected for sound lag and parallax are sent over transmission cables to the control station and thence to the searchlight.

The power plant. This is a Westinghouse portable unit powered with a six-cylinder engine. It delivers 150 amperes (DC) at 100 volts to the searchlight 600 feet away. It also supplies current for the data transmission system. One man operates the plant.

The control station. The comparator at this station receives the angular elevation and azimuth of the target from the sound locator, and by operators manually matching pointers it sends these data to the searchlight 200 feet away. The searchlight commander at the control station can take over control of the light when the target is flicked. Night binoculars mounted on the station enable him better to discern the target.

The transportation units. Two Marmon Herrington six wheel drive trucks serve to transport the equipment and personnel of a section rapidly over the highway or across the countryside.

Tactically the searchlights are disposed in two approximately concentric rings about the defended area. The outer ring lights are primarily pick-up lights and the inner ring carrying lights. Listening posts for alerting the light sections are established miles beyond the outer ring of lights. To be mutually supporting under average conditions lights are kept not over 6,000 yards apart. Since their mission is to illuminate targets for the 3-inch gun batteries lights are so sited with respect to the batteries as to enable the guns to open fire at their maximum effective range and continue firing as long as the target is within the critical zone. Obviously a considerable number of lights are required to fulfill these specifications.

THE .50 CALIBER MACHINE GUN BATTERY

(By Capt. T. G. McFarland)

The .50 caliber machine gun battery consists of a battery headquarters section, an operations section, three machine gun platoons, and a maintenance section. It is equipped with twelve machine guns (.50 caliber) organized into three platoons of four guns each. The machine gun platoon is the fire unit, but when the situation demands, they may be employed by sections or squads. Normally, the platoon leader directs and controls the fire of his platoon, acting under general instruction from the battery commander.

The mission of the anti-aircraft artillery machine gun in a defensive area is to provide protection for vital elements and establishments against attack by low flying aviation. The secondary mission is to protect the anti-aircraft artillery guns and searchlights, and to prevent the smoking of the anti-aircraft artillery defense by hostile aviation.

The problem. The anti-aircraft machine gun has been designed to combat low flying airplanes and must satisfy the following requirements:

- (1) High speed of operations—must be as rapid as finger pointing.

(2) Accuracy—a certain degree of accuracy is essential in order to get hits.

(3) Fire power—the number of hits may be increased by greater accuracy or, less satisfactorily, by using a greater number of guns to increase the volume of fire.

The target is small and fast, and when in effective range of machine guns may be expected to fly at a high rate of speed or on a maneuvering course. Consider a target picked up at maximum range, 1,500 feet altitude and traveling at 200 miles per hour. This target would remain in the effective field of fire for 33 seconds. This emphasizes the one important element that the machine gunner is up against and must consider at all times—the all important element of *time*. It is this element that has defeated all attempts to design a mechanical fire control system for the machine guns, and the most successful fire control system to date is a trained gunner using tracer ammunition to adjust and control his fire. Numerous sights and fire control systems have been tried but due to the time element and certain characteristics of the gun none have proved to be satisfactory.

The answer to the problem at present seems to be trained gunners controlling and adjusting their fire with tracer ammunition.

EFFECTIVENESS

Much has been said about the effectiveness of the .50 caliber machine gun as an anti-aircraft weapon. What is effectiveness? What results are expected? Take a platoon of guns engaging a target for 30 seconds, 1,200 shots fired 2% of which are hits, 24 hits. Consider the vulnerable area of an airplane as 5% which would give 1.2 hits in the vulnerable area of the plane. Is this effectiveness? Should more be expected? Time and the laboratories offered by war will tell.

THE HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE BATTERY

(By First Lieutenant J. H. Cook, Jr.)

The function of the Headquarters and Service Battery is to serve the other batteries so that they may devote their entire time to their normal missions.

The different sections and their functions are as follows:

The Battalion Headquarters, composed of the battalion commander and his commissioned and enlisted staff, is the command and administrative unit of the battalion.

The Battery Headquarters is the command and administrative unit of the battery.

The Communication Section is subdivided into a telephone section and a radio section. The telephone section lays wire to and establishes communication between the Battalion Headquarters and the batteries and battalion observation posts. The radio section establishes communication with aircraft and the headquarters of the next higher echelon or the supported unit.

The Service Section is composed of transportation personnel, mess personnel, and mechanics.

The Meteorological Section takes air soundings and determines the ground temperature of the air and the speed, direction, and density of the air at 1,500 foot intervals up to 30,000 feet. The data is given the gun

battery so that they may apply corrections for wind to their firing data.

The Records Section takes records during target practice, consolidates them and gives the data to the batteries so that they may determine their scores.

WHAT WOULD JAPANESE VICTORY IN CHINA MEAN TO AMERICA?

(Continued from page 6)

to compete. I am taking all this, including the quotes, from Japan's book.

There is no future for American trade in Japan's success. In five years she will have her raw cotton from the plains of North China, in exchange for Manchurian grain, and she will undersell every competitor in the finished product. It will be similar with wool, machinery, everything.

Our freedom of action will be hampered from within when a flood of expert Japanese propaganda now in preparation bursts upon us through publications that can be bought by advertising, and through other more elegant and subtle means. Our freedom of action will be hamstrung when American, British, and French money seeking profitable investment, as money must, and finding no outlet in western industry, begins to flow over to the enemy side in the coming battle of the standards of living. For Western industry will be beaten down by the competition of a totalitarian system that seizes its raw materials by force, keeps its cheap labor "unspoiled" and respects no patents or copyrights. That battle must concern us more than military or naval war; it is the ultimate struggle between our systems. Then, of course, anger will break out, and blind rage will rule the day, and we shall experience the logical end of our *laissez-faire*.

Pin-pricks like the sinking of the *Panay* or the closing of the Open Door to American trade and philanthropy should not blind us to the sword hanging over our ideals, our economy. Yet these pin-pricks should awaken us. I am able to reveal something to you here tonight which will bring you up in your chairs. Perhaps you have wondered, as have I about the anti-spy activity that has followed the *Panay* sinking, about the despatch of another United States gunboat up the dangerous river to explore and try to raise the wreck. Perhaps you failed to remember that the *Panay* when attacked was carrying most important secret diplomatic and naval intelligence and code books from the endangered Embassy in Nanking. Tonight I have this for you from Ray Tucker, Washington writer of the "National Whirligig." It may be published in tomorrow morning's newspapers throughout the country. Tucker says that it is known to Washington that Japanese soldiers who boarded the *Panay* just before it sank perused—probably stole—our secret diplomatic, naval, and military codes. These our wounded and harried naval and diplomatic officers on the ship were unable to destroy, or carry the information entrusted to them to safety.

You see what we are dealing with. The *Panay* apology leaves us in the zone of Japanese military activity waiting

for the next incident. It may be sensational, like interference with American liberty of action and policy in regions we will not admit have passed to Japan. Japan's hope of avoiding clash with us rests, upon her side, solely upon the possibility of our getting out of China—lock, stock, and cash register. Japan votes whole-heartedly for Hamilton Fish withdrawal, for Smedley Butler isolation, for Ludlow referendum. She is pleased, for now, to endorse Boake Carter ideas of forgetting the Orient in a new interest in Latin America.

I have no time to deal with these proposals, but they are the same sort of cure as hitting oneself on the head to stop a headache. Examine them. They hold promise of disrupting our economy, compelling the replanting of the South, or driving us, too, toward totalitarianism and gangsterism; but they hold no promise of peace. Our President has chosen against isolationism. He requests more armed force. Our people are not likely to repudiate him. We are not a martyr nation. We are not even a modest and retiring nation. While other peoples are asserting the right to conquest by undeclared wars, we are not likely to give up the right to peaceful residence and friendly trade. And the forces of decency in the world would merely be weakened if we did.

But we are a nation that "lets-'er-slide"—up to a point—and then gets mad. As we did in 1916. Then when our "mad" passed we "let-'er-slide" again. That should be the horrible example to us now of the wrong way. This time if we go out to save the world for international decency we should not abandon the maiden to the traders in flesh so soon as we have rescued her from the mailed fist. We should see it through or not act at all. But if you see as I do that letting things slide, letting the gangster nations count on American reticence, count on American-British inability to stand together—if you see as I do that this will only result in our getting mad and acting in anger later on, you will agree with me that it is better to take our stand now, coolly and intelligently, welcoming whatever risk is involved. We could stop selling Japan munitions and airplanes—right now. We could stop being brokers of her international credit. We could—with Britain, France and Russia—quarantine her great merchant marine without major war operations or risk of serious attack. There is no ideal action; particularly if ideal action means, as I'm afraid it so often does to Americans, running no risk—having our cake and eating it too. When you wake up in a warm bed and see an armed robber in the house there is no ideal action you can take. When Lincoln faced slavery, and later secession, he had to make a choice of the lesser of evils. So always in life.

There is risk that in going out to save what we believe in we will lose our own souls—that war would ensue and beget militarism and tyranny here at home. But there is a greater risk, is there not, that not lifting our hand will destroy our sensibilities and our souls? We soon cease to believe in what we run no risk to protect.

Lastly, Dr. Batchelder's belief that, let alone, Japan will collapse in China—is what I would call the wraith of hope from the graveyard of wishfulness. Maybe. I dare not put the future of democracy, international decency, American economy, in that ghostly hope. My Chinese friends tell me that Japan will succeed—with China's customs,

railroads, mines, cotton, land, in her hands—unless the desperate policy of destroying everything while retreating breaks Japan economically, and the desperate instillation of communism gives the conquered population spiritual incitation enough to resist. Thus far Japan boasts that she has spent only a half billion of her three billion dollar war budget of last spring. The war is being felt in Japan, but it is also bringing out Japanese loyalty. China, save for the two above measures of desperation, is at the end of her string. Japan can go a long way still, long enough, many observers think, to win—provided only that America maintain her "correct" attitude.

Salvation for us at the expense of a materially destroyed, communistic China would likely prove a tricky salvation. Japan's victory in China and Japan would mean to us economic quarantine, a world at the mercy of those who believe that might makes right, that contracts are to be kept while they are useful, that truth is whatever serves the purpose. It would mean irritations, anger, finally full-fledged war across the Pacific. I am forced to conclude that evil, let alone, does not destroy itself, but compounds itself. I am forced to recognize that causes, constructive or destructive, succeed in this world which are placed by their backers above property or even life. In humbleness and not without reluctance, but frankly, I offer these considerations for your thought.

Chairman Bryson:

As many of you know, there has recently been introduced in Congress a resolution making mandatory a national referendum before a declaration of war. Known as the Ludlow Resolution, it has been the subject of much controversy. You have just heard two speakers talk on how the Japanese activities in China will affect the United States. How would a war referendum work in the event of an American clash with some foreign power? We are happy to have in the audience tonight two men who are particularly acquainted with the proposed referendum: Major General William C. Rivers, United States Army (retired), who is a leader of the drive for enactment of the referendum; and Major George Fielding Eliot, a speaker on one of our recent Town Meetings, who is opposing it. General Rivers, won't you tell us something about how the Ludlow Referendum would affect America in the event of a threatened war?

Major General William C. Rivers:

I am glad to say a word in favor of the Ludlow Amendment. It contemplates that a foreign and offensive war must first be approved by a vote of the people. Congress may, as at present, declare war if American territory or possessions are attacked. I have been in all of our wars for half a century and in France had a line-of-battle command in all our major combats. I have seen much of war and the Ludlow plan seems to me a sensible and practical proposition.

Congressman Ludlow is anxious to get and to accept constructive amendments to his Referendum plan. One of the important objections to the plan which have been raised is that it would curb the power of the State Department to avoid war. It appears to me that the Ludlow Amendment might lessen the power of the Department of State as to the use of power politics. Is not this, after all, a form of not very helpful bluffing?

It is said that the Ludlow plan would hinder sending our fleet and army to attack some nation which was preparing to make an attack on us. That is the outmoded illusion that the offensive is the best or the only defense. Joffre nearly ruined a French army by that in Alsace; the 400,000 losses at Gallipoli and the 300,000 lost by Nivelle's new attack scheme on the Chemin des Dames show the power of machine guns and new modern rifles.

It is claimed that the Ludlow plan would change our representative form of government. Yes, the application of the Ludlow plan would make a great change, but I believe and I hope that the change would be for the better—a better balance, now that we have seen how, ever since the Civil War, the power of the executive at Washington has grown so greatly.

Ludlow's proposal is an extraordinary one, yet it is less extraordinary than merely drifting into a major war. We must try some new method to stop or minimize wars; we should not just continue on the old ways which have in the past proven to be unsatisfactory. War is too vital a matter for the nation.

Specifically, the proposed nationwide vote could have readily been taken while the case of the *Panay* was under investigation; or in the Spanish war while the sinking of the battleship *Maine* was being investigated. The radio enables both sides of any question to be given to the people and a vote could be taken within a few days.

Chairman Bryson:

And now we will hear briefly from Major George Fielding Eliot, formerly of the Military Intelligence Reserve of the United States Army and co-author of *If War Comes*. Major, what have you to say on the question of the Ludlow Amendment?

Major George Fielding Eliot:

In considering the effect of the Ludlow Amendment upon Japanese-American relations, it seems to me that its advocates get off on the wrong foot. They start with the idea that it is the American government which needs to be restrained; as a matter of fact, as anyone who reads the newspapers knows, it is the Japanese military who must be restrained if peace is to be preserved.

Any measure which tends to lift from their minds the fear of dire consequences is a war measure, not a peace measure. This the Ludlow bill would surely do. It would, from their viewpoint, give them two direct advantages: the possibility, as they would have every reason to hope, that the vote would be against war no matter what the provocation; and in any case, a distinct time-interval which they could employ in preparation.

Who can doubt that many Japanese military leaders, under such circumstances, would make up their minds that the time had come to drive America out of the Far East forever and free themselves from what they consider a threat to Japan's security? Whether we should be there at all is not the point. We are there. We must face the facts as they exist. Our troops and Marines are in China, in weak isolated detachments; our Asiatic fleet, our Philippine garrison, are too small to make much of a fight. Once in occupation of the Philippines, the ejection of the Japanese would take a two or three years' war fought under tremendous difficulty and at an incalculable

expense in blood and treasure. Yet we would fight that war. Our people would never allow our slaughtered garrisons to remain unavenged. And the mere taking of the Ludlow vote might enable the military leaders to frighten the Japanese people into supporting them in desperate resistance to what they might well call a hostile threat.

In this era of undeclared wars, to put the government of the United States in a strait jacket while its potential enemy remains free and truculent, is an act of incomparable folly. It will not prevent war; it may very well provide the occasion of war; and it will make certain that, if war does come, it will be fought under the most disadvantageous conditions possible for the United States.

Chairman Bryson:

And now, may we have your questions. Please make them brief. Questions, please!

Man: Mr. Close, at the time that Secretary Stimson protested against the Japanese Government, the British Government seemed to favor Japan. But, at this particular time, there is a different attitude. Should we take the initiative at this time?

Mr. Close: It is my belief that the blame for lack of cooperation back in 1932 and now between Britain and America belongs on both sides; that we are equally to blame. As I understand the situation back there between Mr. Stimson and Sir John Simon, it was that Stimson wanted Britain to cooperate with us in letter-writing diplomatic action. Britain asked if we would follow it through by a joint naval demonstration. We said, "No, we would not." Therefore, the British said, "Why write the note?"

Man: Mr. Close, in your speech you said that the United States should save the world for decency. Do you think that if we were involved in a war with Japan, and if hundreds of thousands of our boys lost their lives, it would save the world for decency?

Mr. Close: I think that always you have to make a stand against terrorism if you are going to save the world for decency. The city of Chicago a while back was faced by a situation like that on a city-wide basis, and a lot of the good people said: "Let the gangsters shoot it out; they will kill themselves." They soon found that a lot of the decent people were being hit, and the streets became unsafe for their wives and daughters. Above all, their pocketbooks were hit, business went to pot, and so some of them had to stick their necks up and take a chance on being hit by a few gangster bullets in order to restore order.

Woman: Mr. Close, do you think Russia would allow Japan to keep control in China if she won?

Mr. Close: Well, the question really involves fundamental Russian statecraft. As I view it, Russia is caught on two sides; Germany on the European front, Japan on the Asiatic rear. In that situation, Russian statecraft is much too clever to take the initiative. We have been hoping we could dump the hot basket of Japanese coals in Russia's lap for a long time, but I am sure if any dumping is going to be done, Josef Stalin will prove the better dumper. I think instead of our being able to dump it on Russia that unless we take a stand on the thing, in which Russia can join us, Russia will make some sort of ar-

rangement with Japan that will free her from immediate danger on the Siberian border to go into the areas of the Pacific Islands which principally concern us and the British and the Dutch.

Man: Mr. Batchelder, in your personal experience in international affairs and economics what gives you the opinion that the good people of Japan will be able to control their military gangsters?

Mr. Batchelder: I didn't say the good people. I said that the agricultural classes and the workers in the factories are on the verge of a condition which is unendurable, and they will become so restless under the pressure of the post-war burdens that there will be a general reorganization. The conditions are not so very different from those which brought about the change in Spain.

Man: Mr. Batchelder, you said that the Japanese will be absorbed by China, and then in ending your speech you said, "Keep our hands off and mind our own business." Isn't it pretty well recognized that once Japan succeeds in conquering China there will be general fascism?

Chairman Bryson: This gentleman wants to know will we encourage fascism if we keep our hands off Japan?

Mr. Batchelder: I don't think so, because Japanese militarism is not fascism; it is totally different. For instance, under a military government in Japan, the position of the Emperor will be unchanged. What is likely to come in Japan is some form of state capitalism, not fascism, not communism, but something quite different, peculiar to the Orient and suited to Japanese conditions.

Man: Mr. Batchelder, you stated that economic sanctions are ineffective and cited as your example the in-

ability of the League of Nations to sanction Italy in Ethiopia. Were those really sanctions?

Mr. Batchelder: They were sanctions, but they were not effective. I have spent considerable time in looking into that and studying statistics. It was evident from the start that those sanctions applied by the League of Nations could not be effective without the full coöperation of the United States which, as you know, was not given.

Man: Mr. Close, did we not hear your speech in 1916 when we were told to go out and fight a war to save democracy?

Chairman Bryson: The gentleman says there is something familiar about your speech. What about it?

Mr. Close: I mentioned that in my main speech. I say that what we did from 1914 to 1922 should be the horrible example of what not to do now. I say that we did not go out to save the world for democracy back there. We waited until we got mad. We didn't even know what side we were going to be on until we got mad. We waited until we got mad at somebody and then we invented the phrase "saving the world" for something or other in order to cover our being mad. We went out and hit somebody an awful swipe; and then we came home and left the world in an awful mess as the result of our having gone over there and helped give triumph to the side that had the most already, and then walking away, and doing nothing to see that that side acted in a decent manner.

Chairman Bryson: I have a question here from Chicago which has come in by telegraph. It says to ask Mr. Close what effect a decisive Chinese victory would have on American and English investments in China?

Mr. Close: I imagine our Chicago friend is an old China hand who is much afraid that the Chinese would wipe out American and British business there if they were entirely free to do so and masters of their own country. I may say that that feeling has very rapidly disappeared from American and British business in Shanghai and other parts of China in the last few years. American and British men out there have found Chinese business men very good to coöperate with. But, if the Chinese should become total masters in their own land and decide to throw us out, I should feel that it was a very much more honorable bit of being thrown out than to be thrown out by a third party coming in there.

Chairman Bryson: Mr. Batchelder, what would you say about that question?

Mr. Batchelder: I was in China last May. I have been American Commercial Attache in China and have been there ten times. I am quite convinced that if the Chinese should win a decisive victory over the Japanese, one of the first things they would do is to abolish all foreign settlements in China. Without those foreign settlements, it would be almost impossible for the Americans or British to carry on trade. There has been a movement for a long while in China to abolish, to take away all foreign settlements. My American friends told me they were liquidating their investments in China because they thought the Chinese would force them out, and that was before the war. What would a victory for China mean?

COMPLIMENTS OF

R. C. Williams & Co., Inc.
New York

Distributors of the

Famous
Royal Scarlet Food Products

Serving the Marines since 1868

MEYERS MILITARY SHOP

"From a Ribbon to An Outfit"

816 - 17TH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

It would intensify that anti-foreign feeling of the Chinese people.

Chairman Bryson: Mr. Batchelder, you have aroused Mr. Close; he wants to say something more on that question.

Mr. Close: May I just add to that by saying that the international settlements should have been ended long ago. May I also add that since Germany was deprived way back in 1917 of her special rights in China, German business has grown in China by leaps and bounds. Why couldn't America do the same?

Man: You mentioned in your speech, Mr. Batchelder, that the Chinese have always succeeded in absorbing their conquerors. I wondered whether such a thing was possible in the present era of overwhelming military power that the Japanese have over the Chinese?

Mr. Batchelder: Not as quickly, but in the long run.

Mr. Close: Not quick enough to save us.

Man: China is being conquered by force. Is it not true that it would take at least half a million soldiers, Japanese soldiers, to hold China in subjection?

Chairman Bryson: The gentleman wants a military opinion on that. Major Eliot, what about it?

Major Eliot: I think it would take a great many more than that to really conquer China and for Japan to realize any economic benefits—in other words, to get any booty as a result of her having made this conquest. At the present time, the Japanese hold certain points of importance. They hold certain lines of communication. They are going to be able, I think, to set up puppet governments which will in the course of time be able to politically organize some of the areas. For Japan to conquer the whole of China and to reduce it to subjection will take more than 500,000 men.

Woman: Don't you think, Mr. Close, that if England and France and America and possibly Russia were to employ real economic coöperation to their fullest ability, they are powerful enough to check Japanese aggression, especially if they would begin by agreeing to sell munitions only to defenders and not aggressors?

Mr. Close: I believe that that would be effective.


Woman: Mr. Close, you said in answer to a question that our hands are slightly soiled with a bit of personal economic monopoly in China. Doesn't that possibly enter into our reticence to act in China? Another thing: since the science of homicide and the psychology of war is so insane in its very nature how can you possibly get a sane solution from it?

Mr. Close: The first question: Isn't our reticence to act in China partly due to the fact that our hands are not clean? I doubt it, because it has been so long since our hands have really been seriously dirty over there that all of us have quite forgotten it. It wasn't in this generation. They have not considered us a menace for many years. In fact, they never did consider America a menace. As a matter of fact, we never did take a concession in China. One was offered to us in Shanghai. I think that a good many of our friends, particularly of the communist type of persuasion, tend to picture America's hands as much

more dirty over there than they have really been. You ask the Chinese themselves.

As to the second issue—what was that?

Mr. Close: Oh, yes. How are we going to go out and fight and by fighting establish anything good? That was the general idea.



Contractors to the United States Army, Navy and Coast Guard...and Aircraft Engine Builders



Patented in the United States and Other Countries

**MICA
AVIATION
SPARK PLUGS**

THE B. G. CORPORATION
136 WEST 52nd STREET, NEW YORK

BENDIX - SCINTILLA AIRCRAFT MAGNETOS

No greater honor can be given an aircraft product than to be chosen as equipment by the United States Army and Navy. For both have the highest standards in the world. Products must "measure up" 100% to be selected. It is significant that year after year Bendix-Scintilla Aircraft Magneto have been approved equipment on U. S. Army and Navy engines.

SCINTILLA MAGNETO CO., Inc.
SIDNEY, NEW YORK

(Subsidiary of Bendix Aviation Corporation)
Contractors to the U. S. Army and Navy

ALL UNIFORMS *are not uniform*



The added distinction and smartness that "sets off" the well-groomed officer is the added workmanship and attention to detail that only hand-craftsmanship can give. Our long experience in custom-tailoring uniforms is appreciated by the officer who is particular about his dress. May we design and tailor your individual uniform? . . . Uniform — to regulations . . . Individual — as to taste.

WRITE FOR SAMPLES AND PRICES

KASSAN - STEIN INC.

Military and Civilian Custom Tailors
510 Eleventh St., N. W. Washington, D. C.

I believe, in the first place, that we can accomplish this result without going into a large scale war that will lead to all the war hysteria that brings about dictatorships and general hysteria. If we keep our heads, I see no reason why we couldn't clip the life arteries of Japanese tyranny today by stopping the free passage of Japan's merchant marine all over the world—the second largest merchant marine in the world—if it came to that, without falling into the fallacy of getting mad and going over there with an expedition as we did to France and then clearing out. We could keep our heads and fight an undeclared war as well as they.

Man: I am going to ask one question. Don't you think that peace and quiet and good neighborship that we have had with China would be sufficient to guarantee us if she were to gain an impressive victory?

Mr. Close: I don't think any one who knows China and the Chinese has any fear of China retaliating on us in case she should come into possession of her own house. If the Chinese are pressed too hard, and pressed into the arm of Russia, and pressed into a communist tyranny, that is another thing. But if that happens, we will be responsible, too, for letting it happen.

Man: Mr. Close, can we wage another war to make the world safe for democracy such as the last?

Mr. Close: We never yet have waged a war to make the world safe for democracy. We might very likely do well right now to make a resolute stand for democracy, decency, and international correct dealing.

Man: Do you think any country can depend on full coöperation from Great Britain?

Mr. Close: That is a good question. I would answer it very briefly this way: Any one would be a fool to depend upon the coöperation of certain powers in England, known to Englishmen often as "The Citadel," who try to sit in the middle, selling most everybody, including themselves and their own people. But I think that there is a marvelous public sentiment in Britain, of millions of decent Englishmen who are looking today for leadership from the younger branch of the Anglo-Saxon race, which they can not find at home.

PROCUREMENT PROGRAM FOR SECOND LIEUTENANTS

(Continued from page 27)

III. CIVIL LIFE

Vacancies existing as of July 1 annually after the commissioning of Naval Academy graduates selected for the Marine Corps and qualified noncommissioned officers, are filled by civilians, the quota, if any, from each of the following groups, decided upon by the Major General Commandant depending on commissioned personnel vacancies:

- (1) Platoon Leaders, Marine Corps Reserve.
- (2) Marine Corps Reserve officers and Reserve Aviation Cadets.
- (3) Graduates in current classes of selected colleges having Army or Navy ROTC training, who complete 4 year ROTC course in honor status.

(1) *Platoon Leaders, Marine Corps Reserve.*

At selected colleges in the United States which do not have Army or Navy ROTC units, students may enlist in the Marine Corps Reserve and perform active service with pay in the Platoon Leaders' Classes during their summer vacations at the end of the sophomore and junior years. The training is conducted at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va., or at the Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Calif. Upon enlisting in the USMC Reserve, students are appointed to the rank of private first class. They are required to complete two periods of six weeks training before they are eligible for commission in the regular Marine Corps or in the Marine Corps Reserve.

Those members of the Platoon Leaders' Class not designated for a commission in the regular Marine Corps, who are found qualified on completing the prescribed course of training, are appointed second lieutenants in the Marine Corps Reserve, upon graduation from college.

Honor graduates of the Platoon Leaders' Class upon graduation from college are eligible for appointment as second lieutenants in the regular Marine Corps. The annual quota assigned to this group provides for the appointment to the regular service of a limited number of "honor graduates" only. The diplomas of those designated are accepted in lieu of the usual mental examination.

The following are additional requirements for commission in the regular Marine Corps from the Platoon Leaders' Class:

- (a) Must be over 20 years but less than 25 years of age when commissioned, about 1 July; single; citizens of the United States.
- (b) Must be recommended by the Director, Marine Corps Reserve.
- (c) Must qualify physically before a Board of Examiners of the Naval Medical Corps, travel expense to the point selected for the physical examination to be at the expense of the applicant. Final physical examinations are held in May.

(2) *Marine Corps Reserve Officers and Reserve Aviation Cadets.*

Officers of the Marine Corps Reserve, and aviation cadets who are Naval Aviators, are eligible to apply for commission in the regular service provided they have accepted their commissions or have been appointed aviation cadets prior to 1 February of the year they wish to take the examinations.

Graduates of recognized colleges and universities who have completed a course in military or naval science, or who have completed a course in aeronautical engineering, and desire training in aviation, may become aviation cadets in the Reserve, provided they meet all the requirements. Elimination flight training covering approximately thirty days and primary and advanced training at the Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida, cover approximately one year. Aviation cadets then serve three years



Private Telephone Systems by AUTOMATIC ELECTRIC

Produced by the originator of the automatic telephone. Automatic Electric private telephone systems have a background of over forty-five years of successful application and constant improvement. They are noted for their instant response, accurate operation and rugged, reliable construction.

These qualities have proved to be of particular value in the service of every branch of national defense, where equipment must function with unfailing regularity, even under the most adverse and difficult conditions. For complete information, address American Automatic Electric Sales Company, 1033 West Van Buren Street, Chicago, Illinois.



TELEPHONE, COMMUNICATION AND SIGNALING PRODUCTS

Officers of the Marine Corps provide your dependents with

NAVY MUTUAL AID PROTECTION

The cost of this protection is much less than the cost of insurance in commercial companies and our protection offers most of the insurance features, such as paid up insurance, extended insurance, loan privileges and cash surrender value. In addition, it offers invaluable service to your beneficiary.

ROOM 1038, NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Cullen, Inc. Mechanical Engineers

PLUMBING — HEATING
AIR CONDITIONING

Washington, D. C.

with regular Marine Corps aviation units, upon the expiration of which they are commissioned lieutenants in the Marine Corps Reserve.

The mental examination given candidates for commission in the regular service from these two groups is the same as specified for meritorious noncommissioned officers, the subjects of which are listed in paragraph II (c) of this circular. The examination is held annually in May in Washington, D. C.; it is competitive, and the quota of appointments is limited. Travel and living expenses during the period of examination are borne by the applicant.

The following are additional requirements for commission in the regular Marine Corps for Marine Corps Reserve officers and aviation cadets:

- (a) Must be over 20 but less than 25 years of age when commissioned, about 1 July; single; citizens of the United States.
- (b) Must be recommended by the Director of the Marine Corps Reserve, or by the Director of Aviation, as applicable.
- (c) Must qualify physically before a Board of Examiners of the Naval Medical Corps prior to commencing the mental examinations.

- (3) *Graduates in Current Classes of Selected Colleges having Army or Navy ROTC Training, Who Complete Four Year ROTC Courses in Honor Status.*

With the approval of the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, appointments open to candidates in this group are offered to graduates in current classes

of certain selected colleges throughout the United States maintaining Army or Navy ROTC units. When vacancies exist, the Major General Commandant communicates with the Presidents of the colleges from which applications are to be submitted several months prior to the date of graduation, inviting them to make nominations. Applications are not received direct from the aspirants. Blank forms and circulars of information are forwarded for distribution by the college Presidents to interested seniors. Diplomas of those nominated are accepted in lieu of the usual mental examination. Endorsements of the Professor of Military or Naval Science and Tactics and the President of the college are accepted as evidence of moral qualifications.

Following are the additional requirements:

- (a) Must be over 20 but less than 25 years of age when commissioned, about 1 July; single; citizens of the United States.

- (b) Must be graduates in current classes and must have completed 4 year ROTC course. From Army units certificate of completion of military course in "honor status," (defined in Army Reg. 145-10, Para. 79), is required. From Navy units certificate that the applicant is of representative and outstanding material for appointment to the Marine Corps is required.

- (c) Must qualify physically before a Board of Examiners of the Medical Corps, U. S. Navy. Travel expenses to the point selected for the final physical examination must be borne by the applicant.

—Ed.



LOANS:

Used Cars:

6%

DISCOUNT

FINANCING SERVICE

TO OFFICERS OF THE ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS, COAST GUARD

For Purchasing Automobiles—Making Loans and Buying
Listed Stocks or Bonds on the Partial Payment Plan

New Cars 4½% Discount

(Plus Required Insurance)

With No Restriction on the Movement
of Cars when Changing Stations

FEDERAL SERVICES FINANCE CORPORATION

Home Office

718 Jackson Place

Washington, D. C.

Branch Offices:

Long Beach, Cal.
Ocean Center Bldg.

Honolulu, T. H.
Dillingham Bldg.

San Diego, Cal.
Spreckels Bldg.

The Marine Corps Association

ORGANIZED APRIL 25, 1913, AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA

BOARD OF OFFICERS

MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS HOLCOMB, *President*
BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES T. BUTTRICK, *Vice-President*
COLONEL J. C. FEGAN, *Secretary-Treasurer*

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

COL. GEORGE VAN ORDEN, U.S.M.C., Retired	MAJ. E. F. C. COLLIER, U.S.M.C.
COL. W. P. UPSHUR, U.S.M.C.	MAJ. E. A. CRAIG, U.S.M.C.
COL. L. A. CLAPP, U.S.M.C.	MAJ. H. M. H. FLEMING, U.S.M.C.
LT.-COL. C. H. METCALF, U.S.M.C.	MAJ. H. M. KELLER, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
LT.-COL. A. A. WATERS, Marine Corps Reserve	CAPT. A. R. PEFFLEY, U.S.M.C.
MAJ. O. P. SMITH, U.S.M.C.	1ST LT. L. W. NICKERSON, Marine Corps Reserve
MAJ. D. J. KENDALL, U.S.M.C.	CHF. MARINE GUNNER W. L. ERDMAN, U.S.M.C.
CHF. PAY CLERK C. A. PHILIPS, U.S.M.C.	

OBJECT OF ASSOCIATION—"The Association is formed to disseminate knowledge of the military art and science among its members; to provide for the improvement of their professional attainments; to foster the spirit and preserve the traditions of the United States Marine Corps; and to increase the efficiency of its members."—Section 2, Article 1, of the Constitution.

CONDITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP—Active membership open to officers of the United States Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve and to former officers of honorable service with annual dues of \$3.00. Associate membership, with annual dues of \$3.00, open to officers of the Army, Navy and Organized Militia and to those in civil life who are interested in the aims of the Association. Honorary members shall be elected by unanimous vote of the Board of Officers.

Associate membership, with annual dues of \$3.00, including yearly subscription to THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, open to enlisted men of the Marine Corps of the first pay grade.

CONTRIBUTIONS—The GAZETTE desires articles on any subject of interest to the Marine Corps. Articles accepted will be paid for at the GAZETTE'S authorized rates. Non-members of the Association as well as members may submit articles. In accepting articles for publication, the GAZETTE reserves the right to revise or rearrange articles where necessary.

All communications for the Marine Corps Association and THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE should be addressed to the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington. Checks for payment of dues should be made payable to the Secretary-Treasurer.

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

COLONEL J. C. FEGAN, U.S.M.C., *Editor*

Published Quarterly By

THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION

Room 3317—Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C.

Printed at 32nd St. & Elm Ave., Baltimore, Md.

Authors are responsible for all statements contained in articles published in this magazine.

Chesterfields
satisfy millions



They'll give you
MORE PLEASURE

Copyright 1938, LIGGETT & MYERS TOBACCO CO.

XUM